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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an in depth study of the structures, actors, and policy communities
associated with U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran. Since 2006, the U.S. government has spent
more than $200 million for its Iran-related public diplomacy via State Department “democracy
promotion” programs, National Endowment for Democracy, and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors. These initiatives promoted regime change in Iran, ignoring a substantial majority of
Iran’s population opposed to U.S.-sponsored interventions. The study finds U.S. public
diplomacy as it relates to Iran fits with the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations.
The dissertation identifies 182 individuals who participated in the Iran policy debate
between January 2008 and January 2009. Based on the policy recommendations these members
of the Iran issue network propose, the study uncovers the existence of the following four policy
communities: Punitive Nonengagement, Hawkish Engagement, Strategic Engagement, and
Fundamental Change. While regime change is the ultimate objective of both the Punitive
Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities, only the latter believes that
negotiation is a useful tactic in gaining compliance from Iran. Both, however, view Iran as a
major threat to U.S. and Israeli interests and see no role for Iran in solving regional challenges.
The Strategic Engagement policy community does not share this abysmal appraisal of
Iran; rather, its members see meaningful cooperation between the United States and Iran on key
regional issues as viable if their relationship is based on mutual respect. The Fundamental
Change policy community finds the underlying assumptions of U.S. Iran policy vitally flawed
and believes that all policy options short of an overhaul of U.S. international behavior lack
ethical and legal legitimacy. Both the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy
communities argue America should cease its pursuit of regime change in Iran and abide by its
obligations under the Algiers Accord.
xii

Public diplomacy recommendations proposed by the Punitive Nonengagement and the
Hawkish Engagement communities correlate with policies adopted by the Bush administration,
with those of the former doing so more readily. The Obama administration is expected to adopt
policies resembling the recommendations of the Hawkish Engagement policy community.

xiii

1. INTRODUCTION
In the Cold War climate of the 1950s, the United States initiated an active propaganda
policy in the Middle East to incorporate the region into a global anti-Soviet alliance.1 In this,
Iran was a major target of U.S. propaganda due to its strategic location near the Soviet border
and its vast petroleum resources. 2 The CIA-directed propaganda campaign to dismantle the
nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953 is a stark example of such activities.
According to Donald Wilber, the principal planner of the 1953 coup d’état, the CIA orchestrated
“a massive propaganda campaign against Mosaddeq and his government but with Mosaddeq
himself as the principal target.” 3 In the words of Algar, “the return of the Shah inaugurated the
intense period of a quarter of a century of unprecedented massacre and repression, and the
intense exploitation of the resources of the Iranian people.” 4
In the years after the 1979 Islamic revolution, the United States has continued to employ
propaganda, again as means of regime change. These propaganda efforts, which the U.S.
government calls public diplomacy, have been reinvigorated in the context of the post-9/11
United States global propaganda activities to win the hearts and minds of the people in the
Muslim world. Moreover, ever since the Bush Administration placed Iran in the axis of evil and
in the aftermath of the pre-emptive war in Iraq, there has been the looming possibility of a
military strike against Iran. Thus, in this juncture of time, it is important to closely attend to
issues about U.S.-Iran relations. 5 Despite the importance of U.S. public diplomacy efforts

1

Joyce Battle, "U.S. Propaganda in the Middle East: The Early Cold War Version (Electronic Briefing Book No.
78)," National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/essay.htm.
2
Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2005).
3
Donald Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953 (Washington, DC: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1954), Appendix B, 15.
4
Hamid Algar, The Roots of the Islamic Revolution (London: Open Press, 1983).
5
Appendix A gives a brief chronology of U.S.-Iran relations.
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toward Iran, no study to date has focused on the subject. 6 As a first step to fill this gap, this
dissertation attempts to provide an in depth study of post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy policy
toward Iran and the policy communities associated with it.
To achieve a more comprehensive analysis of U.S. public diplomacy policy toward Iran,
it is necessary to go beyond a mere narration of U.S. policy and to include an examination of the
“issue network” 7 that participates in the Iran policy debate. Coupling the analysis of the
American public diplomacy policy toward Iran with the study of the Iran issue network, the
present study provides a unique understanding of the policy options available to U.S. policy
makers. An issue network denotes “a specific type of public-private linkage, involving a great
many actors” 8 who are interested in a particular policy debate and who actively participate in
“the communication of criticism of policy and generate ideas for new policy initiatives.” 9 These
actors include, but are not limited to, independent public policy institutes (i.e., think tanks),
academic research centers, government research units, government officials, public relations
consultants, and lobbyists. 10 More generally, issue networks are referred to as policy networks

6

There have been a number of scholarly works that have generally focused on the U.S. propaganda and public
diplomacy efforts in the Arab world: James R. Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the
Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Melani McAlister, Epic
Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2001), Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), Douglas
Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2002), William A. Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The Soft Power of U.S. Public
Diplomacy in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). I will review the literature on
American public diplomacy in the Middle East after this introduction.
7
Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in The New American Political System, ed.
Samuel Hutchison Beer and Anthony Stephen King (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1979).
8
Andrew S. McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America," British Journal of Political Science
17, no. 2 (1987): 146.
9
Ibid.
10
Thomas A. Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public Policy
Making (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
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linking “heterogeneous communities of policy actors into intricate webs of common benefitseeking actions.” 11
Sabatier asserts that the analytical value of a network approach to policy research “lies in
the fact that it conceptualizes policy making as a process involving a diversity of actors who are
mutually interdependent.” 12 He further explains that such an approach allows the researcher to
go beyond “a formal description of policy making” 13 and takes into account the role of state and
societal actors. Thus, a network approach synthesizes state-centric and society-centered
approaches to policy making. In addition to evaluating the influence of a variety of actors, a
network approach takes into account the interdependent relationship among policy actors. On
the same note, Wasserman and Faust assert that “the fundamental difference between a social
network explanation and a non-network explanation of a process is the inclusion of concepts and
information on relationships among units in a study.” 14
Raab and Kenis note that in the late 1980s policy researchers began to give importance to
the role of networks in the policy making process. 15 This research agenda was marked by a
theoretical and empirical focus on “how networks between public, private, and non-profit actors
shape processes of policy making and governance.” 16 Policy network analysis grew more in

11

David Knoke et al., Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.
12
Paul A. Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 146.
13
Ibid.
14
Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6.
15
Jorg Raab and Patrick Kenis, "Taking Stock of Policy Networks: Do they Matter," in Handbook of Public Policy
Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald Miller, and Mara S. Sidney (Boca Raton, FL:
CRC/Taylor & Francis, 2007).
16
Ibid., 187-88.
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popularity since the beginning of the 1990s “due to the growing insight that public policies
emerged from the interaction of public and private actors.” 17
Policy researchers and political scientists have used different terminology for concepts
similar to issue networks that denote how government interacts with other state and non-state
actors in policy making. For example, Ripley and Franklin use the term “iron triangle” and
propose that policy making is a product of the interaction among Congressional subcommittees,
relevant agency in charge, and the benefit interest group. 18 Similarly, Freeman and Steven
introduce the concept of subgovernment and maintain that policy develops through the
interaction of “clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine decisions in a
given substantive area of policy.” 19 These include Congressional members and their staff, a few
bureaucrats, and representatives of interest groups. Heclo rejects these narrow
conceptualizations of policy making process and maintains that by “looking for the few who are
powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise
of power.” 20
The two concepts of epistemic communities 21 and policy communities 22 are also used in
the policy research literature. Epistemic communities are knowledge-based networks of policy
actors. 23 Of all the variants of policy networks, policy communities are the most closed and
elitist in nature. Marsh and Rhodes propose that policy networks can vary along a continuum
17

A. Windhoff-Heritier, "Policy Network Analysis," in Comparative Politics: New Directions in Theory and
Method, ed. Hans Keman (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), 143.
18
Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy (Homewood, IL: Dorsey
Press, 1980).
19
J. Leiper Freeman and Judith Parris Stevens, "A Theoretical and Conceptual Re-Examination of Subsystem
Politics," Public Policy and Administration 2, no. 1 (1987): 16.
20
Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," 102.
21
Peter M. Hass, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46,
no. 1 (1992).
22
Jeremy John Richardson and A. G. Jordan, Governing under Pressure: The Policy Process in a PostParliamentary Democracy (Oxford, UK: Robertson, 1979).
23
Hass, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination."
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between issue networks and policy communities. 24 Rhodes distinguishes between the two
concepts as follows:
A policy community has the following characteristics: a limited number of participants
with some groups consciously excluded; frequent and high-quality interaction between all
members of the community on all matters related to the policy issues; consistency in
values, membership, and policy outcomes which persist over time; consensus, with the
ideology, values, and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; and exchange
relationships based on all members of the policy community controlling some resources.
There is a balance of power, not necessarily one in which all members equally benefit but
one in which all members see themselves as in a positive-sum game. The structures of
the participating groups are hierarchical so leaders can guarantee compliant members. 25
Issue networks, according to Rhodes, stand in contrast to the cohesive and closed policy
communities:
Issue networks are characterized by many participants; fluctuating interaction and access
for the various members; the absence of consensus and the presence of conflict;
interaction based on consultation rather than negotiation and bargaining; an unequal
power relationship in which many participants may have few resources, little access, and
no alternative. 26
As this study concentrates on the composition of the Iran issue network based on policy
recommendations, Rhodes’ consensus criterion seems most appropriate for delimitating policy
communities. In other words, those in the Iran issue network who share “ideology, values, and
broad policy preferences” are considered to be a policy community. Here, my conceptualization
of the influence of the issue network on government policies does not necessarily involve a
direct causal relationship between the two. Instead, I concur with those scholars that understand
the influence of the issue network in terms of “their ability to set the terms of debate, define

24

David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1992).
25
R. A. W. Rhodes, "Policy Network Analysis," in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. Michael Moran,
Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 428.
26
Ibid.
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problems and shape policy perception.” 27 Abelson believes that studying the dynamics of an
issue network in addition to the actual policies of the government renders it possible to better
identify key organizations and individuals who are influential in the policy formation process.28
While such studies “may not enable scholars to make definitive conclusions about which
participants in a policy community were the most influential,” they “can offer useful insights into
whose views generated the most support.” 29 This approach gives a deeper understanding of the
nature of policy making and allows the researcher to compare the recommendations of policy
community members to the actual policies the government implements.
In line with such an approach, I advance the following six research questions to examine
U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran and the issue network that is actively involved in this debate.
RQ1: Which individuals and organizations participate in the Iran policy debate
and are thus part of the Iran issue network?
RQ2: What policy recommendations do the members of the Iran issue network
propose?
RQ3: Which of these policy recommendations come under the category of public
diplomacy policies?
RQ4: Based on Iran policy recommendations and the relationships among
network members, what policy communities can be identified within the Iran
issue network?

27

Diane Stone, "Public Policy Analysis and Think Tanks," in Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics,
and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald Miller, and Mara S. Sidney (Boca Raton, FL: CRC/Taylor & Francis, 2007),
156.
28
Donald E. Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes (Montréal: McGillQueen's University Press, 2002).
29
Ibid., 54.
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RQ5: What are the policies that the various offices within the U.S. government
have formulated with regard to its public diplomacy towards Iran, and which of
these have been implemented? What role do non-state actors play in advancing
these policies?
RQ 6: Which policy communities from the Iran issue network correlate with the
various components of the U.S. government in their policy preferences?
Despite more than six years of intensive public diplomacy, poll after poll suggests that
the favorability of the United States and its policies is in decline internationally. The Pew
Research Center for People and the Press reported in 2006 that discontent with American
unilateralism was widespread in European and Muslim nations, and that the war in Iraq had
undermined America’s credibility abroad. 30 Other scholars have also documented the prevalence
of negative views of Americans among the youth in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries,
including some traditional U.S. allies such as South Korea and Mexico. 31 In her study, DeFleur
demonstrates how “consistently negative portrayals of Americans in [U.S. produced]
entertainment products viewed abroad” cultivate anti-American attitudes. 32
A September 2004 Department of Defense report on U.S. strategic communication in the
Middle East made what many felt were startling observations with regard to the effectiveness of
U.S. public diplomacy. The report asserted that “the overwhelming majority” of Arabs and
Muslims are in “soft opposition” to the U.S. government’s foreign policies. 33 American public

30

Richard Wike, "America's Image Slips," Pew Research Center., http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf.
Margaret H. DeFleur, "U.S. Media Teach Negative and Flawed Beliefs about Americans to Youths in Twelve
Countries: Implications for Future Foreign Affairs," in From Pigeons to News Portals: Foreign Reporting and the
Challenge of New Technology, ed. David D. Perlmutter and John Maxwell Hamilton (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 2007), 108.
32
Ibid.
33
Technology Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, and Logistics, Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense, 2004), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.
31

7

diplomacy is “in crisis,” asserted the report, “and it must be transformed with a strength of
purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and
homeland security.” 34
Scholars take two distinct approaches when criticizing the effectiveness and legitimacy of
U.S. public diplomacy activities. A group of public diplomacy critics view the phenomenon as
an image-building activity and propose that tactical, skills-based, or administrative changes will
improve the effectiveness of the endeavor. 35 The proposed changes under this rubric of
scholarship include systematic assessment of the effectiveness of public diplomacy campaigns 36
and increases in the budget for foreign public opinion polling. 37
There is another group of scholars who challenge the dominant framework that continues
to drive current public diplomacy initiatives and insist that short of major structural changes
public diplomacy lacks ethical legitimacy and will prove ineffective in achieving substantive
international support for U.S. foreign policies. 38 According to these scholars, “current public

34

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), 2.
35
Foad Izadi, "Is Measuring U.S. Public Diplomacy Effectiveness Possible? Revisiting the Debate after 9/11" (paper
presented at the annual convention of Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication,
Washington, DC, August 2007).
36
Edward P. Djerejian, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in
the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim
World, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf. ExpectMore, "Program Assessment, Public
Diplomacy," U.S. Office of Management and Budget.,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10004600.2006.html.
37
Peter G. Peterson et al., Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy - Report
of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf.
38
Rhonda Zaharna, The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the
Arab World (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2003), http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol8/02diplomacy.pdf. —
——, The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2005),
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol10/v10n01pubdip.pdf. Nancy Snow, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems, and
Promise," in Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion, New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria
O'Donnell (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006). Mohan J. Dutta-Bergman, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle
East: A Critical Cultural Approach," Journal of Communication Inquiry 30, no. 2 (2006), Inderjeet Parmar,
"Responding to Anti-Americanism: The Politics of Public Diplomacy," in Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, and
Themes, ed. Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths (Westport, CT: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007). Nancy
Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds., Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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diplomacy efforts being implemented in the Middle East embody the one-way flow of
communication of early development campaigns” with the emphasis “on massaging the minds of
the public, on building an image, and shifting public opinion about the United States.” 39
Scholars use different terminology for a public diplomacy approach that incorporates such
structural changes. Among these are new public diplomacy, 40 dialogue-based public
diplomacy, 41 culture-centered public diplomacy, 42 network-oriented public diplomacy, 43 and
multistakeholder diplomacy. 44 This alternative approach “builds on a vision for peaceful
coexistence of nations and seeks to minimize global security threats in the world through the
process of mutual dialogue.” 45
In line with the latter group of scholars, the present dissertation takes a critical approach
to evaluating U.S. public diplomacy activities targeting Iran. Thus, the study’s seventh research
question asks:
RQ7: Do the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran fit with the twoway symmetrical model, which is in line with the new public diplomacy
paradigm?

39

Dutta-Bergman, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural Approach," 116.
Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft
Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). Kathy R. Fitzpatrick,
"Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective," The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2, no. 3
(2007).
41
Shaun Riordan, "Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm," in The New Public
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
42
Dutta-Bergman, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural Approach."
43
Zaharna, The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab
World. ———, The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy.
44
Brian Hocking, "Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Foundations, Forms, Functions and Frustrations" (paper presented
at the International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy, Malta, February 2005). Jovan Kurbalija and
Valentin Katrandjiev, eds., Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities (Malta: DiploFoundation,
2006).
45
Dutta-Bergman, "U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural Approach," 118.
40
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I address this question by examining the direction and purpose of the current U.S. public
diplomacy efforts toward Iran. Based on the body of scholarship on the subject, I also advance
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran do not
employ the two-way symmetrical model.
In qualitative research “research questions state what you want to learn. Research hypotheses, in
contrast, are a statement of your tentative answers to these questions, what you think is going on;
these answers are normally implications of your theory or experience.” 46 Furthermore, “many
qualitative researchers explicitly state their ideas about what is going on as part of the process of
theorizing and data analysis.” 47 As will be discussed shortly, previous research generally finds
that the U.S. public diplomacy efforts have comprised one-way asymmetrical communications.

Chapter Outline
After this introduction, the second chapter gives a review of the literature on the topics of
propaganda, public diplomacy, and history of U.S. public diplomacy. The third chapter presents
the theoretical frameworks for evaluating U.S. public diplomacy and consists of the theories of
new public diplomacy and two-way symmetrical public relations. The fourth chapter is a
discussion of the methodology the study employs. Chapter five addresses the study’s first four
research questions about the composition of the Iran issue network, their policy
recommendations about Iran in general and public diplomacy in particular, and the policy
communities that emerge based on these policy recommendations. Chapter six tackles the
study’s fifth and sixth research questions about U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran and the policy
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communities that correlate with the U.S. government in their policy preferences. The concluding
chapter addresses the dissertation’s final research question about the presence of a two-way
symmetrical model in U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran based on a synthesis of the information
presented in the previous chapters.
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Propaganda
It is first necessary to define propaganda and public diplomacy and place the terms in
their historical context. Propaganda is not a new phenomenon. “Image cultivation, propaganda,
and activities that we would now label as public diplomacy are nearly as old as diplomacy
itself.” 48 Since World War I, the U.S. government has systematically used public diplomacy at
times of national crisis. 49 Although the term propaganda has negative connotations in popular
belief, it is a communication process closely related to persuasion that does not necessarily have
to have a negative manipulative purpose. 50 The most literal meaning of propaganda is to
“disseminate” or “promote” certain perspectives and ideas. The objective of the endeavor is to
reinforce, replace, or modify the attitudes and behaviors of an audience. 51
The First World War marked the birth of “professional image cultivation.” 52 Taylor
contends that, in Western countries, propaganda acquired pejorative meaning “largely as a result
of the excesses of the First World War (1914-1918).” 53 Before 1914, propaganda meant “the
propagation of ideas or of information on which ideas could be formed.” 54 The term originated
from the name of an institution in the Roman Catholic Church established by Pope Gregory XV
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in 1622. To counter the effects of the Protestant reformation, the Pope established the Sacra
Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda, or more commonly known as the Sacra
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). The objective
of this congregation was to bring men and women to a voluntary, not forced, acceptance of the
Roman Catholic Church’s doctrines.55
The excesses of World War I propaganda campaigns led to the view that human beings
are greatly vulnerable to manipulation by propaganda messages. As the events of World War I
were assessed, many scholars and public intellectuals described concerns about the public being
misled by unethical communication practices. Lippmann’s writings are prime examples of this
view of propaganda and public opinion. Lippmann in Public Opinion argued that mass
communication gives governments the opportunity for mass persuasion. 56 In this seminal work,
Lippmann showed how government officials use symbols that appeal to popular stereotypes to
create pseudo-environments and to manufacture consent.
Early propaganda analysts focused on studying how and with what motive institutions,
media, and officials used messages to shape public opinion. Driven by their belief that mass
communication has a powerful potential to distribute messages that would alter audience
attitudes and behaviors, these critics wanted to educate the public about propaganda and to help
people detect deceptive claims and faulty reasoning.
Lasswell, who is often called the father of propaganda studies in the United States, was
the first to systematically analyze propaganda. 57 He described propaganda as “the management
of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols … or, so to speak, more
concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures, and other forms of social
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communication.” 58 His analysis of the propaganda techniques used during World War I led to a
classification of the components and objectives of propaganda messages. He identified the
following four primary purposes for propaganda, each of which had its own rhetorical features:
1) the identification of a foreign country as the enemy, 2) the promotion of domestic support for
the war effort, 3) the creation of an evil image of the enemy (Satanism), and 4) the
demoralization of the enemy.
Propaganda identifies the enemy by emphasizing the need for mobilization against the
enemy in a time of crisis, blaming the enemy for putting the target society in the role of
aggressor, exposing a record of lawlessness, violence, and malice, and suggesting that the war
was vindication for those transgressions. To achieve domestic support, propagandists appeal to a
common history, use a religious vocabulary, vilify the enemy as an obstacle to peace and
security, appeal to collective egotism, describe the war as one of beliefs, emphasize profitability,
and appeal to interest groups.
Lasswell found that dichotomization of good and evil was a prime feature of the Satanism
metaphor. 59 The propagandist claims that the enemy is the embodiment of evil while the home
country is the embodiment of good. The propagandist attempts to demoralize the enemy by
asserting that the war is unethical and by challenging the confidence of enemy forces in the
enemy government. What Lasswell called the propaganda of diversion also concentrates on
enemy losses.
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, established in 1937 with the aim to study all forms
of foreign and domestic propaganda, gave the following typology of propaganda techniques: (a)
the use of name calling to condemn a person or group, (b) the use of glittering generalities to
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bring about the acceptance of an idea or action, (c) the use of transfers or symbols to achieve
compliance to ideas or actions that are compared to something favorable, (d) the use of
testimonials, (e) the use of plain folks techniques or the promotion of an idea or action because
of its widespread acceptance by average people, (f) the use of card stacking or the selective use
of the best or worst arguments to advance or refute a position, and (g) the use of the bandwagon
technique. 60
Based on their study of propaganda messages, Hummel and Huntress gave a nine-part
typology of deceptive rhetorical techniques that propagandists use to manipulate emotions. 61
Propagandists use satirical humor and shocking images or stories to denigrate the enemy and to
incite dislike for the enemy. They selectively use facts or half truths. They use ad hominem
arguments to attack a cause based on unpleasant characteristics of individuals advocating that
cause. Ad populum arguments praise the audience for some admirable trait (e.g., patriotism),
without defining or explaining what the trait was or why they embodied it. The bandwagon
device is used to bring about conformity to normative beliefs and ideas. Snob appeal and home
folks are two similar strategies that use testimonials from prominent people or lay people to
“prove” support for an idea or behavior. Begging the question is another strategy that involves
discussing an idea or issue as though it were decided when it was not. The last strategy involves
the use of affective language to incite emotion in propagandistic messages in the form of name
calling and glittering generalities.
Overall, Hummel and Huntress believed that the analysis of propaganda should include
an analysis of the event, an explanation of the aims of the message, a distinction between the
facts propagandists used and the judgments they made, an examination of the logical fallacies
60
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inherent in propagandistic rhetorical devices, and an examination of the audience response to
propaganda messages. 62
Earlier, Doob too had articulated a need for evaluating the outcome of propaganda. 63
Doob found that appeals to nationalism and the use of connotatively laden symbols were key
components of propaganda. Using psychology theories, Doob aimed to show how these
techniques function. He believed that propaganda does not have direct effects on people’s
attitudes and behaviors. Instead, he suggested, propaganda’s effect is moderated by individuals’
existing attitudes. An important part of Doob’s idea is that propaganda messages activate
relevant existing attitudes, which are culturally biased. Thus, repeated propaganda messages do
not necessarily mean that people will change their attitudes and behavior. For example when an
audience receives a testimony from a prestigious source, their attitudes associated with the
message and the source are activated. Doob also emphasized the power of normative pressure for
changing attitudes because attitudes are based on social norms. Doob concluded that mass
dissemination of propaganda could result in the perception that the message is socially accepted.
In sum, Doob hypothesized that propaganda is a process of activating attitudes related to a
stimulus through continued media coverage and consumption.
Lowenthal and Guterman contended that propagandists use emotional appeals, such as
the listing of grievances and inciting distrust of the enemy, to bring about agitation and social
change. 64 Schramm analyzed propaganda in Britain and Germany during World War II by
looking at the development of organizations intended to propagandize the people of each country
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in favor of the war. 65 He found cultural differences in the two countries’ approach to
propaganda. For example, the cultural contempt for government propaganda in England
prompted the government to use the media covertly. The basic tactic of the British government,
he concluded, was to maintain the appearance of objectivity in the propaganda. Schramm
suggested that the use of opinion leaders is an effective means of propaganda.
Lee advocated an indirect-effect approach to propaganda effects and rejected the largeeffects perspective of earlier critical researchers. 66 He distinguished between formal and
informal and direct and indirect channels of communication, each of which had a different usage
and affected individuals differently. Lee asserted that news is a valid vehicle for propaganda
because it gives the appearance of an event as significant. Lee further explained that the silencing
of opposing opinions assists in making the propagandists’ stance more accessible in the public’s
mind.
Lee gave the following typology of propaganda tactics. The “hot potato” technique is
used to blame, embarrass, and demand an answer from individuals or groups for something
beyond their control. Stalling is used to diminish enemy vigor, interest, or support before an
attack. Least-of-evils tactic is used to make an unattractive option appear to be the only solution,
or the least distasteful solution. Scapegoating is used to put the blame for a problem on
individuals or groups that are typically subject to bias or dislike. Shift-of-scene and change-ofpage are two similar tactics both of which involve the shifting attention from an aspect of an
attack, a competition, or conflict when the results have been unsatisfactory. Big tent is the
process of attacking a group by stereotyping and demonizing them as a whole. 67
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Berlson and De Grazia studied propaganda by quantifying the total allotment of broadcast
time and accounting for whether the coverage was compulsory or voluntary. 68 They also used
content analysis to analyze the consistency of mass disseminated messages.
Ellul discounted the viability of content analysis, experimental research, and the use of
public opinion polls for studying the qualitative aspects of propaganda and its long-term
effects. 69 He favored the use of historical and critical research, proposing a sociological view of
propaganda that encompasses all the persuasive elements of culture. He defined propaganda as
“a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through
psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization.” 70 Ellul also provided a
typology of propaganda consisting of political vs. sociological propaganda and agitation vs.
integration propaganda. Unlike political propaganda, which advocates particular policies or
issues, sociological propaganda aims to instill a particular life style or ideology over the long
term. According to Ellul, propaganda, as a campaign, must be total such that it employs all
available means including the mass media, arts, personal contacts, educational methods, and
diplomacy. As Mowlana says, starting with the first Gulf War, total propaganda has become “a
prerequisite for the conduct of modern international warfare.” 71 As a result, “mobilization of
world public opinion and manipulation of public support have shifted from the national level and
those directly involved with the conflict to the global level.” 72
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According to Ellul, agitative propaganda attempts to rouse and excite an audience to
action and thus deliberately seeks change. 73 On the other hand, integrative propaganda attempts
to make the audience passive and unchallenging. Each type of propaganda is useful for achieving
specific political goals. During a war, for example, a state may use agitative propaganda to rouse
the people to anger and thus rally them for war against the enemy. At the same time, integrative
propaganda may be used to make the audience receptive to the state’s policies and reduce the
likelihood of opposition.
Modern propaganda, according to Mowlana, is more often sociological in nature,
compared to the blatantly propagandistic approach of informational activities during the First
World War. 74 In the interim years between the First and Second World Wars, “governments
enlisted the cooperation of communication and political scientists” to develop “analytical
frameworks” for future applications of propaganda. 75 This “structural and sociological strategy,”
which, Mowlana maintains, has become more pronounced in recent decades and continues to the
present, “is multidimensional – political, economic, and cultural.” 76 Mowlana’s
conceptualization of sociological propaganda is similar to that of Ellul. He states,
The aim of propaganda is no longer to change adherence to a certain doctrine. It does not
normally address the individual’s intelligence, for intellectual persuasion is long and
uncertain, and the transition to action more so. Rather, it tries to make the individual
cling irrationally to a process of action because action makes propaganda’s effect
irreversible. 77
In defining propaganda, some scholars focus on its deliberate nature and its goal of
advancing the interests of the propagandist. Jowett and O’Donnell define propaganda as “the
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deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” 78 Similarly, Nelson
defines propaganda as “a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the
emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political
or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may
or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.” 79
As such, propaganda only considers the intent and interest of the source of the message;
that is the propagandist. In other words, it is a manipulative technique to make the audience
think, believe, and act in such a way that benefits the propagandist. It is an attempt to reproduce
the ideology, or the perspective, of the propagandist in the target audience. Welch also maintains
that modern propaganda is “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience
through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to
serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.” 80
Jowett and O’Donnell contend that it is important to analyze propaganda as a
communication process that takes into consideration such elements as source, receiver, channel,
and message. 81 They emphasize that in most government-directed propaganda campaigns the
mass media are subject to manipulation. Radio, television, and film have been repeatedly used to
further a specific intent and to bring about the desired response. Consequently, control of the
media has been crucial in times of crisis and war. With limited information available to the
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public, people become more likely to accept propaganda messages as the truth. As such,
propaganda is different from the free and open exchange of ideas.
Propaganda can take three forms with respect to its source and information flow: white,
black, and gray. 82 White propaganda comes from an identifiable source and the information in
the message tends to be accurate. Black propaganda, on the other hand, is attributed to a false
source and is often deceptive. Since the success of this kind of propaganda depends on the
audience’s acceptance of the source, the attributed source has to have high credibility. The higher
perceived credibility of the source increases the likely success of the propaganda. In gray
propaganda, the source is not necessarily identified and the accuracy of the information is
uncertain.
Nelson and Izadi suggest that while propaganda does not necessarily have to be deceptive
and untruthful, propaganda does not have a commitment to truth. 83 Thus, when necessary, a
propagandist uses lies as in black propaganda. At other times, he or she disguises the source of
the message, as in gray propaganda. At other times, the propagandist gives only a selective
version of truth, as in white propaganda. Therefore, propaganda’s preoccupation is with
efficiency and not truthfulness. 84 Cunningham refers to the same concept as an
“instrumentalized” approach to truth. 85 With such a utilitarian ethical approach, credibility
rather than truth gains significance when judging the efficacy of public diplomatic discourse. 86
As a result, public diplomacy initiatives that rely on selective truths to propagate policies do not
fulfill the ethical standard of truthfulness. Similarly, Seib proposes that, in public diplomacy
82
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messages, “the framing of truth through various mechanisms of emphasis must be done [in such
a way as] to avoid distortion.” 87
According to Black, a main feature of propagandistic messages that hinders an openminded approach to truth is their “finalistic, or fixed view of people, institutions, and situations
divided into broad, all inclusive categories of in-groups (friends) and outgroups (enemies),
beliefs and disbeliefs, and situations to be accepted or rejected in toto.” 88 Similarly, Switzer,
McNamara, and Ryan contend that binary language and the tendency to define the world in terms
of opposites provide the sociocultural foundation of ideology. 89
Scholars including Said, 90 Sardar, 91 Karim, 92 Macfie, 93 and Little 94 consider Orientalism
as the dominant ideology that underlies Western attitudes toward the “Middle East.” Orientalism
is a highly influential, if evidently problematic, Western discourse, wherein the Orient is
characterized as the “Other,” effectively a world with a culture of dehumanized inferiority. Said
argues that Orientalist discourse is intimately connected with the political and economic interests
of Western powers in dominating the Middle East. Orientalism is a pervasive (although not
universal) discourse that diminishes the cultural values of the Orient and can serve to justify their
economic and political subordination. 95
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An important characteristic of Orientalist discourse is its reliance on binary language. 96
According to Said, Orientalism, as a style of thought, is a dichotomous Western worldview based
on “an ontological and epistemological distinction,” 97 manifested in a socially constructed
“Other,” between the so-called Orient and the West. Sardar says that such a dichotomy is “the
life force of Western self-identification.” 98 In addition to using a dichotomous language,
Orientalism uses an essentialist discourse, universalizing certain traits and characteristics of the
Islamic World. 99 Said is critical of the numerous writers, novelists, journalists, philosophers,
political theorists, historians, economists, and imperial administrators, who have accepted this
dichotomized Oriental/Occidental distinction as the foundation for their work concerning the
Orient. For him, the defining characteristic of their work is an exoticism, an anti-modern
characterization, and a judgment of societal inferiority.
In defining Orientalism, Said indicates that it underlies the foreign policy mindset that
informs Western relations with the Middle East. In this sense public diplomacy is judged to be
inextricably informed with Orientalist assumptions. This style of thought in turn serves to
legitimize Western domination over the region. Orientalism, in essence, concerns power
relations. This idea is based on Foucault’s notion that knowledge produces and reinvigorates
power. 100 With Orientalism, the West minimizes competing worldviews. For example, notions
such as development, reform, and representative democracy are all defined according to
peculiarly Western values, which are assumed to be universalizable.
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McAlister traces the nature of Western representations of the Middle East from 1945 to
2000 and finds that stereotypical depictions were consistently present among elites. 101 Massmediated Orientalist representations in film and other venues transferred the same perspective to
the public. In his study of The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle
East, 1945-1957, Vaughan shows how the United States and British propagandists viewed their
relations with the Arab world in Orientalist terms. 102 This view was most stark in the case of
Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These presuppositions and prejudices would
appear to influence the elite U.S. media and policymakers even today. For Said, the reason is
simple, “The Middle East experts who advise [U.S.] policymakers are imbued with Orientalism,
almost to a person.” 103 These findings, nonetheless, should not deny the diversity of viewpoints
presented during policy debates in Washington.
Adib-Moghaddam, 104 concurring with Said, 105 finds the Orientalist portrayal of Iran after
the 1979 Islamic revolution a case in point. “Suddenly, for many in the ‘West’ and in Iran itself,
the country was more Semitic than Aryan, more Iran than Persia, more Oriental than IndoEuropean, more black than white, more Third World than emerging economy, more Eastern than
Western.” 106 Journalistic and expert misrepresentations of Iran have fueled the Orientalist
prejudices of the country after the revolution. McAlister contends that the threat of “Islam” and
“terrorism” has supplied the cultural logic of U.S. foreign policy since the events of the Iranian
revolution of 1979. 107 Although Iran is not an Arab country, according to McAlister, “Anti-
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Iranian sentiment in the United States drew heavily on the stereotyped representations of the
Arab Middle East that had become so prevalent in the 1970s, particularly the image of ‘Arab
terrorism.’” 108 Likewise, in their study of three elite U.S. newspapers’ editorial coverage of
Iran’s nuclear program, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria show how journalistic misrepresentation of Iran
is rooted in Orientalist constructions of Islam as a threat indicative of cultural
untrustworthiness. 109
Adib-Moghaddam criticizes the “ideological, unscholarly, and polemical” 110 approach to
what he calls “Iranian pop studies” 111 in the West and proposes the need for critical Iranian
studies. He believes that the scarcity of a critical approach to Iranian studies is not due to a lack
of demand:
Rather it is because many think-tank pundits, journalists, political activists, writers, and
others who are not ‘regulated’ by academic standards have cashed in on the Iran business,
giving their consumers the self-assurance that they have understood Iran, that they know
the history, diverse peoples, powerful revolutions, indeed the collective reality of its 70
million inhabitants – without at the same time intimating to the reader that a great deal in
their analysis is based on one-dimensional empirical material, aestheticized narration or
anecdotal journalistic description. 112

Public Diplomacy
As will be discussed shortly, public diplomacy shares many features with propaganda.
The most neutral definition of public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating
with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals,
its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” 113 The U.S. Advisory
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Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress in 1948, stated that
the core goal of public diplomacy is “to advocate policies.” 114 The Commission defined public
diplomacy as the process of “informing, engaging and influencing foreign publics so that they
may, in turn, encourage their governments to support key U.S. policies.” 115 Occasionally, as in
the case of Cuba (and Iran), public diplomacy aims to bring about regime change in hostile
countries. 116
Christopher Ross, a Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and a
Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Algeria, views public diplomacy as similar to diplomatic
efforts, only involving different parties. While traditional diplomacy involves “exchanges”
between the representatives of two governments, public diplomacy involves the promotion of a
country’s national interests through engaging with non-governmental parties in other countries.
Ross believes that public diplomacy is not as “manipulative” as propaganda. 117 He also claims
that public diplomacy is about telling the truth while propaganda involves some degree of
disseminating lies.
While arguing that the negative connotations of propaganda are not universal across time
and geographical space, Joe Duffey, USIA’s director before that organization was integrated into
the State Department in 1999, also stresses that public diplomacy involves the engagement of
foreign citizens. He suggests that the most important aspect of public diplomacy is its “attempt to
get over the heads or around the diplomats and official spokesmen of countries and sometimes
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around the press to speak directly to the public in other countries and to provide an interpretation
and explanation of U.S. values and policies.” 118
This definition of public diplomacy resembles Kernell’s theory of “going public.” 119 The
presidential practice of going public, as defined by Kernell, is “a strategy whereby a president
promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for
support.” 120 Within such a framework, public diplomacy represents instances of America’s
going public at a global scale. The U.S. administration attempts to bypass the governments of
other countries and appeal directly to international audiences for support.
Some propose that Edmund Gullion, the director of the Edward R. Murrow Center for
Public Diplomacy at Tuft University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, coined the term
public diplomacy in 1965. 121 Cull, however, notes Gullion’s denial of this, while acknowledging
that Gullion popularized the term through promoting its practice and study. 122 According to
Cull, the term public diplomacy itself is in some ways propaganda. 123 By using more neutral
phrasing, Cull explains, the U.S. government wanted to avoid the pejoratives associated with
propaganda to describe the activities of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its
sponsored international broadcasting. Similarly, Fitzhugh Green, a USIA veteran, agrees that
public diplomacy is “a euphemism for the word modern Americans abhor – propaganda.” 124
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Thomas Dine, a former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, defines propaganda as
“information with a purpose” and thus views public diplomacy as propagandistic in nature. 125
Nye sees public diplomacy as the expression of “soft power” – a persuasive power based
on its attractive appeal designed to realize public acquiescence. 126 This conceptualization is
similar to Ellul’s concept of integration propaganda, which also has the goal of achieving public
acquiescence. 127 America’s soft power is “its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S.
policies and the values that underlie them.” 128 Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of
“ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants.”129 For
great powers to control the political environment, it is now increasingly necessary to broaden
their sources of power beyond military resources to soft power, what Mowlana refers to as
“intangible” sources of power. 130
American exceptionalism is very much the essence of describing public diplomacy in
terms of soft power and has been a main justification for America’s aggressive and active public
diplomacy, including its use of the mass media. 131 American exceptionalism indicates that the
United States’ moral superiority, its unique democratic and revolutionary origins, its political
system, social organization, cultural and religious heritage, as well as its values serve to
legitimize its policies.132 America, as the city on the hill, is thus positioned on the moral high
ground with respect to other countries and powers around the world and therefore has a duty to
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spread American style thought, democratic ideals and values, and political systems to the rest of
the world.
Fitzpatrick maintains that conceptualizing public diplomacy as soft power has ethical
shortcomings. 133 American cultural policies (as public diplomacy tools) emanate from
hegemonic assumptions that for many critics amount to cultural imperialism. 134 The use of mass
media as means of cultural transfer can be analyzed as an element of United States’ support and
promotion of modernization projects as tools for containing the encroachment of communism or
anti-U.S. Islamism in Third World countries. Modernization theory attributes developmental
failures of societies to internal factors such as traditional social values and organizations (which
in itself is an Orientalist viewpoint). In contrast, dependency theory explains underdevelopment
by referring to unequal relations between developed and underdeveloped societies.
In the years after World War II, the question of development in the Third World became
a major issue in economics as many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America declared
national independence. Rostow formulated five stages of economic growth starting with the
traditional society and ending with a mass consumption society. 135 Rostow’s thesis rested on the
idea of a uniform mode of development, one that imitated the historical developmental patterns
of Western industrialized nations. Similar approaches to development appeared in other social
sciences including communications. Elasmar asserts that American social scientists articulated a
sense of modernization whereby world economic inequities would be ameliorated if developing
countries changed their traditional way of life and acquired the more developed nations’

133

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, "The Ethics of “Soft Power:” Examining the Moral Dimensions of U.S. Public Diplomacy"
(paper presented at the annual convention of International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, March 2006), 1.
134
Tanner Mirrlees, "American Soft Power, or, American Cultural Imperialism," in The New Imperialists:
Ideologies of Empire, ed. Colin Peter Mooers (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2006).
135
Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).

29

technologies and values. 136 According to Elasmar, the U.S. government funded and supported
this thesis as the basis for development strategies.
American mass media scholars such as Daniel Lerner 137 and Wilbur Schramm 138 viewed
the mass media as ideal channels for promoting Western-oriented modernization to Third World
countries. Lerner and Schramm both viewed the mass media as useful tools for modernization
because, they argued, media provide people with the information they need for development,
give them the motivation to change, and teach them techniques necessary for successful change.
Based on this perspective, the flow of entertainment products such as film, music, and television
encouraged an internalization of the superiority of the Western style of modernization over the
socialist and communist forms. These entertainment-oriented media were designed to show the
prosperous life that modernization promised.
The failed reality of such a model of development made other social scientists reconsider
modernization theory. These scholars replaced the optimistic theory of modernization with
dependency theory. This “contra-discourse,” as Boyd-Barrett calls it, aims to show how Western
powers use their monopoly of Third World markets, partly achieved through the free flow of
information, to further their interests at the expense of the interests of Third World countries. 139
American intellectuals frustrated with the war in Vietnam and the domestic turmoil in the 1960s
joined the forces of anti-capitalism. This new thinking among a number of scholars criticized the
U.S. federal government for playing a controlling and one-sided role in the development of
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weaker economies of the world. 140 Scholars promoting cultural dependency theory (also called
cultural imperialism) see media imperialism as the new mode of domination for reinforcing the
dependency of Third World countries and inevitably (if unintentionally) hindering their
development. 141
Mowlana proposes a model of international media dependency, in which the degree of a
country’s dependency or autonomy is measured according to the two dimensions of technology
and communication. The technology axis involves technological hardware versus software, and
the communication axis involves production versus distribution. The less developed countries of
the Third World are often dependent on Western countries – and mainly the United States – for
the production of cultural products. According to Mowlana, breaking this pattern of dependency
is almost impossible due to Third World countries’ technological reliance on Western countries
with regard to production hardware (e.g., studios, printing plants, etc.) and software (e.g., actual
content, performance rights, management, etc.) as well as distribution hardware (e.g.,
transmitters, satellites, etc.) and software (e.g., publicity, marketing, etc.). 142 Consequently,
media dependency is not restricted to cultural content; rather, it involves conditions of multiple
dependencies in the flow of information from center countries to those in the periphery, 143 to use
Galtung’s terminology 144
Critics of modernization theory and the free flow of information use two ways to support
their thesis. A group of critics apply pre-World War II historical trends to show the similarities
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between the approaches of the colonial powers and the efforts of the United States. In both cases,
critics argue, efforts have revolved around the idea of transforming the cultures of developing
countries to make them resemble the cultures of the more powerful country. These dissenters
allege that the United States is conspiring to create a friendly cultural climate for the promotion
of its economic interests. Using historical evidence, these theorists frame modernization in terms
similar to the colonialism of pre-World War II era. Critics also question the objectives of
American social scientists who promoted the idea of modernization. The fact that these social
scientists were ardently collecting data about the effects of modernization endeavors is perceived
as evidence of collusion with the United States government. 145
A review of the multi-faceted ways in which imperialism has historically changed the
cultural environment of the Third World shows the workings of cultural imperialism more
clearly. Sreberny-Mohammadi gives a synopsis of historical cultural contacts that had important
implications for relations of power with regard to the following elements: map-making and
nation-building, the missionary exportation of religion, education, administration, language,
tourism and travel, dress code, and many other aspects of life such as patterns of child rearing
and family life, etc. 146 Sreberny-Mohammadi attempts to show that cultural imperialism was
long at work before the advent of media technologies. Arguably, the significance of media
technologies to cultural imperialism, especially television, however, lies in their unparalleled
acceleration of culture transfer. Mass media facilitates cultural domination to work from afar.
The historical styles of cultural transfer were means for legitimating colonial acquisition
of new territory. Most colonial powers asserted that they had the right to exercise dominion over
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people to spread a social gospel that would uplift them from their barbaric modes of life. This is
in essence an early form of modernization theory. As Maier notes, “empires have justified their
supra-ethnic domination by invoking allegedly universal values or cultural supremacy, and have
diffused these public goods by cultural diplomacy and exchanges.” 147
Lindenfeld suggests that, historically, when indigenous people began “to associate
missionary work with foreign imperialism,” they tended to show resistance to cultural change. 148
He also found that when people did not actively resist missionary work, they “mixed and merged
the new and the old in their lives” in extremely varied ways. 149 He distinguishes between
inculturation and acculturation as two modes of responding to cultural imperialism.
Inculturation involves the selective acceptance of a narrow range of foreign cultural elements
while holding to one’s native cultural heritage. Acculturation, on the other hand, denotes the
adoption of the foreign lifestyle and culture while keeping some of one’s indigenous cultural
practices.
While colonial powers used suppression and coercion to wipe out or subjugate native
cultures, the new imperial era of late nineteenth century was marked by less brutal means of
cultural transfer. Technological advances and formal education attracted many native people to
European style of life and thinking. 150 Consequently, one could argue that starting with this
period cultural imperialism expanded the means for realizing hegemony in its addition of
persuasion to more obvious forms of coercion. Native elites could be educated to function
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according to the undeniably seductive models of Western behavior while being detached from
their own cultural contexts.
Another group of cultural imperialism scholars focus on the empirical evidence that
shows the one-sided and monopolistic character of information flow from the United States to
developing countries. Nordenstreng and Varis’ 1974 UNESCO report is a seminal work that
shows how American cultural products have permeated not only Third World markets but also
the cultural landscape of European countries. 151
According to Mulcahy, the flood of American cultural products in Canada has also
caused significant concern. 152 In his study of Canadian contentions with U.S. cultural
imperialism, Mulcahy argues that “the omnipresence of American entertainment products has
prompted a near-crisis mentality among some Canadians about the survivability of a national
way of life that is not an American derivative.” 153 American entertainment industries have
significant influence in Canadian markets for movies (80-90 percent of those screened), music
(70 percent due to a 30 percent quota for domestic music), books (70 percent), and magazines
(80 percent). 154 In addition, American broadcasters have a near total monopoly of primetime
English language television drama. American domination of Canadian cultural experience
explains why Canada has exempted cultural industries from the provisions of its free trade
agreements with the United States. 155
Yet, the near monopolistic and one-way flow of cultural products from the United States
to the rest of the world has not been successful in creating a positive image of the United States
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globally. This may be partly due to the mainly entertainment orientation of these products. As
DeFleur found in her study, “the negative portrayals of Americans in [U.S. produced]
entertainment products viewed abroad” cultivate anti-American attitudes among youth in both
Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 156 Also, as was noted earlier, world publics display
opposition to U.S. foreign policies, 157 which may in fact be contrary to the values that the United
States espouses. More importantly, information dominance does not remove the likelihood of
resistance from the audience. This is especially the case in today’s communication environment
in which new communication technologies have opened unparalleled opportunities for the
dissemination of diverse voices.
Parmar and Ferguson believe that soft power is inherently complementary to hard
power. 158 Parmar in particular asserts that the issue of U.S. post-9/11 public diplomacy must be
seen in the context of the “imperial and expansionist character of American world power.” 159
Such a view entails a Gramscian perspective of hegemonic power, according to which soft power
facilitates the realization of U.S. imperial activities and attempts to promote United States’ total
world domination. 160 Accordingly, public diplomacy as practiced by the United States’ foreign
policy elite is seen as the persuasive apparatus of the state facilitating the realization of American
transnational interests. 161
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Maier too argues that soft power “cannot really function as power unless it accompanies
hard power.” 162 He continues:
It [i.e., soft power] thrives under the hothouse of the military supremacy catalogued by
the enthusiasts of military might, and without the aircraft carriers, transport planes, laser
technology, the influence garnered over the years by Jackson Pollock, Van Cliburn,
Bruce Springsteen, McKenzie, and McDonalds, or even American scientific laboratories,
would appear merely beneficial. This would be reason enough to support and treasure it,
but not endow it with an autonomous force in assuring hegemony or empire. 163
According to Gramsci, the ruling groups in democratic societies gain dominance through
a double process of coercion and persuasion. 164 In Hall’s words, drawing on Gramsci’s
terminology:
“Hegemony” exists when a ruling class (or rather, an alliance of ruling class fractions, a
“historical bloc”) is able not only to coerce a subordinate class to conform to its interests,
but exerts a “total social authority” over those classes and the social formation as a
whole. “Hegemony” is in operation when the dominant class fractions not only dominate
but direct – lead: when they not only possess the power to coerce but actively organize so
as to command and win the consent of the subordinated classes to their continuing
sway. 165
In its most powerful realization, hegemony does not coerce the people to accept grudgingly the
center’s superiority, but to have its values accepted readily as superior to those of the indigenous
system.
The coercive apparatus of the state includes legislation, the military, the police and the
prison system. The persuasive forces of the civil society include such social foundations as the
family, the church, the educational system, and the media. The agents of civil society ensure that
the masses of the population “spontaneously” consent to the general direction imposed upon
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social life by the ruling group. 166 The persuasive forces of civil society sustain a hegemonic
order by perpetuating a dominant ideology that furthers the interests of the ruling groups. Here,
ideology is defined as “the ways in which the meaning conveyed by symbolic forms serves to
establish and sustain relations of power.” 167 Each society’s dominant ideology operates as its
criterion for common sense and rational understanding. The dominant ideology also tends to
reject the beliefs and values that undermine the colonized society’s worldview. 168 In this
conceptualization of power, private organizations of the ruling class (e.g., foundations and think
tanks) wield a significant amount of power in the processes of policy formation and
implementation. 169
The three major American foundations Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, for example,
play an instrumental role in promoting Americanism and fighting anti-Americanism by actively
constructing international networks of philanthropies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
universities, think tanks, international financial institutions, and governments. 170 According to
Parmar, “their efforts to combat the opponents of globalization and of U.S. foreign policy must
be seen in light of their attempts to build an ‘Americanized’ global civil society in which their
American-style politics, their neoliberal economics, and their free world ideology
predominate.” 171
A Gramscian view of power renders it necessary to examine influential actors from both
inside and outside government that participate in the policy-making process and the
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implementation phase of policies. 172 Parmar believes think tanks such as institutes of foreign
affairs play an important role in defining the value system of hegemonic projects and in actively
aiding the state in mobilizing public opinion in support of such projects. 173 In his study of
Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations, Parmar finds that, in the years prior to
1945, these think tanks played an instrumental role in redefining the Anglo-American role in
world politics and promoted the transnational hegemonic projects of Anglo-American
cooperation, globalism, and internationalism. 174
According to Parmar, “large-scale anti-Americanism may be, to U.S. foreign policy elite
– White House, National Security Council, Pentagon, the State Department, and assorted foreign
affairs think tanks and policy advisory groups – a price that, up to now, is considered reasonably
low and worth paying.” 175 Anti-Americanism is seen not as an American problem but as a
foreign problem that has not resulted in any serious opposition to U.S. foreign policies at the
state and elite levels. 176 Parmar notes that only a few neo-conservative think tanks, including the
Working Group on Anti-Americanism of the American Enterprise Institute and the Princeton
Project on National Security, have openly entertained this idea. Parmar concludes that public
diplomacy “is designed to mollify public opinion, Congress, media critics, and the political
opposition, rather than represent a serious attempt to solve the problem, which would require
modification or abandonment of U.S. policies.” 177
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Chambers and Goidel contend that a general lack of concern for public opinion in foreign
policy matters is a feature of the current U.S. administration. 178 The Bush presidency uses
“public opinion to legitimize foreign policy decisions already taken, and toward that end will
seek to lead and shape it if required.” 179 As an example, the Bush administration tried to solicit
public support for the Iraq war when the decision to invade Iraq had already been taken. Also,
“the decisions to abrogate the ABM Treaty and to remove the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol on
global warming seem to have been made with little heed to public opinion.” 180 Given the broad
consensus in the literature that American diplomatic initiatives are meant to serve its interests as
a superpower, what are the prospects for a successful public diplomacy based on a symmetrical
dialogue?

History of Public Diplomacy
U.S. Public Diplomacy from World War I to 9-11
Public diplomacy has been a tool of foreign policy in the United States since World War I
when President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information, headed by
George Creel. The goal of this organization, otherwise known as the Creel Committee, was to
popularize America’s war aims throughout the world. 181 More fundamentally, as the title of
Creel’s book (How We Advertised America; The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the
Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of
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the Globe) shows, the agency aimed to spread Americanism throughout the world. 182 President
Roosevelt established the Office of War Information at the outset of the Second World War and
launched Voice of America in February 1942. Later, the U.S. government established Radio
Liberation and Radio Free Europe. These radio networks targeted the citizens of Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe as well as the people of more friendly countries in Western Europe and
elsewhere. Today, the U.S. government sponsors the following stations as well: Radio Farda (for
Iran), Radio/TV Marti (for Cuba), Radio Free Asia, and Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa (both in
Arabic). These stations are all under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and
financed through congressional appropriations.183
While international broadcasting is used to directly influence the general public abroad,
cultural and educational programs are used to affect “the elite audiences believed to have
influence on public opinion.” 184 Educational and exchange programs have been an important
element of American public diplomacy since 1946 and are now administered by the State
Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Programs include the Fulbright
Exchange Program, the International Visitors Program, Citizen Exchange Programs, EnglishLanguage Programs, and Cultural Programs. 185
In his study of American cultural diplomacy and its exchange programs between 1938
and 1978, Mulcahy documents how American cultural diplomacy originated with the political
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aim of countering Nazi and communist cultural activities. 186 As Mulcahy notes, “The basis for
exchanges is the assumption that those who participate will come away with a better sense of
American society and institutions.” 187 He stresses on the sensitive nature of cultural exchanges
and believes that such activities “must not seek to manipulate public opinion nor to pander to the
most recent policy ‘line.’” 188 Mulcahy is critical of the continuing practice of subordinating
genuine mutual understanding to “short-term political considerations.” 189 He suggests that
cultural exchange programs must focus more on mutuality and less on “telling America’s story to
the world:”
An emphasis on the mutuality involved in a cultural exchange would also counter
characterizations of such programs as “cultural imperialism.” The goal is not the
Americanization of other nations but the internationalization of communications about
education and culture. This is a process in which the United States has as much to learn
as it has to teach. 190
By influencing a society’s elites and opinion leaders, U.S. public diplomacy capitalizes
on the two-step flow theory of media effects in addition to the direct effects it may have on the
general public through international broadcasting. According to Lazarfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet, opinion leaders usually mediate between the mass media and the less active sections of
the population. 191 While scholars are increasingly arguing for maximal mass media effects, 192
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they also contend that interpersonally obtained information on political issues is also an
important factor in the formation of political attitudes. 193
United States’ public diplomacy approach during World War I, World War II (with the
founding of Voice of America/VOA), and the Cold War proved to be one largely of crisis
management. 194 After World War II, many in Congress, especially Senator J. William Fulbright
(D-AR), questioned the need for an international broadcasting organization in peacetime. To
engage in propaganda, they thought, was to contradict America’s democratic principles. 195 It
was the increase in Cold War tensions and the belief that the United States was losing the war of
ideas to the Soviet Union’s more sophisticated propaganda apparatus that convinced Congress of
the necessity and legitimacy of the VOA. 196
The controversial United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also
known as the Smith-Mundt Act, legalized propaganda but forbid its use for domestic purposes. 197
The State Department was to carry information and educational exchange programs with the aim
of promoting a better understanding of the United States among foreign publics and increasing
mutual understanding between Americans and people of other countries.
In 1950, President Truman launched the Campaign of Truth to combat Communist
propaganda. In 1953, Eisenhower supervised the creation of the United States Information
Agency (USIA). While the CIA was given responsibility to carry out covert propaganda, the
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USIA was to mange public communication programs such as international broadcasting and the
programs of U.S. information posts in foreign countries. 198 The USIA, nevertheless, did at times
engage in covert public diplomacy activities as well. 199
The USIA mission was altered several times as a result of changing administrations.
Generally speaking, the one central goal that spawned all administrations was the use of public
diplomacy for promoting the acceptance of American foreign policy. U.S. information programs
were to convince the people of the world that the objectives and the actions of the United States
were in harmony with the aspirations of foreign publics.
To fulfill these objectives, the USIA established a press and publication service and a
motion picture and television service. The USIA was given the responsibility for operating the
Voice of America and for U.S. libraries and information centers abroad. 200
The USIA promoted two broad dichotomized themes: anti-communism and positive
themes about the United States. The emphasis was on creating a distinction between us and
them. To show the evil nature of communism, the USIA concentrated on communism’s
ideological contradictions, forced labor camps, absence of freedom, and lack of consumer goods
in the Soviet Union and its communist surrogates. On the positive theme of American ideology
and the virtues of capitalism, the USIA publicized U.S. economic and technical assistance
programs, scientific and technological advances, and the virtues of free trade unions.
The emergence of the Cold War also institutionalized cultural transfer as an important
element of U.S. foreign policy. After 1945, a group of U.S. diplomats and scholars insisted that
in the fight against communism the United States needed to take an aggressive approach to
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winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics. A prime feature of American public diplomacy
was cultural propaganda, to sell the American way of life, celebrate democratic values and
practices, and advocate consumer capitalism. 201 The emergence of transnational cultural
industries and media enterprises in the post World War II period set in motion a perpetual oneway flow of cultural products to the Third World. These initiatives capitalized on what Nye calls
soft power. 202 As mentioned, soft power refers to a country’s ability to attract on the basis of the
appeal of its cultural, social, and political values and ideas. 203 In this, the VOA was one of the
prime weapons of influence. U.S. public diplomacy programs were in essence publicizing the
idea of the American dream vs. the bleak world of Soviet communism. Hollywood movies,
music, and other mass-produced cultural goods were other means to do so. The U.S. government
has proactively supported the export of Hollywood films “with trade negotiations and removing
barriers to trade.” 204 As Wasko notes, in protecting its global and domestic business, the film
industry “receives considerable support and assistance from the U.S. government.” 205
U.S. public diplomacy did not solely depend on its VOA broadcasting as the only means
to reach the mainstream public of target countries with ideological messages. The USIA also
pursued “media control projects.” These projects were designed to influence the indigenous news
media by planting news, placing programs on local television channels, and using personal
contacts to influence the perspective of foreign journalists. Personal contacts were also used to
influence influential opinion leaders. In this way, the USIA engaged in covert or black
propaganda by obscuring the source of its messages. In addition to relying on the corroboration
201
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of foreign journalists, the USIA utilized the help of private cooperation. Private cooperation
involved the use of American nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and ordinary citizens
in the publicity campaign to cultivate a positive image for the United States. 206
Other than the USIA’s mostly overt public diplomacy programs, CIA’s clandestine
psychological warfare operations were important to United States’ Cold War public diplomacy
strategy. The United States made an attempt to directly target the USSR public and the people of
its surrogate countries through CIA-operated Radio Free Europe (launched in 1950) and Radio
Liberation (launched in 1953 and renamed Radio Liberty in 1964). Their goal was to provide
counterpropaganda to anti-U.S. messages in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A number of
foundations were purported as the source of these broadcasting stations to disguise the fact that
the actually CIA ran them. 207
Besides its radio programming, the CIA sponsored numerous covert public diplomacy
initiatives, including subsidizing non-communist labor unions, journalists, political parties,
politicians, and student groups. In Western Europe, the agency helped produce dozens of
magazines, organized many international conferences, sponsored the publication of numerous
books, etc. These activities were done under the guise of the CIA-sponsored Congress for
Cultural Freedom. 208 The CIA also carried out a number of covert operations to manipulate
political developments in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, and Iraq. 209 In Iran, in
particular, the CIA sponsored a successful coup against the democratically elected government
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of Mohammad Mosaddeq. CIA-sponsored black propaganda was central to the success of the
coup. 210
According to Snow, a distinct historical pattern has emerged in which the U.S.
government repeatedly views public diplomacy as appeals made during a national crisis or
wartime that are dismantled at conflict’s end. 211 Congress abolished Woodrow Wilson’s Creel
Committee within months of the completion of World War I. Truman’s Office of War
Information was shut down after World War II, just as the USIA was dissolved following the
Cold War. Both the legislative and the executive branches of the U.S. government considered
public diplomacy a low priority after the Cold War. The Clinton Administration cut funds for
public diplomacy and reduced cultural exchange programs. In 1999, Congress abolished the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) and transferred its public diplomacy functions to the Department of
State. It was the advent of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that once again brought public diplomacy to
the forefront of America’s foreign policy. 212

United States’ Post-9/11 Public Diplomacy
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many inside and outside the U.S.
government asked for the revival of the public diplomacy efforts. 213 U.S. government officials,
members of Congress, foreign policy experts and academicians rediscovered public diplomacy
through many studies, journal articles and op-ed pieces. Snow believes that, today, public

210

Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2004).
211
Snow, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Its History, Problems, and Promise."
212
Peter van Ham, "War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the United States' War on Terrorism," Security
Dialogue 34, no. 4 (2003).
213
James Critchlow, "Public Diplomacy During the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications," Journal of Cold
War Studies 5, no. 1 (2003). Djerejian, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public
Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. Peterson et al., Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating
U.S. Public Diplomacy - Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

46

diplomacy is more significant than ever partly because of the changes in global communications
that have given rise to a global audience. 214
Zaharna notes that after 9/11, “in the rush to get America’s message out, officials relied
on the same approach, tools, and mindset in fighting terrorism that had earlier been used to fight
communism.” 215 In October 2, 2001, Colin Powell appointed Charlotte Beers, former
chairperson of the advertising agency J. Walter Thompson and head of global public relations
powerhouse Ogilvy and Mathers, as the new Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. Defending
his choice of an advertising guru for selling America’s image abroad, Powell said, “She got me
to buy Uncle Ben’s rice. So there is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to
sell something.” 216
During her tenure, Beers directed two public diplomacy campaigns: a 15-page booklet
entitled The Network of Terrorism and an international advertising campaign entitled “Shared
Values,” which included six television commercials or “mini-documentaries,” as the State
Department called them. The booklet showed photos of the victims of September 11 terrorist
attacks and presented negative comments about Osamah Bin Ladin and his propaganda messages
that attacked the United States. The booklet also featured a map of Al Qaeda’s global terrorist
network, showing 45 countries in which it has operated. The Network of Terrorism was printed
in 36 languages and was widely circulated to send a message to the world that terrorism is a
serious global threat and requires an international campaign to end it. 217
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In 2002, Beers unveiled America’s first advertising campaign entitled “Shared Values.”
The mini-documentaries, which ran from November to December 2002, aired at several regional
television stations and aimed to convince the Muslim world that the War on Terrorism was not a
war on Islam. The Council of American Muslims for Understanding endorsed the campaign.
Beers had earlier established the council in May 2002 as a non-governmental organization for
“creating positive dialogue between the U.S. and the Islamic countries. Malik Hassan, its
chairman, defined it as ‘government-funded, not government founded.’” 218 The concealment of
the actual source of the commercials (i.e., the U.S. government) makes them examples of gray
propaganda in which the message is attributed to a supposedly independent source to increase its
credibility.
The videos depicted Muslims living happily in the United States while proclaiming the
shared values of tolerance, religious freedom, community service, and education. Heider’s
balance theory explains why the campaign emphasized shared values. 219 Balance theory
highlights the persuasiveness of messages that are based on the similarity between the source and
the target audience. According to this theory, people are motivated to have consistent attitudes
toward other people and attitudinal objects in general. “People tend to like others who exhibit
signs of similarity because it is reinforcing to their own self-concept and helps them to predict
and understand similar others.” 220 The theory also predicts that people would exhibit positive
attitudes toward a stimulus that is similar to a liked other and dissimilar to a disliked other. 221 In
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an analysis of the propagandistic properties of the Shared Values initiative, Plaisance concludes
that the Shared Values campaign had serious ethical shortcomings. 222 He bases his criticism on
the campaign’s selective utilization of truth and its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to
serve broader policy objectives.
Although the Shared Values commercials received substantial negative media attention,
Fullerton and Kendrick contend that the advertisements may have been effective. 223 Using an
experimental design, Kendrick and Fullerton assessed the attitudinal reactions of various
international students at Regents College in London, England. Measuring participants’ pre-test
and post-test attitudes toward the U.S. government and the American people and their
perceptions of how Muslims are treated in America, the authors suggest, “the SVI commercials
were most effective against their intended target audience – Muslims and women.” 224
Pintak, however, questions the validity of Fullerton and Kendrick’s findings, given that
the commercials did not target international audiences but, instead, people living in Islamic
countries. 225 Also, Christie, Clark, and Zwarun’s experimental study shows very low source
credibility among the target audience, which may have significantly undermined the
persuasiveness of the messages. 226 According to Christie et al., for five out of six credibility
scale items, Muslims found the commercials significantly less credible than non-Muslims did.
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On the bias item, both Muslims and non-Muslims found the commercials not credible, and they
viewed the commercials as forms of government propaganda.
Only four countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Kuwait – were willing to
broadcast the advertisements on their state-run television channels. Several countries in the
Middle East, including Egypt and Jordan, refused to air the programs. In an interview on PBS
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on January 21, 2003, Beers explained these countries’ reluctance to
air the ads: “It’s probably based on the point that they consider it propaganda.” 227 The State
Department abandoned its $15 million campaign just a few months before U.S. invaded Iraq. On
February 27, 2003, Under Secretary Beers appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. She described the gap between America’s self-image and Muslims’ view of America
as “frighteningly wide.” The next week, Beers resigned her post for health reasons.
“America’s public diplomacy initiative had clearly backfired.” 228 It seems plausible to
conclude that the propagandistic approach of the Shared Values campaign and its emphasis on
image building were counterproductive. The subsequent Under Secretaries of State for Public
Diplomacy (Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes, and James Glassman) pursued policies that
proved as ineffective in changing the hearts and minds of the people in the Middle East. Despite
more than seven years of intensive public diplomacy, poll after poll suggests that international
publics especially those in the Middle East hold persistently negative views of the United States
and its policies. 229
In addition to the Shared Values Initiative and The Network of Terrorism, the public
diplomacy response included Radio Sawa, a pop music and news station targeting Arab youth,
227
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Radio Sawa (March 2002); an Arabic youth magazine, Hi (July 2003); and an Arabic language
television satellite network, Alhurra (February 2004). 230
In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission, a non-partisan body created by Congress in 2002,
evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of these public diplomacy initiatives as part of its
investigation of the different aspects of the government’s response to the terrorist attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Center. On the subject of public diplomacy, the 9/11 Commission
recommended that United States should “identify what it stands for and communicate that
message clearly.” 231 The Commission suggested increased funding for the Broadcasting Board
of Governors. 232 It addition, the Commission recommended that the United States should
rebuild its scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people
overseas. 233 The Commission stated that extremist religious schools in the Muslim world teach
hatred to young people and recommended support for secular education in Muslim countries. 234
In December 2005, the Commission issued another report assessing the Congress and
federal government’s response to the recommendations it made the previous year. The
Commission assigned letter grades to actions taken and not taken to implement the 41
recommendations in its 2004 report. Grades for public diplomacy recommendations were as
follows: Public diplomacy efforts received a grade of C for defining the U.S. message and a
grade of B for international broadcasting. Scholarship, exchange, and library programs and
efforts supporting secular education in Muslim countries received grades of D. 235
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This dissertation examines the conceptual framework that is promoted as the basis of a
“new public diplomacy,” with particular reference to U.S.-Iranian relations. Clearly, this dictates
examining two questions: what is meant by a new public diplomacy, and what would
characterize two-way symmetrical dialogue.
For public diplomacy to move beyond propaganda, Snow is among those who assert it
has to incorporate two-way communication. 236 Melissen too has such a vision for the new public
diplomacy practice. 237 He states, “public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to
persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from [propaganda] in the sense
that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.” 238 However, he suggests that the
U.S. government’s approaches to public diplomacy have not yet fostered genuine dialogue. One
way public diplomacy can encourage dialogue is by adopting two-way symmetrical public
relations rather than concentrating on image management. 239 Public relations scholars stress the
importance of nurturing long-term relationships with stakeholders through two-way
communication strategies with a symmetrical perspective as a viable framework for ethical
public diplomacy. 240 Fitzpatrick “questions the moral appropriateness and acceptability, as well
as the practical implications, of public diplomacy philosophies and practices motivated and
directed by the self-interested desire to gain power over those to whom public diplomacy efforts
are directed.” 241 She states that two-way symmetrical public diplomacy maximizes the
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realization of the sponsoring nation’s self-interest while respecting the rights of its global
stakeholders. In addition, Kohut believes that the effectiveness of U.S. communication efforts
rests on major policy initiatives that take into account the interests of global publics. 242

The New Public Diplomacy Debate
In the last few years, policy experts and public diplomacy scholars have carefully
scrutinized U.S. public diplomacy efforts to find out whether improved structures and methods
could help the United States to develop a more successful public diplomacy strategy. Some
experts believe that the United States government can improve its public diplomacy operations to
help win the war on terrorism. 243 Others call public diplomacy “the holy grail of American
foreign policy” and insist that “other countries are not going to buy what the United States is
selling.” 244 According to these critics, “It’s not the packaging that others dislike. It’s the
product.” 245 Such a view is suggestive of the limits of America’s soft power. Other scholars
assert that “short of major policy initiatives, there appear to be limits on how much U.S.
communication efforts in the region can achieve.” 246 Critics having this view suggest the need
for congruency between action and image.
In addition to these criticisms, scholars call for a transformation in how public diplomacy
is practiced. Zaharna, for example, suggests that the problem with the current U.S. public
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diplomacy structure is its emphasis on information dissemination and the control of
communication environment. 247 She proposes that “network is the new model of persuasion in
the international arena and will define America’s effectiveness as a new paradigm of public
diplomacy.” 248 Similarly, other scholars assert that developments in the field have brought about
a “new” public diplomacy, which is fundamentally different from propaganda. 249
Gilboa indicates that new public diplomacy is not a mere state activity, but rather an
interdependent activity of state and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations,
private educational institutions, labor unions, and political parties. 250 In addition, it is a form of
soft power that utilizes two-way communication techniques, strategic public diplomacy,
information management, nation-branding and online image management. According to Gilboa,
new public diplomacy is “a communication system designed to create a dialogue with both foes
and allies.” 251
An additional component of the new public diplomacy is “the blurring of traditional
distinctions between international and domestic information activities.”252 According to
Melissen, due to the revolutionary changes in the communication technology and the forces of
globalization, it is increasingly challenging to separate communication aimed at homeland
audiences and public diplomacy messages aimed at foreign publics.253 Thus, with the line
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delineating public affairs from public diplomacy fading, new public diplomacy has become more
challenging.
At times, the government intentionally cultivates the blowback of its international public
diplomacy messages. One instance of such an operation in action, according to the New York
Times is the Bush administration’s “multimillion-dollar covert campaign to plant paid
propaganda in the Iraqi news media and pay friendly Iraqi journalists monthly stipends.” 254 In
this, the U.S. military employed the services of the Washington-based Lincoln Group public
relations firm, to whom it submitted pentagon-drafted articles for translation into Arabic and
placement in Iraqi press or with Iraqi advertising agencies without mentioning their authorship.
“Western press and frequently those self-styled ‘objective’ observers of Iraq are often critics of
how we, the people of Iraq, are proceeding down the path in determining what is best for our
nation,” one such article opened, according to the New York Times. 255 What appears to be the
voice of an independent Iraqi columnist then reverberates to the domestic media to soften
opposition to the war effort.
Melissen identifies the most important distinction between traditional and new public
diplomacy to be the direction of communication. 256 While, traditionally, diplomacy, in general,
and public diplomacy, in particular, was seen in a “hierarchical state-centric model” of
international relations, new public diplomacy operates in a “network environment” in which the
public is actively participating in the give and take of messages. 257 This is an indication for the
need of an instrumental public diplomacy role for non-state actors such as NGOs.
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According to Hocking, in a hierarchical model, “the foreign ministry and the national
diplomatic system over which it presides act as gatekeepers, monitoring interactions between
domestic and international policy environments.” 258 Hocking maintains that the United States
has approached post-September-11 public diplomacy with this “top-down” mentality. This is
evident in the prescriptions given for improved public diplomacy: allocation of more resources
and better coordination. Similarly, Snow suggests that the U.S. government has traditionally
approached public diplomacy as a “two-track process,” employing a one-way track of
information dissemination while arguing that the effort is mutually beneficial in outcome. 259 The
network model of public diplomacy requires a movement beyond the one-way dissemination of
information to foreign publics toward a more dialogic engagement with the target populations.

Two-Way Symmetrical Public Diplomacy
For more than 25 years, public relations scholars have continued to debate the importance
of two-way communication and balance of interests for building strong relationships between an
organization and its publics. In this process they have developed symmetrical models for
successful public relations. Furthermore, as Signitzer and Coombs observe in their comparative
study of public diplomacy and public relations, the objectives of both are conceptually similar. 260
Therefore, it appears useful for scholars of new public diplomacy to examine relevant public
relations literature.
Like public diplomacy, public relations has been undergoing a fundamental redefinition
in the past few decades as public relations scholars are stressing the importance of nurturing
long-term relationships with stakeholders through two-way communication strategies with a
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symmetrical perspective. Many of the elements of new public diplomacy are, in this sense,
congruent with elements of “excellent” public relations.261
Ledingham makes the case that relationship management should act as the general theory
of public relations. 262 J. Grunig, L. Grunig, and Ehling believe that the establishment of quality
relationships is the basis for excellence in the field, which could be done through reconciling the
organization’s goals with the expectations of its strategic stakeholders. 263 As Melissen notes, “A
lesson that public diplomacy can take on board from the sometimes misunderstood field of PR is
that the strength of firm relationships largely determines the receipt and success of individual
messages and overall attitudes.” 264
To theoretically conceptualize public relations practices, Grunig and Hunt gave a fourmodel typology of public relations practices: press agentry/publicity, public information, twoway asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical. 265 These models were conceptualized based on the
two main variables of direction and purpose of communication. The direction variable consists
of one-way and two-way communication. In models with a one-way direction of
communication, public relations is about disseminating information. In two-way models, public
relations is about exchanging information. As Yun puts it, “one-way means disseminating
information, whereas two-way means an exchange of information.” 266 The purpose variable is
whether communication effects result in a balance of interest (i.e., have symmetry or
asymmetry). In Yun’s words, “symmetry refers to communication effects on both sides and,
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thus, collaboration or cooperation, whereas asymmetry means one-sided effects and, thus,
advocacy.” 267 The two underlying variables of direction and purpose determine the
communication goal of public relations: control versus adaptation. Also, they determine the
communication role public relations serves: advocacy and dissemination versus mediation.
Furthermore, the two variables show whether and how organizations use research.
The press agentry model is descriptive of public relations programs “aimed solely at
attaining favorable publicity for an organization in the mass media, often in a misleading
way.” 268 The goal of public relations in the public information model is to disseminate accurate
but only favorable information aimed at changing the behavior of the public. The two-way
asymmetrical model is aimed at persuasion and is typical of organizations that use social science
research for developing messages that appeal to their stakeholders’ attitudes. All the
asymmetrical models are aimed at changing the behavior of the publics but not those of the
organization. The two-way symmetrical model is based on research and attempts to manage
conflict through negotiation with strategic publics. 269
Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, was a leading advocate of the use of
psychology and other social sciences in the public relations industry. 270 In his 1928 book
Propaganda, Bernays promoted an asymmetrical approach to public relations that is founded on
social scientific theories: “If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, is it
not possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing
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about it?” 271 What Bernays called the “engineering of consent” stands in stark contrast to the
ethically sound two-way symmetrical approach. 272
In 1985, James E. Grunig headed a six-member team to study the characteristics of
excellent public relations programs. Based on an expansive review of theories from public
relations, management, sociology, psychology, marketing, communication, anthropology,
philosophy, and feminist studies, the team arrived at a new theory of excellence in public
relations “to explain how and why communication makes organizations more effective.” 273
“Excellent public relations,” according to Larisa A. Grunig, James E. Grunig, and David M.
Dozier, “is managerial, strategic, symmetrical, diverse, and ethical.” 274 The two-way
symmetrical model of communication is one of the key defining characteristics of excellent
public relations departments. Such a model thrives when the dominant coalition’s “worldview
for public relations in the organization reflects the two-way symmetrical model” and the
organization has a “symmetrical system of internal communication.” 275
Critics of the four models developed by Grunig and Hunt have said that the
conceptualization was too simplistic “to capture the complexity and multiplicity of the public
relations environment.” 276 Cancel et al. proposed that an advocacy to accommodation
continuum would more accurately describe the practice of public relations. Earlier, Murphy had
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argued for a mixed motive approach to public relations. 277 Similar to Grunig’s theory of twoway symmetrical public relations, Murphy suggested that game theory gives “equal centrality to
sender-receiver reflexivity;” however, it also proposes “a continuum of conflict-cooperation.” 278
She further asserted that Grunig’s two-way symmetrical model is similar to “games of pure
cooperation,” 279 which are hard to find in the real world. Murphy proposed that, in reality,
public relations is practiced based on mixed motives: “a sliding scale of cooperation and
competition in which organizational needs must of necessity be balanced against the needs of
constituents, but never lose their primacy.” 280
In reply to these critiques, J. Grunig and L. Grunig said that the two-way symmetrical
model is not congruent with pure accommodation, in Cancel et al.’s terms, or pure coordination,
in Murphy’s terms. 281 Later, L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier clarified on their
conceptualization of symmetry: “Total accommodation of the public’s interest would be as
asymmetrical as unbridled advocacy of the organization’s interests.” 282 The two-way
symmetrical model, according to L. Grunig et al., is in fact equivalent with the mixed motive
model proposed by Murphy and better serves the interests of the organization when compared
with asymmetrical models. Cameron, Cropp, and Reber softened their criticism of the
“excellence” theory:
The excellence theory offers a compelling model for public relations to achieve a higher
calling for as a profession. The theory moves practitioners from a role as persuasive
hired guns or mere communication technicians serving as in-house reporters towards a
role as managers using research and dialogue to build healthy relationships with publics.
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Excellence theory may quite often lead to more ethical and more effective public
relations performance, particularly over longer term. Cameron and other proponents of
the contingency theory of accommodation in public relations argue, however, that the
theory must be elaborated upon and qualified to become a more mature and
comprehensive theory. 283
Responding to critics’ suggestions for a continuum, J. Grunig and L. Grunig modified the
original four discrete models into the two continua of craft and professional public relations. 284
They indicate public relations practices are variants of “craft” and “professional” forms of public
relations. 285 The craft public relations continuum is marked by the two extremes of propaganda
and journalism, both of which are one-way communication models. The two-way
communication models are also placed along a continuum, with pure asymmetry at one end and
pure symmetry at the other. It is the centrality of two-way communication that distinguishes
professional public relations with the practice of public relations as a craft.

Craft Public Relations
I------------------------------I-------------------------------------I------------------------------I
Propaganda
Press Agentry
Public Information
Journalism
Professional Public Relations
I-------------------------------I-------------------------------------I-------------------------------I
Pure Asymmetry
Two-way Asymmetrical
Two-way symmetrical
Pure Symmetry
(Excellent public relations)
Figure 1. Four models of public relations placed on two continua 286
In essence, a dialogue-centered paradigm of public diplomacy calls for a shift from craft
public relations to professional public relations, with an emphasis on symmetrical practices.
Nelson and Izadi suggest that as public diplomacy approaches the symmetrical end of
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professional public relations, it strengthens its ethical legitimacy. 287 Therefore, a new public
diplomacy is to be distinguished from the old to the degree to which it engages in two-way
symmetrical relations rather than one-way propaganda.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Dialogue and Symmetry
The dialogic models of professional public relations are moves beyond the one-way
models of communication management, in which the primary goal is to disseminate information
about the organization’s activities and decisions in order to reduce uncertainty in the
environment. 288 The information model of communication management is epitomized by
Lasswell’s famous formula: “Who says what to whom with what effect.” 289 Shannon and
Weaver’s Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver model of communication is also indicative of the
public information approach. 290 The two models of rhetorical dialogue and relationship
management are departures from the one-way, sender-centered approach to communication
management.
Heath identifies rhetoric as the essence of public relations and referred to this process as
“enactment of meanings.” 291 He asserts, “rhetoric is a dialogue of opinions, counter opinions,
meanings, and counter meanings – the process by which interests are asserted, negotiated, and
constrained.” 292 Persuasion is central to the rhetorical perspective, which “treats persuasion as
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an interactive, dialogic process whereby points of views are contested in public.” 293 Based on
this view, persuasion is not equivalent with “linear influence,” instead it is based on argument
and counterargument. 294 Heath contends that persuasion as rhetorical dialogue would result in
zones of meaning whereby organizations and their publics arrive at shared understanding of
problems through debate and argumentation. 295
Issues management is one way organizations attempt to harmonize their actions with their
stakeholders’ needs and expectations. Heath defines issues management as “the management of
organizational and community resources through the public policy process to advance
organizational interests and rights by striking a mutual balance with those of stakeholders.” 296
Issues management comprises of the four steps of issues identification, scanning, monitoring,
and analysis. According to Heath and Nelson, issues management has the two goals of adjusting
the organization to the public and helping the public understand the complexity and requirements
of the organization. 297 Through issues management, organizations aim to meet or exceed the
expectations of key publics and build mutually beneficial relationships. Heath maintains that
issues management is not just beneficial for large corporations. It is a management tool that is
also applicable to nonprofit organizations, governmental agencies, and activist groups. 298
According to Heath, issues management and normative two-way symmetrical public relations are
“companion efforts to achieve similar ends but with different means.” 299 Nelson proposes that
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issues management “presupposes a willingness for organizations to not only seek to change
others but also be prepared to reform internal policies and practices as well.” 300
J. E. Grunig and L. A. Grunig indicate that the rhetorical approach to persuasion is
compatible with the two-way symmetrical model of public relations since both parties have a
chance to persuade the other. 301 Similarly, Riordan finds it necessary for public diplomacy to
adopt a dialogue-based paradigm in which the parties of dialogue arrive at shared meanings. 302
Such a paradigm, he asserts, “recognizes that no one has a monopoly of truth or virtue, that other
ideas may be valid and that the outcome may be different from the initial message being
promoted.” 303 Genuine dialogue, he notes, is the means for achieving credibility with foreign
publics.
Grunig says that problems of public relations cannot be solved merely through image
management. 304 “Public relations must be concerned both with and symbolic relationships and
not with symbolic relationships alone.” 305 He states that these behavioral relationships are based
on several key components: “dynamic vs. static, open vs. closed, the degree to which both
organization and public are satisfied with the relationship, distribution of power in the
relationship, and mutuality of understanding, agreement, and consensus, trust and credibility, and
the concept of reciprocity” 306 Therefore, the problem with the public information and press
agentry models lies in their preoccupation with symbolic relationships while ignoring behavioral
relationships.
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In addition to symbolic relationships (as in mediated messages), public diplomacy should
concern actual behavioral relationships. 307 Hence, not only should the communication of
messages involve dialogue, but also the consequences of such messaging should take into
consideration the views of the other party. Thus, for the United States to engage in two-way
symmetrical public diplomacy, it has to consider the feedback it gets from other countries when
making its policies.
Central to Grunig’s relationship management model is the concept of symmetry or
balance of interests between an organization and its publics. Grunig’s approach to public
relations is based on. A system is “a set of interacting units with relationships among them.” 308
Grunig and Huang propose a model of stages and forms of relationships. 309 The two-way
symmetrical model is viewed as an open system, in which practitioners get input from the
organization’s environment to bring about changes in the organization, as well as its
environment.
In this model, Grunig and Huang identify the symmetrical and asymmetrical public
relations practices as relationship maintenance strategies. 310 With a symmetrical worldview, an
organization is more likely to use symmetrical relationship maintenance strategies, approaching
the pure symmetry end of the continuum, where Grunig places the two-way symmetrical model.
In contrast, an organization with an asymmetrical worldview is more likely to use asymmetrical
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strategies, approaching the asymmetrical extreme of the continuum, where Grunig places the
two-way asymmetrical model. The two-way symmetrical model of public relations is in essence
the same as new public diplomacy.
Nelson and Izadi too contend that adopting the ethical standards of commitment to truth
and two-way symmetrical public diplomacy (or otherwise called new public diplomacy) is vital
to an effective public diplomacy strategy. 311 To this, they add the ethical standard of “valuesbased leadership.” Such leaders listen to their constituents, respect their opinions, and practice
the art of inclusion. While there may be nuances to leadership styles based on different
circumstances and cultures, values-based leaders are exemplified by courage, integrity,
authenticity, vision, and passion.
These structural changes are not premised on ethical grounds only. Realignments in the
post-Cold War political environment, the proliferation of new media, and the resulting possibility
for more public participation in international relations have made Cold War public diplomacy
strategies obsolete and ineffective. 312 With advances in new media and the globalization of
information technology, it is no longer possible for the United States to achieve information
dominance. 313 Black propaganda, or deceptive public diplomacy, has become increasingly
ineffective. For black propaganda to be effective, it has to be seen as a semblance of the truth
and not rumor or official dissembling. Moreover, what might have become public knowledge
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after a long time can now become evident almost immediately. Also, an image-oriented public
diplomacy will best work in closed societies. Thus, a major obstacle to U.S. public diplomacy
program is its emphasis on image building rather than emphasis on genuine dialogue and
symmetrical relationships. 314
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4. METHODOLOGY
This dissertation uses the case study method and William Domhoff’s membership
network analysis 315 in addressing the study’s seven research questions. Case study is the
intensive study of a single case, which is often defined as a single instance of an event or
phenomenon, to shed light on a specific problem or question. Case studies are used extensively
in the various fields of the social sciences because researchers want to have a holistic and
meaningful understanding of complex social, political, and historical phenomena.
Gerring differentiates between the study of a single case (the case study) and that of a
sample of cases (the cross-case study). 316 He defines a case as a phenomenon that has both a
spatial and a temporal boundary and that could be any social or political unit. In the present
study, the case comprises post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy policies toward Iran and the issue
network associated with it.
Bennett and Elman find it important to note that the unit of analysis is not the event or the
phenomenon itself but rather a well-defined aspect of that event or phenomenon. 317 Thus, the
investigator has to decide which aspects of any historical happening, or social or political
phenomena to focus on. Selecting a single instance of a phenomenon, nevertheless, does not
mean that the researcher makes a single theoretically relevant observation. That is because, as
Bennett and Elman note, each case has a potentially large number of observations on the
dependent and independent variables of interest.
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Yin maintains that case studies are the preferred method of analysis when the researcher
is interested in questions of how and why, when the researcher has limited control over the
events under study, and when the focus is on real life contemporary phenomena. 318 Orum also
asserts that the intensive analysis of a single case is a viable research strategy due to five
advantages: 1) The researcher can probe the particular question in great depth, 2) the researcher
can study the context surrounding the case comprehensively, 3) the researcher can study the case
multi-dimensionally or holistically, 4) the researcher can study the case in isolation from other
cases, and 5) the researcher can understand a phenomenon in greater depth by studying a single
typical case or a single deviant case. 319
An important strength of case studies lies in the possibility for high conceptual
validity. 320 When measuring such complex social concepts such as democracy, statistical largeN studies have no choice but to lump together dissimilar cases to get a large sample. With case
studies, however, it is practical to research cases with much higher conceptual refinement. For
example, they can focus on a particular type of democracy, what George and Bennett call
“democracy with adjectives,” such as federal, parliamentary, presidential etc. 321 When
distinguishing between subtypes of a concept, the researcher using case study methods can
investigate how specific theories work in variations of the concept. In this way, the researcher
can identify more relevant variables and help theory development. High internal validity is
another strength of the case study approach. This means one can be more certain of the
relationships that he or she observes in the single case. The trade off for this strength is external
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validity. Unlike large –N cross-case study, it is hard to be certain of the representativeness of the
single case in relation with the population. 322
Yin suggests that a study protocol is a major component in raising the reliability of the
case study research. 323 A typical protocol should have the following sections: an overview of the
case study project (objectives, issues, topics being investigated), field procedures (credentials
and access to sites, sources of information), and case study questions (specific questions that the
investigator must keep in mind during data collection). The introduction presented an overview
of the case study project and case study questions. I will discuss the study’s sources of
information in the remaining pages.

Sources of Information
The study’s first four research questions are as follows:
RQ1: Which individuals and organizations participate in the Iran policy debate
and are thus part of the Iran issue network?
RQ2: What policy recommendations do the members of the Iran issue network
propose?
RQ3: Which of these policy recommendations come under the category of public
diplomacy policies?
RQ4: Based on Iran policy recommendations, and the relationships among
network members, what policy communities can be identified within the Iran
issue network?
In this study, my operational definition of the Iran issue network is as follows: all
individuals who have published about Iran and provided policy recommendations at least once in
322
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the time span from January 2008 to January 2009. Individuals who have endorsed a policy paper
about Iran in the above time span are also included. This time period was primarily chosen for
two reasons. It was the most recent time span before the completion of this dissertation, and it
captured the policy debates during the most recent presidential election campaign. Policy
communities generally become most vocal as presidential elections approach.
I search the following databases to identify the members of Iran issue network: Academic
Search Complete, CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online), Communication & Mass
Media Complete, Factiva, Humanities International Complete, Index Islamicus, International
Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center, LexisNexis Congressional, Middle Eastern &
Central Asian Studies Collection, Military & Government Collection, OCLC WorldCat, Peace
Research Abstracts, and PolicyFile. Appendix B presents the database providers’ description of
the above databases. I then examine the organizational affiliation of the issue network members.
I use a network analysis approach similar to William Domhoff’s network analysis
methodology to identify the issue network that is interested in the Iran policy debate. 324
Domhoff contends that network analysis should include three steps. First, the researcher should
conduct a membership network analysis, identifying the individuals and organizations that are
part of an issue network. In any network analysis, the critical question is the criterion that links
individuals in the network. Whereas in Domhoff’s approach, organizational affiliation serves as
the link between individuals, in this study policy recommendations denote the linking
relationship among the individuals. I use the organizational affiliation information to identify
which organizations are more active in each policy community.
Domhoff’s second step to the construction of membership networks, i.e., tracing the
money flow among individuals and organizations, is beyond the bounds of the current study.
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The third step in a network analysis, according to Domhoff, is the analysis of “the verbal and
written ‘output’ of the network, that is, the speeches, policy statements, and legislative acts that
allow us to study the goals, values, and ideology of the people and institutions in the
network.” 325 Here, I examine the published output of the issue network members within the
study’s time span. Based on the documents retrieved from the above mentioned databases, I
examine the policy recommendations of members of the Iran issue network and identify public
diplomacy policy recommendations.
I use NVivo 8 data management software to organize and analyze the data. NVivo is
designed to help users manage and analyze textual data by storing documents, organizing
documents, assigning attributes to documents and their authors, and finding patterns among
documents. I use the attributes feature of NVivo to assign attributes to the members of Iran issue
network. Based on the attributes assigned, NVivo allows users to organize documents into sets
that share similar characteristics. In this study, policy recommendations serve as the main
attribute for members of Iran issue network. Another attribute is issue network members’
institutional affiliation. NVivo allows the user to group idiosyncratic attributes of documents
and authors into broader categories. The resulting sets of issue network members denote the
various policy communities within the Iran issue network. NVivo capabilities can be used to
visually display the resulting sets.
The study’s fifth research question asks:
RQ5: What are the policies that the various offices within the U.S. government
have formulated with regard to its public diplomacy towards Iran, and which of
these have been implemented? What role do non-state actors play in advancing
these policies?
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I use the mentioned databases in addition to the World Wide Web to identify key open
source documents related to post-9/11 U.S. state and non-state actors’ public diplomacy toward
Iran. I use the following keywords in combination with the word Iran in conducting the database
searches: propaganda, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, soft power, anti-Americanism,
battle for hearts and minds, war of ideas, ideological warfare, information operations,
psychological warfare, psychological operations, psyops, information warfare, political warfare,
cultural imperialism, media imperialism, cultural dependency, democratization, National
Endowment for Democracy, Middle East Partnership Initiative, dissatisfaction, and dissent. I
then present the policies that the U.S. government has implemented with regard to its public
diplomacy strategy toward Iran.
According to Maykut, “it is desirable to end both data collection and data analysis when
no new or relevant information is being uncovered, a process that has been described as reaching
‘redundancy’ in the data.” 326 Similarly, Ely says that redundancy is reached “when the data
repeat themselves, when the researcher has confidence that themes and examples are repeating
instead of expanding.” 327 Consequently, I end the data collection when I have reached the point
of redundancy.
Based on an examination of the results to the study’s first five research questions, I
address the following inquiry:
RQ 6: Which policy communities from the Iran issue network correlate with the
various components of the US government in their policy preferences?
I address the final research question based on a synthesis of the information presented in
the previous chapters:
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RQ7: Do the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran fit with the twoway symmetrical model, which is in line with the new public diplomacy
paradigm?
As was mentioned earlier, I hypothesize that U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran
do not employ the two-way symmetrical model. As Williams notes, “In qualitative research, a
hypothesis might be framed in terms of a social setting having certain features, which, through
observations, can be confirmed or falsified.” 328 Therefore, I examine the direction and purpose
of the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran based on what is presented by U.S.
government officials, as described in government documents or uncovered in my study of other
data sources. In studying the direction of communication in U.S. public diplomacy initiatives, I
see if their goals and objectives are geared toward “disseminating information” (one-way) or “an
exchange of information” (two-way). 329 I also examine whether the purpose of U.S. public
diplomacy incorporates “communication effects on both sides and thus collaboration and
cooperation” (symmetry) or “one-sided effects and, thus, advocacy” (asymmetry). 330

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies
As extensive as this dissertation is, it has limitations that further studies should address.
Throughout the discussion of how U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran is manifested, there is one
enormous political reality that must be recognized. The United States and Iran do not have
formalized diplomatic relations. Future works should examine how the case of Iran compares
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with that of other countries that have friendly bilateral diplomatic relations with the United
States.
Also, as stated earlier, no comprehensive study has focused on U.S. public diplomacy
efforts toward Iran in the post-9/11 period. The same is true for the Clinton, the first Bush and
Reagan administrations (i.e., administrations that took office after the 1979 Islamic revolution in
Iran). Future studies should address the question of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran by
focusing on each of these administrations individually. This dissertation and its likes could then
serve as the basis for a comparative analysis of a grand U.S. public diplomacy strategy toward
Iran and potential similarities and differences between Republican and Democratic
administrations. Future research should also examine the public diplomacy approach of the
Obama administration and determine the degree of continuity and change as compared to the
approaches of the previous administrations. There is also a need for a comparative examination
of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran before and after the 1979 Islamic revolution, analyzing the
evolution of public diplomacy practices and strategies when a client state becomes an enemy
state.
Furthermore, I only examine the public diplomacy of the United States toward Iran. It
would be beneficial for future research to address the public diplomacy of Iran toward the United
States. Issues related to Iran are also important elements of European foreign policy. Future
studies could examine the European public diplomacy policy toward Iran and the policy
communities associated with it. It would be then beneficial to compare European and American
approaches.
Lastly, the current events nature of this dissertation serves as an impediment to a
complete analysis of the subject under study. A more accurate picture can be constructed in
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future studies as classified government documents are declassified. An example of such research
is Vaughan’s study of American and British propaganda in the Arab world in the 1940s and
1950s. 331
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5. THE DEBATE OVER UNITED STATES IRAN POLICY
The Iran Issue Network
The first research question for this dissertation inquires about the composition of the Iran
issue network. Specifically, it asks which individuals and organizations participate in Iran policy
debate and are thus part of the Iran issue network. To address this question, I searched the
databases mentioned in the methodology chapter using the keywords Iran or Iranian. A total of
182 individuals met the criteria to be included in the Iran issue network as described in the
methodology chapter. A number of these 182 individuals were affiliated with the same
organization, bringing the total number of organizations that have an affiliate who is a member
of the Iran issue network to 104. A full listing of the Iran issue network will be presented in the
following pages.

Policy Communities and Policy Recommendations
The dissertation’s next three research questions asked: What policy recommendations do
the members of the Iran issue network propose? Which of these policy recommendations come
under the category of public diplomacy policies? And based on Iran policy recommendations,
and the relationships among network members, what policy communities can be identified
within the Iran issue network? To address these inquiries, I examined the documents retrieved
during my search for the Iran issue network on a one-by-one basis, taking note of individuals’
policy recommendations. As the data analysis got underway, four broad frameworks emerged
based on the individuals’ policy recommendations and their assumptions about the nature of the
U.S.-Iran relationship and about political realities in Iran. The analysis revealed the existence of
the following four broad categories encompassing the policy recommendations of the Iran issue
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network: Strategic Engagement, Punitive Nonengagement, Hawkish Engagement, and
Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Policy. The emergence of these categories denotes the
existence of four main policy communities in the Iran issue network. As Figure 2 shows, while
none of these categories command the support of the majority of the overall issue network, a
large plurality of the experts give recommendations denoting Hawkish Engagement (83
individuals – or about 46 percent) and Strategic Engagement (56 individuals– or about 31
percent) categories. Another 33 individuals in the Iran issue network (about 18 percent) believe
that punitive nonengagement is the best strategy, while only 10 (about 5 percent) think that there
is a need for a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy, in general, and U.S. policy toward
Iran, in particular.

Figure 2. The composition of the Iran issue network
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It is important to point out that the above categories denote segments of a continuum;
where one leaves off, the other starts. Members of the Iran issue network were placed in each of
the four groups based on their shared assumptions and the broad strategy that they favored. This
does not imply complete uniformity in policy recommendations among members of a policy
community. The following pages give a detailed description of the four policy communities,
addressing the study’s first four research questions.

Strategic Engagement
About 31 percent of the Iran issue network members (56 individuals) propose diplomatic
engagement with Iran, without preconditions, is the only viable approach that should frame
United States strategy in its relationship with Iran. They also believe that United States should
stay away from regime change measures and adhere to the 1981 Algiers Accord, in which it
pledged to avoid political and military interference in Iran’s internal affairs. The
recommendation for strategic engagement is premised on a pragmatic outlook that acknowledges
the failure of all other available options. Sustained engagement is deemed “far more likely to
strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued
efforts to threaten, intimidate, or coerce Iran.” 332 Members of the Strategic Engagement policy
community argue that Iran is a powerful and influential country in the Middle East, that there is
room for common ground, and that the nuclear issue can be managed with international
partnership in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Therefore, they propose that, given the failure
of all other options, it is wisest for the United States to become a strategic partner with Iran.
This, however, does not mean a blanket endorsement of Iran’s policies and actions.
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This group of experts put forth two main recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy.
First, they encourage the adoption of policies to facilitate people-to-people exchanges between
American and Iranian “scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers, and ordinary
citizens.” 333 The increased unofficial cultural exchanges should be geared toward facilitating the
initiation of a direct diplomatic relationship. The recommendation for increased people-topeople public diplomacy does not come with any qualifiers. Proponents of strategic engagement
make a second public diplomacy recommendation: The U.S. government needs to cease its
“democracy promotion” efforts as they are “harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in
Iran.” 334 This recommendation would mean a substantial downgrading in U.S. Farsi
broadcasting, but more importantly, the elimination of U.S. funding of groups opposed to Iran’s
government. Here, I refer to this public diplomacy approach as facilitative public diplomacy: a
public diplomacy approach that is aimed at reducing tensions between the United States and Iran,
fostering increased understanding between the two countries, and facilitating the movement
toward normalized relations between the United States and Iran.
The Strategic Engagement option entails a series of principles as necessary first steps to a
successful Iran policy. A joint experts’ statement on Iran – endorsed by 20 Iran experts
including Thomas Pickering, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1989 to 1992, and
James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s first special envoy to Afghanistan – well captures the
main elements of strategic engagement. According to the statement, first and foremost, United
States policy makers should acknowledge that three decades of “U.S. efforts to manage Iran
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through isolation, threats, and sanctions” have failed to solve “any major problem in U.S.-Iran
relations, and have made most of them worse.” 335
United States efforts for regime change in Iran are deemed as the most destructive
element of past U.S. policy toward Iran. Iran is not going to negotiate in good faith, the
statement makes clear, while perceiving that the U.S. government is trying to overthrow it.
Thus, the most fundamental step to starting a “meaningful dialogue” with Iran is to “replace calls
for regime change with a long-term strategy.” 336 According to the experts believing in strategic
engagement, “Giving Iran a place at the table – alongside other key states” – is the key to
resolving the Iran nuclear issue, the instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli
peace process. Experts advocating strategic engagement do note that, after three decades of
hostility, engagement with Iran may prove to be difficult and may not be a “cure all,” but it
“certainly will change the equation.” 337 True diplomacy has been the missing element in U.S.
policy for the last thirty years, and it is time to see what it can accomplish, they say.
The Iran nuclear issue is believed to be best resolved as part of a wider U.S.-Iran
relationship and carried through multilateral talks with the United States taking an active
leadership role. Nuclear negotiations with no preconditions do not, however, eliminate the
possibility of costs, in the form of sanctions, if negotiations fail. Engaging Iran diplomatically is
also said to be beneficial to Israel’s security since Iran has much influence over Israel’s
adversaries, Hamas and Hezbollah. According to the joint statement, Washington’s active
diplomacy with Iran does not signal approval of Iran, just as earlier U.S. diplomatic interactions
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with governments of the Soviet Union or China did not mean an endorsement of their policies or
actions. 338
According to this policy community, U.S. policies towards Iran have failed to achieve
their objectives, mainly because “they are rooted in fundamental misconceptions that have driven
U.S. policy in the wrong direction.” 339 These misconceptions include the following:
 Myth # 1. President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy.
 Myth # 2. The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for
regime change.
 Myth # 3. The Iranian leadership’s religious beliefs render them undeterrable.
 Myth # 4. Iran’s current leadership is implacably opposed to the United States.
 Myth # 5. Iran has declared its intention to attack Israel in order to “wipe Israel
off the map.”
 Myth # 6. U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion can help bring true democracy
in Iran.
 Myth # 7. Iran is clearly and firmly committed to developing nuclear weapons.
 Myth # 8. Iran and the United States have no basis for dialogue. 340
According to Suzanne Maloney, who is also an advocate of strategic engagement, the
failure of the Bush administration’s Iran policy was in large measure a consequence of its
ingrained faith in these “mistaken assumptions.” 341 Maloney, who is now a senior fellow at the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, served on the Department of
State policy-planning team from 2005 to 2007. According to Maloney, with the conviction that
the Islamic Republic of Iran was on the verge of collapse, the Bush administration included Iran
as part of an “axis of evil,” which resulted in the termination of the unprecedented cooperation
between Tehran and Washington on defeating Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting the
government of Hamid Karzai. The Bush administration lost successive opportunities for
engaging Iran diplomatically and instead pursued a “Freedom Agenda” to support opponents of
338
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the Iranian government. Based on her retrospective analysis of past mistakes, Maloney
concludes that diplomacy is “the only alternative available to U.S. policy makers.” 342
In a recent paper, William Luers, president of United Nations Association of the U.S.A.
and a former deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Thomas Pickering, the former U.S. ambassador
at the United Nations; and Jim Walsh, a professor of international security at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, lay out the case for strategic engagement in more detail.343 The authors
urge the Obama administration to recognize that the prime issues of Iran’s nuclear capabilities
and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan are interconnected and require a unified strategy. Taking
military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, for example, would remove the prospects of
American-Iranian cooperation on Iraq and Afghanistan. Resolving these issues requires direct
talks without preconditions between the United States, Iran, and other interested countries.
Specifically, the authors propose the creation of a continuing forum where such talks could take
place. Luers, Pickering, and Walsh propose that creating an international consortium to enrich
uranium in Iran under international inspections is a viable solution that has a higher possibility of
being accepted by Tehran.
Luers, Pickering, and Walsh recommend the following course of action for a successful
engagement strategy. Before the initiation of talks, which is recommended to take place after
Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, the Obama administration should win the support of
members of Congress, Europeans, Russians, and Chinese for an engagement strategy. The
Obama administration should also assure American allies in the neighboring region – most
notably the Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel – that direct U.S.-Iran diplomacy serves
their interests as well by diplomatically resolving issues that could lead to regional instability or
342
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outright war. In the case of Israel, the authors suggest, strategic engagement with Iran will offer
the best chance of dealing with Hamas and Hezbollah. The Obama administration should also
make confidence-building overtures, including “a reaffirmation of Article I of the 1981 Algiers
Accord, in which the United States pledged not to interfere politically or militarily in Iran’s
internal affairs.” 344
In short, United States should engage with Iran based on mutual respect and not the
domineering talk of “carrots and sticks,” a phrase which Iranians “associate with the treatment of
donkeys and which in any case suggests that they can be either bought off or beaten into
submission.” 345 The authors express their criticism of the Obama foreign policy team for
coupling its stated readiness for negotiations with a continuation of the “tough talk” of the
previous administration. “The U.S. can impose costs on Iran, but it cannot impose its will,” the
authors conclude. “The same is true for Iran. Progress requires on both sides a greater focus on
strategy rather than tactics.” 346
Table 1 presents the list of the members of the Strategic Engagement policy community.
Table 1. Strategic Engagement policy community
1

Name
Norman Neureiter 347

Current Affiliation
Amer. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science

Affiliation Category
NGO official

2

Richard Parker 348

American Foreign Policy Project

Think tank fellow

American School of Kuwait

Professor

Author

Columnist

Author

Former U.S.G. official
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Former U.S.G. official

3
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6

Anthony Newkirk
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Table 1 continued
7
8
9
10

Ali Banuazizi 353
Augustus R. Norton
Paul Ingram
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Suzanne Maloney
James G. Blight

12

358

14
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16
17
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20

Philip Giraldi

356

357

11
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Karim Sadjadpour
Robert Gard
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Kingston Reif
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Leonor Tomero
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Zbigniew Brzezinski
William Odom
Gary G. Sick
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Bradley L. Bowman
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Boston College

Professor

Boston University

Professor

British American Security Information Council

Think tank fellow

Brookings Institution

Think tank fellow

Brown University

Professor
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Former U.S.G. official

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Think tank fellow

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Retired military officer

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Think tank fellow

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Think tank fellow

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Former U.S.G. official

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Retired military officer

Columbia University
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Council on Foreign Relations
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21
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Ray Takeyh 367

Richard N. Haass
Vali Nasr

368

369
370

24

Mehran Kamrava
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Gawdat Bahgat

371
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28
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Hadi Ghaemi

Thomas R. Pickering

Jim Walsh
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John Tirman
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John Thomson
Trita Parsi
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Think tank fellow

Council on Foreign Relations
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Council on Foreign Relations

Think tank fellow

Georgetown University

Professor

Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran

NGO official

International Crisis Group

Former U.S.G. official
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Flynt Leverett 380

New America Foundation

Former U.S.G. official
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New America Foundation

Think tank fellow

New York Times

Columnist
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Frida Berrigan
Roger Cohen
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Barnett R. Rubin
Farhad Kazemi

New York University
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Professor
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Northwestern University

Professor
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NGO official

RAND Corporation

Think tank fellow

Strategic Energy and Global Analysis

Former U.S.G. official

Syracuse University

Professor

Texas A&M University

Professor

The Century Foundation

Think tank fellow

The Friends Committee on National Legislation

Advocacy group member

U.S. military (retired)

Retired military officer

U.S. National Academies

NGO official

U.S. Naval Academy

Think tank fellow

Stephen Kinzer
Joe Cirincione
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Mehrzad Boroujerdi
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50

William Luers 396

51

Nikki R. Keddie

52

398

53
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Farideh Farhi

Juan R. I. Cole

397

399

William O. Beeman

401

55

William G. Miller
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Babak Yektafar
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United Nations Association of the U.S.A.

Former U.S.G. official

University of California at Los Angeles

Professor

University of Hawaii

Professor

University of Michigan

Professor

University of Minnesota

Professor

Woodrow Wilson Inter. Center for Scholars

Think tank fellow

World Security Institute

Think tank fellow

One of the more prominent members of the Strategic Engagement policy community is
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as U.S. National Security Advisor to President Carter. As is
evident from the above table, the Strategic Engagement policy community includes four experts
whose primarily affiliation is with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Among the four is
Richard Haass, the president of the CFR, who was the Director of Policy Planning at the State
Department in the first George W. Bush administration. Four other affiliates of the CFR are
members of the hawkish Strategic Engagement policy community. Three of the Strategic
Engagement policy community members are affiliates of the Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation (CACNP), including CACNP president Robert Gard, a retired army Lt. General.
Of the 182 members of the Iran issue network, four are affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and are all in the Strategic Engagement policy community.
Three of the think tanks and advocacy organizations represented in this policy
community are quite active in Iran-U.S. relations issues. One is the New America Foundation, in
which Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow. Leverett was the Senior Director for Middle East Affairs
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on the National Security Council in the first George W. Bush administration. In addition, two
advocacy organizations have been active in opposing hawkish congressional legislation against
Iran. One is the Friends Committee on National Legislation, an anti-war Quaker group, and the
other is the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), a Washington-based Iranian-American
organization founded by Trita Parsi who was a former Ph.D. student of Zbigniew Brzezinski at
the John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. A number of NIAC’s
recent projects have been funded by Ploghshares Fund, whose president Joe Cirincione is also a
member of this policy community.

Punitive Nonengagement
About 18 percent of the Iran issue network (33 individuals) advocates a punitive
nonengagement strategy with Iran. This approach consists of a concerted and integrated strategy
of sanctions, military threats, and support for regime change. The Punitive Nonengagement
policy community views what is myth to those advocating strategic engagement as evidence of
Iran’s clear and present danger to United States’ national security. Iran is perceived as an
existential threat to both the United States and Israel. Central to this premise is the looming
threat of a nuclear Iran that is deemed “almost certainly impossible to stop diplomatically,”
according to John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006. 403
After “the world was hit with a different kind of bomb,” as Norman Podhoretz terms the release
of the unclassified summary of the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the
unquestioned assumption that Iran is developing nuclear weapons was reframed. 404 Now, “Iran
continues to acquire the capabilities to make nuclear weapons, while disguising their political
403
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intent to build the bomb,” as noted by Kenneth Timmerman, the founder and president of the
Foundation for Democracy in Iran. 405 In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Bolton also
expressed his frustration over the failure of the European negotiations with Iran. “Every day that
goes by allows Iran to increase the threat it poses, and the viability of the military option steadily
declines over time,” he said. 406
While the Punitive Nonengagement policy community frames Iran’s danger for U.S.
national security in terms of the projected reality of a nuclear Iran, it is the very nature of the
Iranian government that produces their perception of an existential threat. “Iran has been at war
with this country since it came to power in 1979,” says the president of the Center for Security
Policy Frank J. Gaffney, in an article in the Washington Times. 407 The United States should take
all measures to destabilize and eventually change the Iranian government, he recommends.
These include imposing sanctions, best if targeted at investments in Iran’s oil and gas industry to
deflate the price of oil, aiding Iranians to overthrow their government through all available
covert and overt means, and keeping the military option a viable strategy. “We should be under
no illusion: We will not avoid war,” says Gaffney; “it has been thrust upon us by the mullahs for
many years now.” 408 In essence, it is the threat of the Islamic nature of Iran’s government that
makes the prospects of a nuclear Iran such a catastrophic event. Also, by its very nature, Iran is
deemed untrustworthy and unreliable. These are assumptions that make deterrence a projected
failure in the view of this policy community: “Deterrence could not be relied upon with a regime
ruled by Islamofascist revolutionaries who not only were ready to die for their beliefs but cared
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less about protecting their people than about the spread of their ideology and their power,”
according to Podhoretz, Commentary magazine’s Editor-at-Large. 409 “If the mullahs got the
bomb, it was not they who would be deterred, but we,” Podhoretz argues. 410
Given the above way of thinking about the nature of Iran’s government, the members of
the Punitive Nonengagement policy community were highly critical of the Bush administration’s
eventual entrance into diplomatic talks with Iran on its nuclear program, which was seen as a
departure from Secretary Rice’s earlier call for Iran to first verifiably stop enriching uranium.
The criticism referred to the Bush administration’s decision to send an envoy, as a “one-time
deal,” to the international talks with Iran in July of 2008. 411 “Diplomacy is not wrong,” says
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “but President Bush’s
reversal is diplomatic malpractice on a Carter-esque level that is breathing new life into a failing
regime.” 412
Clearly, the punitive nonengagement perspective views public diplomacy as political
warfare, with the eventual goal of regime change. Michael Ledeen, a Foundation for Defense of
Democracy “freedom scholar,” captured the essence of the punitive nonengagement strategy:
“It’s all about the regime. Change the regime, and the nuclear question becomes manageable.
Leave the mullahs in place, and the nuclear weapons directly threaten us and our friends and
allies, raising the ante of the terror war they started twenty-seven years ago.” 413 “In Iran
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revolution is the dream of at least 70% of the people,” Ledeen says, “They are waiting for
concrete signs of our support.” 414
Ian Berman, the American Foreign Policy Council vice president for policy and a
member of the Committee on the Present Danger, is another member of the Punitive
Nonengagement policy community who expresses strong discontent with the Bush
administration’s meager accomplishments in its Iran public diplomacy efforts. The Bush
administration, according to Berman, has failed to bring about “the ‘empty political space’ in
which real regime alternatives can flourish.” 415 Berman urges that the new U.S. administration
must “avoid short-term diplomatic deals” that could diminish the prospect of regime change in
Iran. 416
Berman applauds President Bush’s January 2007 State of the Union address for
broadening the focus of the war on terror. He argued that by extending the list of U.S.
adversaries to include “Iranian-supported Shiite extremists in Iraq,” the president had rightly
assessed that terrorism threats are beyond those posed by al-Qaida and Taliban-led Sunnis. This
“wider war on terror,” Berman maintained, “requires that Washington resolutely confront the
Islamic Republic of Iran.” 417
An aggressive public diplomacy, in Berman’s view, is an important mechanism for a
resolute confrontation with Iran. In 2007 Berman edited Taking on Tehran: Strategies for
Confronting the Islamic Republic, 418 which includes a comprehensive view of the range of public
diplomacy recommendations advocated by the Punitive Nonengagement policy community.
414
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Berman coauthored a chapter in the book with Robert A. Schadler and Bijan R. Kian specifically
dealing with public diplomacy issues toward Iran. According to Berman and his co-authors, in
the “struggle for hearts and minds, there is no more important battlefield than the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the ideological and political epicenter of global Sh’ia Islam.” 419
The authors find the two main faults that inhibit the success of U.S. Persian international
broadcasting to be the “MTV-ified” nature of such programming and their aim to be “balanced”
“at the expense of a robust U.S. democratic message.” 420 Referring to a 2006 report of the
Defense Department’s Iran Steering Group, the authors harshly criticize the poor quality of news
reporting and analysis on official U.S. broadcasting programs and their failure to provide “proper
framing of issues.” 421 The authors suggest that to bring about a successful political
transformation, U.S. broadcasting should highlight the following themes:
a. American support for political opposition forces within Iran.
b. The fallacy of the Iranian government as the sole source of Islamic
knowledge.
c. The corruption endemic of the country’s ruling clerical class.
d. The dangers that the Iranian government’s quest for nuclear weapons poses to
its own population. 422
In his 2005 book on Iran, Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States, Berman
maintains that buttressing the above messages with face-to-face cultural outreach programs could
“loosen the ideological bonds between the Iranian people and Iran’s ayatollahs.” 423 In this, the
main constituency is said to be Iran’s youth who form a majority of the country’s population.
Berman and his co-authors also find the Internet as the best and least vulnerable medium for
reaching the Iranian public. They argue for the use of “advanced Internet techniques (podcasts,
419
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email blasts, newsgroup postings and secondary distribution)” to provide an uninterrupted flow
of information to Iranian activists. 424 The authors consider the current U.S. public diplomacy
toward Iran underfunded and ask for an increase in funding “to make it commensurate with the
magnitude of the challenge to American interests now posed by the Iranian regime.” 425
Berman and colleagues also call for an increase in funding for the Iranian diaspora
broadcasting into Iran. They consider the 2006 State Department $5 million funding of Iranian
expatriate radio and television station not enough and believe the U.S. government “fails to
appreciate the positional contribution expatriate broadcasting can make to public diplomacy
toward Iran.” 426 American officials, according to the authors, “must make it a priority to
supplement existing official programming with the requisite funds to truly empower such private
sector efforts.” 427 In his 2005 book, Berman takes specific note of the value of the Los Angelesbased National Iranian Television (NITV) and KRSI, Radio Sedaye Iran. 428
Berman and his colleagues contend U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran should go beyond
radio and television programming and include “scholarships, fellowships, speeches, artistic
performances and a wide array of face-to-face meetings and exchanges, among numerous other
efforts.” 429 Such programs are significant, according to the authors, because they provide the
United States with venues for “properly identifying and engaging emerging pro-democracy
leaders in the region.” 430
In his 2005 book Berman highlights the significance of nurturing Iranian leaders as a vital
part of a successful political warfare against Iran. “This promises to be a difficult undertaking,”
424
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writes Berman, “unlike the Polish opposition to the Soviet Union in its day, Iranians are still in
search of their Lech Walesa – a charismatic, populist leader to serve as the public face of their
resistance.” 431 Among the exiled Iranian opposition, Berman entertains the possible leadership
of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, or the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO),
an armed Iranian opposition group designated a terrorist organization by the Clinton
administration in 1997. As both choices carry their “political baggage,” Berman is doubtful
whether either one will garner Iranian’s support. Nevertheless, he says, “Washington now has
some hard choices to make. It must either decide to harness these forces or to seek new ones.” 432
Berman believes it is necessary to conduct polls of Iranians to gather more definitive information
regarding viable alternatives to the current government. Meanwhile, in Berman’s view,
Washington has to deal with “the discrepancy in the group’s [MKO’s] current legal status … for
the MKO to assume a seat at the U.S. policy planning table.” 433
Berman bases the above vision of public diplomacy toward Iran on their assessment of
the key role of public diplomacy initiatives in winning the Cold War. Just as the United States,
most notably under the Reagan administration, used public diplomacy “to pierce the Iron Curtain
and export American ideals to the Soviet bloc,” Berman argues, so too can it achieve victory in
its political warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 434 In addition to his vehement belief in
the Reagan doctrine as the catalyst for changing the Iranian regime, Berman highlights the
importance of the doctrine of preemption. Berman’s repeated designation of public diplomacy as
political warfare and a mechanism for changing governments hostile to American national and
transnational interests gives further indication of his vision of public diplomacy as one tool in the
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preemption toolbox. In a 2006 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Armed Services Berman concluded with the following remarks:
...the goal of the United States should not simply be to contain and deter a nuclear Iran. It
should also be to create the necessary conditions for a fundamental political
transformation within its borders, through forceful public diplomacy, economic
assistance to opposition elements, international pressure, and covert action. 435
Table 2 presents a list of the members of the Punitive Nonengagement policy community.
Table 2. Punitive Nonengagement policy community
Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

John R. Bolton
Richard Perle

437

Danielle Pletka

438

Frederick W. Kagan
Ilan I. Berman
Uzi Rubin

American Enterprise Institute

Former U.S.G. official

American Enterprise Institute

Former U.S.G. official

American Enterprise Institute

Think tank fellow

American Enterprise Institute

Think tank fellow

American Enterprise Institute

Think tank fellow

441

American Foreign Policy Council

Think tank fellow

Author

Author

Author

Retired military officer

Benador Associates

Author

442

443

Amir Taheri

439

Affiliation Category

440

Michael Rubin
Mark Weston

Current Affiliation

436

444

435

Ilan Berman, "Confronting a Nuclear Iran: Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Armed Services," http://www.house.gov/hasc/comdocs/schedules/2-1-06Berman.pdf.
436
Bolton, "While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes.", John R. Bolton, "Israel, Iran and the Bomb," Wall Street
Journal, July 15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121607841801452581.html.
437
Richard Perle, "Coalition of the Ineffectual," Washington Post, June 26, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/25/AR2008062501943.html.
438
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Danielle Pletka, Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq, and
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080227_IranianInfluenceReport.pdf, Danielle Pletka, The Iran Counter-Proliferation
Act of 2007 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27773/pub_detail.asp.
439
Kagan, Kagan, and Pletka, Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
440
Rubin, "Now Bush Is Appeasing Iran.", Michael Rubin, "Biden's Blink On Iran," Washington Post, August 26,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/25/AR2008082502337_pf.html, ———,
Iran's Global Ambition (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080317_No322870MEOg.pdf.
441
Berman, "How to Think About the Iranian Bomb.", ———, "The President is Right.", ———, ed. Taking on
Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic, ———, "Confronting a Nuclear Iran: Testimony before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services.", ———, Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the
United States.
442
Mark Weston, "Coming to Grips with Iran's Regime," Washington Times, October 26, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/26/coming-to-grips-with-irans-regime-66685762/.
443
Uzi Rubin, "Iran's Naked Ambitions," Washington Times, January 8, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/08/irans-naked-ambitions/.
444
Amir Taheri, "The Problem with Talking to Iran," Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121193151568724469.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries.

96

Table 2 continued
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Nir Boms 445

Frank J. Gaffney

446

Norman Podhoretz

Center for Security Policy

Think tank fellow

Commentary magazine

Columnist

448

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Think tank fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Think tank fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Think tank fellow

Foundation for Democracy in Iran

Advocacy group member

Fox News

Former U.S.G. official

Global Strategic Partners

Former U.S.G. official

Heritage Foundation

Think tank fellow

Heritage Foundation

Think tank fellow

Heritage Foundation

Think tank fellow

Inst. for Monitoring Peace & Cultural Tolerance

Think tank fellow

449

Reuel Marc Gerecht

450

Kenneth R. Timmerman
Thomas G. McInerney
David M. Denehy
Ariel Cohen

454

James Phillips
Nile Gardiner
Shayan Arya

455

456

457

Think tank fellow

447

Michael A. Ledeen
Orde F. Kittrie

Center for Freedom in the Middle East

453

451

452

445

Nir Boms and Shayan Arya, "Looking for Enemies," Washington Times, August 26, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/26/looking-for-enemies, ———, "Iran's Blood-Drenched
Mullahs," Washington Times, July 14, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/14/irans-blooddrenched-mullahs/.
446
Frank J. Gaffney, "Incoherence on Deterrence," Washington Times, April 29, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/29/incoherence-on-deterrence/, Gaffney, "The War with Iran.",
Frank J. Gaffney, "Disarmed in the War of Ideas," Washington Times, March 25, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/25/disarmed-in-the-war-of-ideas/.
447
Podhoretz, "Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands."
448
Michael A. Ledeen, Understanding Iran (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2008),
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11783587&Itemid=0.
449
Orde F. Kittrie, "How to Put the Squeeze on Iran," Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122654026060023113.html.
450
Reuel Marc Gerecht, "The CIA vs. The Mullahs," Washington Post, January 27, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/26/ST2009012601964.html, ———, The End of
Nuclear Diplomacy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080821_4423415OTIGerecht_g.pdf.
451
Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Global Strategy Harbinger," Washington Times, August 15, 2008,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/15/global-strategy-harbinger/, Timmerman, "Threats We Face."
452
Thomas G. McInerney, "Don't Kowtow to Iran," Washington Times, September 22, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/22/dont-kowtow-to-iran-us-israel-face-key-decisions/, Louis Ren
Beres and Thomas McInerney, "Target: Israel," Washington Times, February 4, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/feb/04/target-israel/.
453
David M. Denehy, "The Iranian Democracy Imperative," Journal of International Security Affairs no. 15 (Fall
2008), http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/15/denehy.php.
454
Ariel Cohen, The U.S. Should Oppose Hezbollah and its Iranian and Syrian Masters in Lebanon (Washington,
DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/upload/wm_1922.pdf.
455
James Phillips, Iranian Missile Tests Boost International Tensions and Proliferation Concerns (Washington, DC:
The Heritage Foundation, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/iran/upload/wm_1985.pdf, ———, The Iran
National Intelligence Estimate: A Comprehensive Guide to What is Wrong with the NIE (Washington, DC: The
Heritage Foundation, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/Research/middleeast/upload/bg_2098.pdf, ———, Iranian
President Ahmadinejad's Vexing Visit Exposes U.N. Failures (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/upload/wm_2074.pdf.
456
Nile Gardiner, President Bush's Transatlantic Tour: The U.S. Must Pressure Europe on Afghanistan and Iran
(Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/upload/wm_1952.pdf.

97

Table 2 continued
23

Kimberly Kagan458

Institute for the Study of War

Think tank fellow

24

Raymond Tanter459

Iran Policy Committee

Think tank fellow

25

Ali Safavi460

Near East Policy Research

Advocacy group member

26

Daniel Gallington461

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Think tank fellow

27

Louis Rene Beres462

Purdue University

Professor

28

James A. Lyons463

U.S. military (retired)

Retired military officer

29

Rami Loya464

U.S. military (retired)

Retired military officer

30

Gerald F. Seib465

Wall Street Journal

Columnist

31

James G. Zumwalt466

Washington Times

Retired military officer

32

Jeffrey T. Kuhner467

Washington Times

Columnist

33

Ronen Bergman468

Yedioth Ahronoth

Columnist

In this policy community, the American Enterprise Institute, Foundation for Defense of
Democracy, and the Heritage Foundation are three think tanks that have been actively advocating
a punitive nonengagement strategy with Iran. No affiliates of these three think tanks are part of
the other three policy communities. David Denehy is also one of the prominent members of this
policy community. Denehy was a Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the
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State Department, where he served as the Iran Freedom Agenda Coordinator from 2005 to 2007.
Richard Perle, the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee during the first
George W. Bush administration, is another influential member of the Punitive Nonengagement
policy community.

Hawkish Engagement
A third group of policy experts believe an engagement policy fortified with sharp sticks
and appetizing carrots is the only viable method for dealing with Iran. The Hawkish
Engagement policy community is the largest policy community in the Iran issue network,
consisting of 83 individuals (46 present). The Hawkish Engagement policy community agrees
with the Punitive Nonengagement policy community in that Iran’s policies and actions have been
threatening American interests in the Middle East ever since the Islamic Republic’s inception in
1979 and that they pose an existential threat to Israel. Iran is deemed as United States greatest
national security threat. Furthermore, Iran’s ascendance to a nuclear weapon state should be
prevented.
In spite of these similarities, the Hawkish Engagement policy community does not
preclude the engagement policy option. But unlike the view of the Strategic Engagement policy
community, engagement is not considered to represent an umbrella strategy that could resolve
America’s problems with Iran. This contrast is partly because the hawkish engagement
proponents do not presume that Iran could ever be a trustworthy diplomatic partner and that its
interests are always at odds with those of the United States and Israel, unless it is coerced to
behave otherwise. To achieve behavior change, these policy experts propose that sharp sticks
and appetizing carrots have to be administered strategically, although they may prescribe
different measures of sticks or carrots. While regime change is considered a long-term strategy,
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tactical engagement with Iran is deemed a necessary prerequisite to retard Iran’s nuclear
capabilities in the interim.
On the public diplomacy front, they believe these efforts must continue but in a less
flamboyant manner. Continued engagement with Iran, if Iran is compliant, is not seen as a
lifeline for the Islamic Republic; rather, it is seen as a curse for the current Iranian government
disguised as blessing that allows Iranian society to evolve due to the possibility of increased
interaction with American society, in essence facilitating the realization of the long-term goal of
regime change. Consequently, engagement is viewed as one of the several tactics that
Washington is advised to use in concert to achieve its goal of halting Iran’s progress in its
nuclear capabilities and its overall regional influence.
While the members of the Strategic Engagement policy community view the endurance
of Iran through 30 years of war, isolation, and sanctions as testament to the failure of these
tactics, the proponents of hawkish engagement view the failure of American policy due to a lack
of an integrated approach that would make use of all of the mentioned policy options in a
coordinated fashion. Moreover, Iran is seen as much more vulnerable to outside pressure
compared to the view of the Strategic Engagement policy community in this regard. Here, the
Hawkish Engagement group is closer to the Punitive Nonengagement group in its assessment of
Iran’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. As a result, even regime change is contemplated as a
viable option, albeit in the long term.
A September 2008 report Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear
Development, published by a task force convened by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)
represents an example of a hawkish engagement strategy. BPC is a Washington-based policy
group established in 2007 by former U.S. senators Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and

100

George Mitchell. George Mitchell was appointed as President Obama’s Special Envoy to the
Middle East in January 2009. Among the task force members were Dennis Ross, the Special
Advisor to Secretary of State Clinton for developing Obama administration’s Iran strategy; two
former senators, Daniel Coats and Charles Robb; three retired generals; and two former assistant
secretaries of Defense and State. The task force endorses an Iran policy that combines a
diplomatic solution with “a comprehensive strategy involving economic, military, and
informational components undertaken in conjunction with allied and regional states.” 469 The
report finds it unacceptable to trust Iran with a civil uranium enrichment program, even under
international inspections. Nothing could provide “meaningful assurance to the international
community” that Iran will not go nuclear if it is allowed to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, even
under international inspections and even as part of an international consortium. 470
If Iran rejects the offer to give up its uranium enrichment and support for Hamas and
Hezbollah in exchange for “security assurances, lifting of economic sanctions, and the
unfreezing of [its] assets,” the United States and her allies should administer a series of
successive sticks, including a sanction or embargo of Iran’s energy sector and threats of force. 471
The report advises that the new U.S. president create leverage for possible use of force by
bolstering U.S. military presence in the Middle East, which would include “pre-positioning
additional U.S. and allied forces, deploying additional aircraft carrier battle groups and
minesweepers, emplacing other war material in the region, including additional missile defense
batteries, upgrading both regional facilities and allied militaries, and expanding strategic
partnerships with countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to maintain operational
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pressure from all directions.” 472 The report assesses the presence of American forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan a positive development in this regard. If United States military presence and threat
of force fails to succeed as a deterrent or containment mechanism, the report suggests that the
actual military attacks will be a last resort. According to the report, “The objective of any
military campaign to end the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program would be either to destroy
key elements of the program or to compel Tehran to dismantle these elements in a verifiable
manner.” 473
It must be noted that not all members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community
believe in the advisability of the use of military strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. As
such, the Hawkish Engagement policy community could have been further divided into two
categories: those that recommend military strikes and those that withhold such a
recommendation based on pragmatic calculations. As this dissertation did not focus on the
nuclear issue, the Hawkish Engagement policy community was not subdivided.
The signatories to the Bipartisan Policy Center report advise the president to implement
“a concerted informational campaign” in conjunction with the above diplomatic and economic
measures. 474 “Investments in Radio Farda and Voice of America should be increased manifold
to a level commensurate with the strategic threat which the Islamic Republic now poses,” the
report recommends. 475 The U.S. government should make sure its programming and message is
“relevant to ordinary Iranians wishing to understand U.S. position and concerns,” the report
states. 476 In addition, the task force finds it “in the long term interest of the United States” to
support Iranian reformists’ attempts to gain influence over Iran’s government. “The next
472
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president should recognize the importance of an independent civil society and trade union
movement inside Iran and encourage their growth through any appropriate means,” the report
asserts. 477
With the following logic, the task force also recommends regime change: “Because
nuclear knowledge cannot be reversed, should the Islamic Republic not forfeit its nuclear
ambitions, the only permanent resolution may be regime change.” 478 Here the underlying
premise of the threat of Iran becomes evident: the knowledge of uranium enrichment. It is not
the presence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program that is threatening; rather, it is the very
ability to enrich uranium. Consequently, the release of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate, which stated with “high confidence” that Iran does not at present have a nuclear
weapon program made little difference in the calculations of the hawkish engagement
proponents. 479 As a result, the ultimate solution is seen in transferring the control of such
knowledge to a government that is more amicable to the United States and Israel.
Instigating labor unrest is recommended as the least risky of the options available for
achieving regime change. Supporting exiled political groups such as the monarchists and the
Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO) are not seen as a viable means for achieving regime
change because “few [of these groups] can demonstrate much following inside the country.” 480
The task force doubts the usefulness of MKO, which “has conducted terrorism against both
Western and Iranian interests,” because it is widely hated across Iran for actively helping
Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. 481 Iranians look at MKO, the report says, “in the
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same way that many Americans view John Walker Lindh, the American student who joined the
Taliban to fight against his own people.” 482 While MKO is said to have provided “useful and
verified intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program,” they are not found as a reliable substitute
for Iran’s current government because their “bizarre philosophy and cultish behavior.” 483
Exploiting ethnic diversity as a regime change strategy is also said to be counterproductive
because Iranians have a nationalistic sense of identity despite their heterogeneous composition,
and ethnic minorities are well integrated in the ruling structure. “Khamenei [the supreme leader]
is an ethnic Azeri. Khatami, so often embraced by the West as a reformer, is half-Azeri,” the
report notes. 484
In short, the Hawkish Engagement policy community advocates the use of engagement
and negotiations as a necessary tactic to the successful administration of sticks and carrots for
achieving the eventual short-term goal of subverting Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence and the long term goal of regime change in Iran. A list of the members of the Hawkish
Engagement policy community is provided in Table 3.
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Since President Barack Obama’s inauguration, seven members of the Iran issue network
have taken senior level positions in the Obama administration, and all seven belong to the
Hawkish Engagement policy community. They are Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan; John Brennan, and Thomas Donilon, both deputies of the National
Security Advisor; Susan Rice, ambassador to the United Nations; Samantha Power, Senior
Director for Multilateral Affairs at the National Security Council; Michael McFaul, National
Security Council’s Senior Director; and Dennis Ross, who was appointed as Special Advisor to
Secretary of State Clinton for developing Obama administration’s Iran strategy. 568
Ross reiterates the policy positions of the Hawkish Engagement policy community in
writings of his own, which could be indicative of Obama administration’s approach to Iran.
Ross believes the United States must “Talk tough with Tehran,” 569 something the Bush
administration failed to do appropriately in his belief. He states, “Iran has continued to pursue
nuclear weapons because the Bush administration hasn’t applied enough pressure – or offered
Iran enough rewards for reversing course.” 570 The best way to achieve the needed pressure on
Iran, according to Ross, is “to focus less on the United Nations and more on getting the
Europeans, Japanese, Chinese, and Saudis to cooperate.” 571 The main value of United States
willingness to talk directly to Iran, in Ross’s view, is that U.S. partners will “feel more
comfortable ratcheting up the pressure.” 572 The ultimate aim goes beyond Iran’s readiness to
forgo its uranium enrichment program and includes a change in Iran’s support for Hamas and
567
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Hezbollah. Ross proposes that the United States enter the nuclear negotiations with Iran without
Iran having to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, on the condition that the European
Union agrees to “adopt more stringent sanctions on investments, credits, and technology transfer
vis-à-vis Iran in general or at least on the Iranian energy sector.” 573 This move is necessary, “to
avoid misleading the Iranians into thinking they had won,” Ross writes. “The price for our doing
this [i.e., talking directly with Iran] would not be with Iran but with Europe.” 574
Before joining the Obama administration, Ross was the chairman of the Jerusalem-based
Jewish People Policy Planning Institute. 575 Ross and Richard Holbrooke also co-founded the
American Coalition against Nuclear Iran (ACANI) in September 2008. According to its web
site, ACANI aims to “prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a regional super-power
possessing nuclear weapons.” 576 In February 2009 ACANI announced the start of “Iran
Business Registry” (IBR) as part of its web site, in which ACANI compiles a list of those
countries and corporations that have dealings with the Iranian economy. IBR is an effort to
“educate” investors and policymakers because Iran is said to be “uniquely susceptible to
financial pressure.” 577 In a full page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal on February 19,
2009, ACANI asked the readers to join the cause against a nuclear Iran by stopping to do
business with companies that have economic dealings with Iran. 578
Among other prominent members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community are
Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor under President Clinton; R. James Woolsey, the
former head of the Central Intelligence Agency in the first Clinton administration; and Martin
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Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Indyk is currently the director of the Saban Center
for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Seven out of eight Brookings Institution
affiliates who are members of the Iran issue network promote a hawkish engagement strategy,
with the last one (Suzanne Maloney) advocating strategic engagement. The same is true with the
RAND Corporation, with five members in the Hawkish Engagement policy community and one
member (James Dobbins) in the Strategic Engagement policy community. The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is another think tank that is a strong advocate of a
hawkish engagement approach, with all of its six affiliates being part of this policy community.
Dennis Ross was also a WINEP counselor and distinguished fellow before joining the Obama
administration.

Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Policy
Members of the Iran issue network that advocate fundamental change in U.S. foreign
policy find the underlying assumptions of U.S. Iran policy vitally flawed. These experts argue
that Iran has never militarily threatened the United States or Israel and that it is not in violation
of any international law. They further argue that U.S. allegations that Iran is pursuing nuclear
weapons, supporting terrorism, and helping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have not
been substantiated with evidence. The United States and Israel, on the other hand, repeatedly
threaten to use military force against Iran. Proponents of fundamental change maintain that the
underlying aim of existing U.S. Iran policy has been and continues to be the prevention of Iran’s
ascendance to a regional power and the preservation of U.S. hegemony in the region. This group
believes that a legitimate United States Iran policy requires a fundamental change in the overall
objectives of U.S. foreign policy and United States behavior. Unlike the Strategic Engagement
policy community, the members of the Fundamental Change policy community do not propose a
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change in the course of U.S. Iran policy due to pragmatic reasons; rather, they make the case for
such redirection based on legal and moral grounds.
This policy community’s specific policy positions and recommendations could be
gleaned from a 2008 report published by the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies
entitled Iran in the Crosshairs: How to Prevent Washington’s Next War. 579 Contrary to the
position of the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities,
Phyllis Bennis, the author of the report, lays out her arguments as to why Iran is not a threat to
international peace. Bennis assertively states that “Iran does not and has never had a nuclear
weapon – and no one, not even the Bush administration, claims they have.” 580 She further
asserts, the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agrees that there is no
evidence Iran has ever had a military program to build an atomic bomb. Moreover, she
maintains, as a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “Iran has a legal
right to produce and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes.” 581 Thus, asking Iran to forgo
uranium enrichment for fueling its civil nuclear program is to prohibit it from “exercising that
internationally-guaranteed right.” 582 With these premises, Bennis maintains, “The U.S.orchestrated decision of the U.N. Security Council to strip Iran of that right and impose sanctions
if Iran continued to exercise its NPT rights, has no grounding in international law; it is based
solely on the U.S. claim that it doesn’t trust Iran.” 583
The author further asserts that it is not Iran that is “fomenting a nuclear arm race in the
Middle East;” rather, it is Israel that is doing so. 584 Also, contrary to the U.S. position, it is
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Washington that is in violation of its international obligations under the NPT, not Iran. Bennis
notes that under Article VI of the NPT, the United States and the other nuclear weapons powers
are obligated to move in good faith towards complete nuclear disarmament. The United States is
also in violation of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice that, as quoted in
the report, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.” 585
“What about Iran’s support for terrorism?” Bennis asks. While criticizing the U.S.
government for failing to support this perpetuated argument with substantiated evidence, the
author of the IPS report notes that Hamas and Hezbollah are “both important political parties that
have been elected to majority and near-majority positions in the Palestinian and Lebanese
parliaments.” 586 Furthermore, they emphasize, the activities of these political parties are not
merely militaristic; rather, they “provide important networks of social services, from clinics and
hospitals to schools, daycare centers, food assistance, and financial aid, to the most
impoverished, disempowered, and (in the case of the Hamas in Gaza) imprisoned populations of
Lebanese and Palestinians.” 587 Bennis also finds the allegation that Iran is instigating unrest in
Iraq and Afghanistan as unsubstantiated. These allegations, the author argues, do not justify an
attack on Iran.
“Is Iran a threat to Israel?” The author of the report thinks otherwise. It is Israel that has
repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the United States fails to do so. These threats have come
directly from Israeli officials who have control of Israel’s military and whose track record shows
that these threats are real. Bennis stresses that Iran’s president does not control the country’s
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military and that his comments regarding “wiping Israel off the map” have been taken out of
context. Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan with near
native Farsi speaking ability – who is in the Strategic Engagement policy community – agrees.
He told the New York Times, as quoted by Bennis, “Ahmadinejad did not say he was going to
wipe Israel off the map because no such idiom exists in Persian. He did say he hoped its regime,
i.e., a Jewish-Zionist state occupying Jerusalem would collapse.” Like the Strategic Engagement
policy community position, Bennis asserts Iran has not declared its intention to attack Israel.
So why is Iran perceived to be such a fundamental threat to the United States and Israel?
Bennis believes it is because “Iran is one of only two countries [the other being Iraq] in the
Middle East with all the prerequisites to become an indigenous regional power: water, oil, and
size.” 588 To insure that Iran does not become a regional power, successive U.S. administrations
have attempted to either “buy its allegiance, insure its weakness, or destroy its capacity.” 589
What Iran has done, according to Bennis, is “to threaten its [U.S.] control of Iran’s oil and its
strategic neighborhood,” first through its 1951 oil nationalization and then through its 1979
revolution that ousted the Shah who was the de-facto United States gendarme in the region. 590
Despite Iran’s many grievances against the United States (i.e., the 1953 CIA coup against
Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq, American support for the Shah’s dictatorship, its backing of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran, American aid for the Iranian terrorist militant group
MKO, funding Iranian opposition groups for regime change, and years of sanctions and threats
of military attack), Bennis believes diplomacy is possible between the United States and Iran.
She makes this assessment based on Iran’s constructive role in assisting the United States and
other western countries in stabilizing Afghanistan. As James Dobbins, President George W.
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Bush’s first envoy to Afghanistan, as quoted by Bennis, said, “perhaps the most constructive
period of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy since the fall of the Shah of Iran took place in the months after
the 2001 terrorist attacks.” 591 Notably, James Dobbins is among the Strategic Engagement
policy community who has a positive view of the prospects of U.S.-Iran relations.
According to Bennis, the potential of normalized relations between the United States and
Iran could only be realized if America recognizes that “negotiations and diplomacy, not crippling
sanctions, military threats, or military attacks, must be the basis of the U.S. posture towards
Iran.” 592 She also believes that, as a first step to ease the nuclear dispute, the United States must
recognize and implement its obligations under the NPT. The U.S. must also recognize that it
does not have the jurisdiction to dictate to Iran about its nuclear program. Rather such
jurisdiction lies exclusively with the United Nation and the IAEA. Successful negotiations
require a recognition of Iran’s demands for “a security guarantee (guaranteeing no invasion, no
attack on nuclear facilities, and no efforts at ‘regime change’), recognition of Iran’s role as an
indigenous regional power, and reaffirmation of Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.” 593 Once again, Bennis’ assessment of what Iran wants is similar to the assessment of
the Strategic Engagement policy community. While the Fundamental Change policy community
makes this recommendation because it finds it the only legal and moral alternative, the same
recommendation is advanced by the Strategic Engagement policy community for its pragmatic
value. This assessment is, of course, a complete departure from the demeaning stick and/or
carrot approach of the other two policy communities.
Bennis makes a final recommendation that underscores one of the fundamental
differences between this policy community and the previous three policy communities:
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Washington should stop using the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” as an instrument to
gain regional support for its position in the U.S.-Iran crisis, as it did at the Annapolis
conference in December 2007. Instead, it should change its Middle East policy from its
current uncritical political, military, economic, and diplomatic support for Israeli
occupation and discriminatory policies, to a policy aimed at establishing a just and
comprehensive peace based on human rights, international law, equality, and UN
resolutions. 594
From the above positions, it is evident that the Fundamental Change policy community
opposes public diplomacy efforts that are aimed at regime change or the destabilization of the
Iranian government. In addition to this general public diplomacy stance, Bennis proposes the
need for “broadened participation in people-to-people delegations to Iran,” which denotes a
genuine interaction between the Iranian and United States societies. 595 This recommendation
hints at the need for moving beyond the people-to-people exchanges that are strictly controlled
by the U.S. government. Table 4 gives a list of the members of Fundamental Change policy
community.
Table 4. Fundamental Change policy community
Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Hannes Artens

Current Affiliation

596

Jonathan Cook

597

Affiliation Category

Author

Author

Author

Author

Sasan Fayazmanesh

598

California State University, Fresno

Professor

Ervand Abrahamian

599

City University of New York - Baruch College

Professor

Furman University

Professor

Institute for Policy Studies

Think tank fellow

Institute for Policy Studies

Think tank fellow

Akan Malici

600

Dedrick Muhammad
Farrah Hassen

602

601
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Table 4 continued
8
9
10

Phyllis Bennis 603

Tom O’Donnell
Stephen Zunes

604

605

Institute for Policy Studies

Think tank fellow

The New School

Professor

University of San Francisco

Professor

Institute for Policy Studies is the only major think tank that advocates an Iran policy
incorporating fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy. IPS was founded in 1963 by two
resigning Kennedy administration officials (White House staffer Marcus Raskin and State
Department lawyer Richard Barnett) and began as an organization for the anti-Vietnam War
movement. IPS has continued to oppose America’s successive military interventions, including
the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
As Figure 3 shows, the Iran issue network is composed of 75 think tank fellows, 32
former U.S. government officials, 30 professors, 12 columnists, ten retired military officials,
seven Obama administration officials, five authors, five NGO officials, three advocacy group
members, and three military officers.
The Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities were
dominated by the think tank fellow affiliation category, with 16 out of 33 and 38 out of 83
members respectively. Of the 56 members of the Strategic Engagement policy community, 18
were affiliated with a think tank and another 18 were professors. In the Fundamental Change
policy community, the professor affiliation category had the highest number with 5 members.
Figure 4 gives a breakdown of the four policy communities based on the four affiliation
categories with the highest number of issue network members.
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Figure 3. Number of issue network members in each affiliation category

Figure 4. Breakdown of policy communities by affiliation category

119

Think tank fellows mostly advocated a hawkish engagement strategy (38 individuals),
followed by strategic engagement (18 individuals) and punitive nonengagement (16 individuals).
The same applied for former U.S. government officials, of whom 19 promoted a hawkish
engagement strategy, with the rest advocating strategic engagement (9 individuals) or punitive
nonengagement (4 individuals). No former government official was among the Fundamental
Change policy community. Most professors advocated a strategic engagement approach (18
individuals), followed by hawkish engagement (6 individuals) and fundamental change (5
individuals). The figures 2-4 of this study were generated by the NVivo software.

Policy Communities and the Question of Symmetry
Based on the policy recommendations of the four policy communities, it appears that
symmetrical public diplomacy would only be realized under the foreign policy frameworks set
out by the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities. Figure 5 places
the four policy communities on the professional public relations continuum.
As mentioned in the theory chapter, symmetry requires an organization to actively
engage with its environment, as in an open system, and to be receptive to both symbolic and
behavioral changes while at the same time aiming to change the attitude and behavior of its
stakeholders. 606 The two-way symmetrical public relations approach plays a central role in
raising an organization’s effectiveness in this regard. 607 The two-way asymmetrical model of
public relations, on the other hand, is defined by the practice of using social science and two-way
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communication for the sole purpose of bringing about change in the target population.
Organizations using such measures resist calls for change in the organization itself.

Craft Public Relations
I------------------------------I-------------------------------------I------------------------------I
Propaganda
Press Agentry
Public Information
Journalism

Professional Public Relations
(Excellent public relations)
Pure Asymmetry
Two-way Asymmetrical
Two-way symmetrical
Pure Symmetry
I-------------------------------I-------------------------------------I-------------------------------I
Punitive Nonengagement Hawkish Engagement
Strategic Engagement Fund. Change
Figure 5. Iran policy communities placed on the professional public relations continuum.
Given the centrality of negotiations, dialogue, mutual respect, and change of behavior on
both sides, the Strategic Engagement policy community envisions in its policy recommendations
a symmetrical relationship between Iran and the United States. The public diplomacy
recommendations of the Strategic Engagement policy community show that the anticipated aim
of such endeavors is conflict resolution rather than linear influence. This public diplomacy
approach is in line with the two-way symmetrical model. Similarly, the Fundamental Change
policy community views the only solution to the problematic relationship between the United
States and Iran in structural behavioral changes in U.S. policy toward Iran. Again such a
proposition embodies a symmetrical relationship, which in this case is closer to the pure
symmetry end of the continuum compared with the Strategic Engagement policy community.
While the Fundamental Change policy community advocates symmetry in America’s
relationship with Iran on ethical and legal grounds, the Strategic Engagement policy community
does so because it sees a symmetrical relationship between the United States and Iran as the most
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effective alternative in resolving United States’ challenges in the region. These two positions
together are congruent with the findings of James Grunig and colleagues who argue that two-way
symmetrical public relations practices are the most ethical and the most effective communication
means for an organization to reach its goals. 608 When organizations display a willingness to
change their behavior, their stakeholders more readily accept to compromise.
The foreign policy approaches of the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish
Engagement policy communities stand in sharp contrast to those of the Strategic Engagement
and Fundamental Change policy communities and exemplify an asymmetrical relationship
between the United States and Iran. Here, Iran is deemed an arch enemy of the United States
who poses an existential threat to the United States and Israel. Thus, harmonizing of interests
between the United States and Iran and U.S. openness to change to achieve such harmony are
nonissues. Evidently, the public diplomacy recommendations of these policy communities are in
conflict with a symmetrical perspective. Nonetheless, the Punitive Nonengagement policy
community comes closer to the pure asymmetry end of the continuum as its members perceive
punitive measures to be the only acceptable options when dealing with Iran. Moreover, their
benchmark of success is regime change regardless of Iran’s change of behavior. The Hawkish
Engagement policy community, however, is ready to give some limited incentives to Iran for the
country to change its policies. This short term goal, however, does not preclude necessary
actions to bring down Tehran’s government in the long run. Given this mentality, the purpose of
communication in both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy
communities is to achieve the desired effect in the Iranian society only. Therefore, it is expected
that public diplomacy under a hawkish engagement approach would resemble the two-way
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asymmetrical public relations model. This discussion will be picked up in the conclusion
chapter.
The above examination of the Iran issue network provides a unique contribution to a
more nuanced understanding of the range of policy options being debated regarding the future of
U.S.-Iran relations. The proposed typology in this dissertation is the first of its kind and could
serve as a foundation for future research. Using the policy communities furnished here, other
studies could do a concentrated analysis of the views of the more prominent members of each
policy community paying closer attention to the networks that bind them together. Such network
analyses could focus on the members’ shared organizational affiliations beyond their primary
affiliation noted here, their prior government service, members’ co-authorship of articles, and
citation analysis. Future examination of the funding sources of those think tanks that are most
active in the Iran issue network may also prove beneficial. The role of lobbying groups,
especially the Israel lobby, in the promotion of certain think tanks and policy positions must also
be investigated. A review of the Foreign Agents Registration data could be useful in this regard.
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6. STRUCTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN
This chapter aims to address the study’s fifth and sixth research questions about United
States public diplomacy toward Iran and the policy communities whose views correlated with
these policies. Specifically, the research questions asked the following. What are the policies
that the various offices within the U.S. government have formulated with regard to its public
diplomacy towards Iran, and which of these have been implemented? What role do non-state
actors play in advancing these policies? And which policy communities from the Iran issue
network correlate with the various components of the U.S. government in their policy
preferences?
To fully grasp the current structure of U.S. public diplomacy, it is worthwhile to trace the
development of its components. A little more than four months after its establishment, in
December of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a directive, NSC 4, titled the
“Coordination of Foreign Information Measures,” that became the bedrock for an intertwined
official/private and overt/covert system of political warfare. 609 The directive vested the
Secretary of State with the authority to formulate policies and coordinate the implementation of
all foreign information measures. 610 NSC 4-A, part of the same directive, made the CIA
responsible for conducting necessary covert psychological warfare activities, noting that “in the
interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S.
Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.” 611 With the passage of
the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, in
1948, the mandates of the above directive achieved legislative backing. In 1983, Congress
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founded the National Endowment for Democracy (Public Law 98-164) to take over some of the
covert activities that were carried out by CIA in the previous decades. 612 American public
diplomacy is carried through the totality of the above-mentioned overt measures of information
programs (i.e. sponsored international broadcasting, cultural and educational exchanges, etc.),
covert CIA-directed psychological operations, and works of government-funded nominallyindependent organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy.
An examination of the public diplomacy assets available to the U.S. government reveals
the following elements:









International broadcasting, which includes Voice of America, Radio/TV
Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle
East Broadcasting Network;
State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs
(DRL);
State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs;
National Endowment for Democracy and the family of institutes affiliated
with NED, namely the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
International Republican Institute, the Center for International Private
Enterprise, and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity;
The many non-profit organizations that receive government grants through
USAID to concentrate on democracy promotion, such as the Freedom House;
The Defense Department functions;
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, as the carrier of covert psychological
operations.

As information on CIA and Defense Department activities involving Iran are not
normally disclosed, they are out of the bounds of this dissertation. Hence, State Department
public diplomacy activities, the activities of the National Endowment for Democracy, and
international broadcasting serve as the focus of this study. Also, the study aims to identify the
non-state actors (e.g. NGOs) that contribute to Iran-focused public diplomacy activities as
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grantees of the U.S. government. What follows is a discussion of U.S. public diplomacy toward
Iran.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February 2006 Initiative
In its last two years in office, the Bush administration greatly augmented State
Department’s infrastructure and funding for destabilizing Iran’s political system, to achieve the
policy objective of regime change. This move was set in motion with former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice’s February 15, 2006, request for an additional $75 million for the State
Department’s Iran democracy promotion activities and the subsequent establishment of the
Office of Iran Affairs. 613 In addition, the State Department established Iran monitoring positions
in cities with large Iranian expatriate populations, namely in Dubai, Baku, Istanbul, Frankfurt,
and London. Among their responsibilities were reporting on Iran-related political and economic
developments through their engagement with the regions’ Iranian populations and increased
public diplomacy outreach to Iranians. 614 With these moves, the Bush administration attempted
to restore State Department capabilities of dealing with Iran, resources that have been much
limited compared to those available prior to the 1979 severing of Iranian-American diplomatic
ties.
U.S. support for regime change in Iran is not a new phenomenon. In 1996, for example,
former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) called on the CIA “to force the replacement of the
current regime in Iran,” for which he proposed an $18 million package of funding. 615 The
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regime change agenda got renewed life with expanded funding and allocation of resources in the
Bush administration. In the period between 2006 to 2009 alone, Congress appropriated more
than $200 million for Iran regime change purposes, 616 which is in addition to the reported $400
million of funding under a presidential finding for covert operations to destabilize Iran’s
government. 617
On June 13, 2006, a conference agreement reconciled differences between supplemental
House and Senate spending measures and appropriated $66.1 million for Iran democracy
promotion programs, $9 million less than the amount Secretary Rice had requested. The
supplemental funding was to be used over the course of the next two years. Appropriations
funded $20 million ($5 million above request) for democracy programs in Iran administered
through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and in consultation with the State
Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Congress fully approved $5
million requested for internet and other interactive programming administered through the
Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), and another $5 million requested for
education and cultural exchanges administered through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs (ECA). President Bush signed the bill, the Iran Freedom Support Act, on September 30,
2006. 618
Middle East Partnership Initiative, established by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell in
December 2002, supports Middle Eastern reformers “to create educational opportunity at a
grassroots level, promote economic opportunity and help foster private sector development, and
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to strengthen civil society and the rule of law throughout the region.” 619 MEPI is managed by
the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Bureau of International Information
Programs’ initiatives include print and electronic publications as well as screening and planning
traveling and electronically transmitted speaker programs. IIP also manages State Department’s
America.gov website, which has a Farsi section. IIP’s Digital Outreach Team participates in
Farsi discussion forums to advocate U.S. policy. 620 According to its website, Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs is “including Iranians in a broad range of traditional
educational, professional, and cultural exchange programs for the first time since 1979.” 621 ECA
programs include scholarships for student exchange and leadership programs for target
countries’ elite. Among its Iran activities, ECA has planned and administered sport exchanges
with Iran as part of its sport diplomacy program. 622 IIP and ECA, formerly part of the United
States Information Agency, were integrated into the State Department in 1999.
In her February 15, 2006 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Secretary Rice said that her request for increased funding was indicative of “a new effort to
support the aspirations of the Iranian people.” 623 She said that the extra $75 million public
diplomacy funding, which was in addition to the $10 million that Congress had already
approved, would be used in part “to develop support networks for Iranian reformers, political
dissidents, and human rights activists.” 624 Rice said the Treasury Department would lift U.S.
restrictions to allow U.S. funding of American NGOs who have dealings with Iranian trade
unions, political dissidents, and nongovernmental organizations. Rice also tangentially
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mentioned her new plans for transforming the State Department workforce to better
accommodate the new Iran policy.
The increased attention to Iran democracy promotion came in the context of the Iran
Freedom and Support Act of 2005, which appropriated $10 million and directed the President of
the United States to use these funds to help groups opposing the Iranian government. 625
President Bush praised the congressional move as a first step to promote Iran’s opposition groups
to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Also, the reallocation of resources to tackle Iran policy came
as part of Secretary Rice’s vision for transformational diplomacy, which is defined in her words
as the “effort to use our diplomacy literally to change the world.” 626
Following Secretary Rice’s testimony, at a press briefing on the new Iran initiative, an
unnamed senior State Department official said that the increased funding is just “a down
payment” for efforts to come. 627 This new effort, according to the State Department official, was
to highlight United States’ concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, its support for terrorist
organizations, and its democracy deficit. She acknowledged that there are restraints on what the
United States can do in Iran given the lack of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, but added, “What
we can do is show support for those in Iranian society ... who wish to see a different type of Iran,
who wish to see further democracy and freedoms both for the press as well as for political
figures and individual citizens.” 628
Another unnamed senior State Department official at the same briefing said the United
States will capitalize on many of the programs that are already in place in support of Iranian
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labor unions, dissidents, and human rights activists. The official said civil society organization is
the key to bringing about positive change in Iran. The State Department official, however,
dismissed the idea of working with existing non-governmental organizations in Iran because, as
she said, they all have been penetrated by the Iranian government agents. “The challenge is to
help to organize other networks and help to take some of the extremely brave people who are
risking their lives to speak out against the regime,” the official said. 629 For now, the official said,
the State Department will work through the intermediary of American and international NGOs
until it can help organize other networks free of the Iranian government infiltration.
One such organization is the New Haven-based Griffin Center for Health and Human
Rights, which received a grant of $1.6 million of the $3.5 million the U.S. government spent on
democracy promotion in 2004 to start the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. Among its
activities, the center held a human rights workshop in Dubai for Iranian dissidents. According to
a New York Times Magazine report, Emadeddin Baghi, an Iranian dissident, sent some of his
family members to attend the workshops under the impression that the project was a U.N.sponsored event. 630 Upon arrival, Baghi said, the participants found themselves in a crash course
on successful popular revolts. Several members of Otpor – the Serbian youth movement
instrumental in ousting Slobodan Milosevic – were present, and “portions of ‘A Force More
Powerful,’ a three-hour documentary series featuring civil-resistance movements overcoming
authoritarian rule around the world, was also screened.” 631 Participants were trained on how to
use Hushmail (an encrypted e-mail account) and Martus (a secure open-source software) to
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effectively and securely transfer information about human rights abuses. Participants were given
the software to take back to Iran.
These activities have not gone unnoticed to Iranian authorities. “American officials have
been inviting Iranian figures to so-called academic seminars over the past few years,” said
former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif. “However, when the Iranians
attend these sessions, they realize they have gathered to discuss measures to topple the Iranian
government.” 632
Ramin Ahmadi, the Iranian-American founder of the Griffin Center and a board member
of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, has new plans to translate “a sort of activist
computer game developed by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict” into Farsi. 633
Players could use the game to construct certain scenarios to play in, “like women rising up
against a clerical regime.” Ahmadi plans to smuggle the games into Iran to be mass copied. He
believes, “There will be 20,000 copies on the street in one week.” 634
According to a State Department fact sheet released on February 15, 2006, the $15
million (increased to $20 million by Congress) was designated to “foster participation in the
political process and support efforts to expand internet access as a tool for civic organization.” 635
The funding was to be spent with the help of “organizations such as the International Republican
Institute, National Democratic Institute and National Endowment for Democracy.” 636
Shortly after the supplemental budget request for Iran, the Office of Middle East
Partnership Initiative announced “an open competition for grant applications that support
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democratic governance and reform in Iran.” 637 Applicants were asked to outline their proposed
activities and demonstrate how their proposed program would “achieve sustainable impact in
Iran.” 638 Awards were said to range from $100,000 to $1 million for up to two years, with the
possibility of an additional year of funding for projects that demonstrate results. According to a
March 3, 2006 Congressional Research Service report, the State Department’s Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which works with MEPI on grant awards, selects
grantees that further the priority areas of “political party development, media development, labor
rights, civil society promotion, and promotion of respect for human rights.” 639
NGOs with Iran-focused initiatives can also receive grants through the United States
Agency for International Development’s (USAID) democracy promotion programs. USAID’s
total “democracy and governance” grants for FY 2007 and FY 2008 amounted to about $12.7
and $14.0 million, respectively. 640
Specific information on Iran expenditures is not provided. USAID, however, gives the
following criteria for potential Iran-focused grantees:
Applications should advance one or more of the following objectives: strengthening civil
society organization and advocacy; increasing awareness of and strengthening the rule of
law; and expanding freedom of information. USAID intends to make several awards
under this APS for a total of up to $20 million. Applicants can request $100,000 to
$3,000,000 for expenditure for a maximum of two years. 641
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The USAID application instructions indicate, “Programs that have a strong academic or research
focus will not be considered.” 642 Also, programs that aim to support or advance the agenda of
specific Iranian political parties do not meet the requirements for a USAID grant.

Office of Iranian Affairs
With the establishment of the Office of Iranian Affairs (OIA), the Bush administration
institutionalized its moves to bolster opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. On March 3,
2006, State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli announced that the State Department was
to set up the Office of Iranian Affairs to supervise and administer the expenditure of funds
associated with Secretary Rice’s February 15 Iran initiative, to augment Department of State
public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population, and to monitor Iran issues. 643 OIA which
was created within State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs was supported by a team
of Washington-based and regional Foreign Service officers. According to Ereli, of the new
posts, one was located in the State Department’s Department of Human Rights and Labor, and
eight were field positions based in regions with significant Iranian populations: Dubai, London,
Frankfort, Baku and Istanbul.
Explaining the logic for creating these posts, Ereli said, “Iran is and is going to continue
to be a very important country. We need to develop a cadre of foreign service officers who
speak Farsi, who understand the region, not just Iran but the region where Iran has influence and
reach.” 644
In a hearing on “United States Policy toward Iran” before the House Committee on
International Relations, former State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas
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Burns described the creation of the new American presence posts in American embassies and
consulates outside of Iran in the context of the Riga station that was set up in the 1920s to watch
Russia in the absence of an American embassy there. “We sent young diplomats like George
Kennan to Riga, and we created Riga Station. That station watched the Soviet Union from a
close distance,” Burns said. 645 The new posts were in essence American stations to watch Iran.
Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, voiced his criticism of the State
Department’s new approach saying, as quoted in London’s Financial Times, “Dubai is crawling
with Iranian intelligence. Every Gucci wearing Iranian exile without a day job is for democracy
now.” 646
In a May 19, 2006, article, Laura Rozen of the Los Angeles Times described the new
Iranian office in the context of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. Rozen wrote that OIA
will work in conjunction with a newly created “Iranian directorate” at the Pentagon, “set up
inside its policy shop, which previously housed the Office of Special Plans. The controversial
intelligence analysis unit, established before the Iraq War, championed some of the claims of
Ahmad Chalabi.” 647 Among those staffing or advising the new Pentagon Iran directorate,
according to Rozen, are “three veterans of the Office of Special Plans: Abram Shulsky, its
former director; John Triglio, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst; and Ladan Archin, an Iran
specialist.” 648
According to the New Yorker magazine, the outlines of the $85 million Iran Freedom
Agenda had been developed by Elizabeth Cheney, the Vice-President’s daughter who was the
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Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Cheney had been
assisted by J. Scott Carpenter and David Denehy, two Near Eastern Affairs officials who had
both worked in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. 649 Elizabeth Cheney became the
head of the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group (ISOG), which was established in March
2006 as part of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. The unit was dismantled
in late May 2007 as it was increasingly seen as a regime change operation group similar to the
special committee group in the run up to the Iraq war. 650
The dismantlement coincided with a May 22 ABC News report that President Bush had
given the CIA permission to subvert Iran’s government with a “coordinated campaign of
propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation of Iran’s currency and international financial
transactions.” 651 ABC reported that Deputy National Security Adviser Elliot Abrams, who cochaired the disbanded ISOG, spearheaded the covert action. Abrams’ involvement in the Reagan
administration’s regime change operations against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government led to
criminal charges in 1990. He was pardoned by President George H. W. Bush in late 1992 after
pleading guilty in October 1991 to “two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from
Congress.” 652 Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker magazine also reported in 2008 that Congress
had agreed in late 2007 to President Bush’s request for $400 million to fund the CIA covert
action in Iran. 653
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In press reports following the creation of the Office of Iranian Affairs, David Denehy was
often referred to as the head of the office. In an article he wrote for the Journal of International
Security Affairs Denehy is introduced as “a Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
of the United States Department of State, where he served as the Iran Freedom Agenda
Coordinator (2005-2007).” 654 According to a June 24, 2007, article by Negar Azimi in the New
York Times Magazine, Denehy was “a veteran of democracy promotion programs in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia with the International Republican Institute [an arm of the
congressionally-funded National Endowment for Democracy] and a close associate of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz during the Iraq War, [where] he served in Baghdad from
June to October 2003.” 655 Denehy resigned from his position at the Department of State on
October 26, 2007.
David Denehy’s Journal of International Security Affairs article entitled “The Iranian
Democracy Imperative” leaves no doubt of the regime change motive. After outlining the
existential threat Iran’s government poses for the United States, Denehy argues that the only
respite is “revolution, not evolution.” 656 “The answer to the question of how to curb Iran’s
international misbehavior is fundamentally simple,” wrote Denehy, “change the nature of the
relationship between the people of Iran and their leaders.” 657
Denehy believes many indicators necessary for revolution are present in Iranian society:
half of the population is under 24 with little or no emotional tie to the 1979 revolution; Iran has a
highly educated population; and there is high potential for dissent. Denehy believes that the
United States should provide “a broad spectrum of moral, technical, and financial assistance” to
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lift the revolution project from the ground. 658 An important element, according to Denehy, is the
engagement of Iranian diaspora who could then take the freedom agenda inside Iran. Engaging
the Iranian diaspora with the freedom agenda was clearly an important factor in the decision to
create several State Department presence posts in countries with large Iranian populations (in
Dubai and Europe). These posts in essence were to operate as shadow embassies, a topic picked
up in the coming section.
Richard Haass, former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy-planning director and
now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, expressed concern that the State
Department’s new Iran initiative reveals a growing contradiction in the Bush administration’s
Iran policy. Haass, who was quoted in the Los Angeles Times, said, “We are telling Iran, ‘We
want regime change, but while you’re still here, we’d like to negotiate with you to stop your
nuclear program.” 659 Haass recalls his days at the State Department, as quoted in The New
Yorker magazine:
I was in one camp, and the Vice-President’s office and the O.S.D. “-the Office of the
Secretary of Defense-” in the other. There were two very different schools of thought.
One, that the U.S. ought to ‘engage’ Iran, offer the Iranians as much of a dialogue as they
were prepared to have, to extend these concrete and political benefits, but only if we get
what we want. The problem is that a lot of people in the government have been wedded
to the idea of “regime change.” They thought the regime was vulnerable, and
engagement would throw the Iranians a lifeline. I believed then and I believe now that
they are dead wrong. History shows that the U.S. and Iran can do some business. 660
Rice’s initiative was received with skepticism among some Iran specialists as they
believed the initiative could be seen as U.S. meddling in Iran’s internal affairs, which could
inflame nationalist fervor among Iranians and strengthen public support of Iran’s nuclear
program. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was among this
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group of specialists as he told the Boston Globe, “I don’t think it will help democracy, and I
don’t think it will solve the Iran issue.” 661
On March 13, 2006, ten days after the announcement about the creation of the new Office
of Iranian Affairs, Iran allocated $15 million to “probe and defuse” American conspiracies and
interventions in the country, Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported. 662 On the
same day Iran’s foreign ministry again objected to Washington’s plan to spend $75 million in the
Islamic Republic as an “intervention move,” the IRNA reported. 663 A U.S. allocation of funds
for pro-democracy activities in Iran is a “blatant violation of Washington’s commitments under
the Algeria Declaration, by intervention into Iran’s internal affairs,” the ministry said in a letter
to the U.S. Interest Section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran. 664 “Based on the Algeria
Declaration, Iran reserves the right to refer the U.S. violation of its commitments to legal and
political actions,” the foreign ministry said. 665 Under the Algeria Declaration, also known as the
Algiers Accord, of January 19, 1981, the United States pledged not to interfere in Iran’s internal
affairs. 666 “The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United
States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs,”
reads Point 1 of the Accords. 667
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Shadow Embassies
According to a March 6, 2006, unclassified State Department cable, which was posted
online by the Center for American Progress Action Fund, a Washington-based think tank, the
Office of Iranian Affairs is part of an:
initiative [that] will enhance our capacity to respond to the full spectrum of threats Iran
poses, to reach out to the Iranian people to support their desire for freedom and
democracy, over the long-term, reestablish a cadre of Iran experts within the Foreign
Service. Additionally, these new positions are part of the Global Diplomatic
Repositioning Strategy to support transformational diplomacy and the President’s
Freedom Agenda. 668
The cable announced “the establishment of three new, Iran-focused initiatives” in Dubai,
Europe, and Washington. With the establishment of a Dubai-based central Iran-focused
Regional Presence Post and four dedicated reporting positions in American embassies in Baku,
Istanbul, Frankfurt, and London, the State Department aimed to enhance its political/economic
reporting on Iran and direct public diplomacy outreach to Iranians. Reflecting on Burn’s
statement that the new Iran initiative is a sort of throwback to Cold War-era Soviet monitoring
efforts, the cable states that the Dubai Regional Presence Post, in particular, is modeled on
Riga. 669
Capitalizing on “its proximity to Iran and access to an Iranian diaspora numbering in the
hundreds of thousands,” Dubai is designated as the central location for the network of Regional
Presence Posts that together act as a shadow embassy. The Dubai post was staffed with four
Farsi speaking Foreign Service Officers – i.e. director, deputy director/public diplomacy officer,
an economic reporting officer, and the Iran watcher already positioned in Dubai – one office
management specialist, and four locally engaged staff. The director oversees the activities of the
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rest of the staff and is authorized “to speak for the U.S. government on Iran issues to local
government officials, the private sector, and media representatives.” 670
The deputy director has the responsibility to plan and coordinate public diplomacy efforts
to the Iranian people in general, especially the region’s 560,000 Iranian immigrants and the
10,000 Iranian students in UAE. The cable lists nine responsibilities for the deputy director
position. The deputy director is responsible to target and increase Iranian participation in the
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and State Department’s Bureau of Democracy Human
Rights and Labor (DRL) programs. He/she is to increase “engagement with Iranian people and
UAE’s huge Iranian community through Iran-related speaker programs, DVCs [Digital VideoConferencing], and American studies programs to promote U.S. policy on human rights,
democracy, terrorism, and non-proliferation.” The deputy has to find ways to support Iranian
political and civic organizations both financially and through U.S. government programs,
including organizing “series of NGO-sponsored conferences on Iran.” He/she has to assist MEPI
and DRL in the identification of potential pro-democracy groups inside and outside Iran. Also,
in consultation with Iran political officer, the deputy needs to notify Washington if there is a
“need to issue statements on behalf of Iranian dissidents.” 671
Several of the duties of the deputy director involve engagement with Iranian students. In
partnership with U.S. universities, the deputy is to organize “Study in the United States”
seminars “to recruit Iranian students.” Of the other duties of the deputy director is arranging for
the establishment of American studies programs at UAE universities, with the Iranian students as
the target. In line with Secretary Rice’s policy of significantly increasing the Iranian student
body studying in the United States, the deputy director is responsible to directly advise Iranian
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students who wish to study in the United States. The deputy is also in charge of identifying and
processing exchange candidates for State Department’s educational and exchange programs. 672
The economic officer at Dubai informs Washington of significant economic
developments in Iran, with particular attention to Iran’s petroleum sector. Information of
significant value involves analysis of problems in key sectors of Iran’s economy, especially the
petroleum industry, and information on “terrorism finance, sanctions impact, and Iranian
economic ties with other regional and international partners and companies.” Also, the
economic officer is to report on potential economic corruption among Iranian leaders. 673
The four officers stationed in the European cities are responsible to develop contacts with
the Iranian expatriate community in their respective regions and are to provide Washington with
“information and analysis on developments within the Iranian expatriate community” and “on
Iranian foreign policy efforts” in their region. Notably, the cable states that these activities are to
be carried out “in consultation with EUR [Europe].” The Iran watcher in Istanbul engages the
Iranian community in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Tel Aviv. The officers in Frankfurt and
London are to report on developments in Germany and United Kingdom respectively. The Baku
office is responsible for monitoring developments within the Iranian community in Baku, the
Caucasus, and Turkmenistan, “with a particular emphasis on Caspian oil issues.” 674
The Office of Iranian Affairs functions as “the nexus” for the “network of designated Iran
watcher positions at overseas posts” and is responsible for providing them with policy guidance
and coordinating all Iran-related activities. The office has the authority to program, administer,
and track the democracy fund money for Iran. The office oversees the activities of the grantees
and reports on the progress of their work to the Treasury Department, makes outreach to
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congressional staff, and act as the liaison between the U.S. government and NGOs and the
Iranian diaspora. 675

Congressional Response to Secretary Rice’s 2006 Initiative
On April 4, 2006, Condoleezza Rice defended the 75-million-dollar budget measure to
promote democracy in Iran, saying the United States must speak out about the plight of Iranians.
“I don’t think speaking softly about the democracy problem in Iran is really the appropriate
course,” Rice testified before the House Appropriations Committee. 676
At the hearing, Representative David Obey (D-WI) said he had very little faith in
prospects for success of the outreach effort. He said it could be characterized as a regime destabilization package and could be easily discredited by the Tehran government. Questioning the
openness of the initiative, he asked:
If we are going to engage in activity like that, why on earth would we be as public about
it as we’ve been. It’s simply giving that regime an opportunity to claim that virtually
every piece of information which is produced is disinformation from us. I mean, why are
we making it easier for them to blame us for interfering in their affairs by being so public
about something like this? 677
Rice answered that U.S. officials have heard from Iranians and frequent visitors to the
country that the people of Iran want to hear the United States speak about their plight, and she
said the experience of the Cold War era suggests they will not dismiss the U.S. message out of
hand. In this regard, Rice said:
I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that Iranians believe what their government says about
that. I remember in the days of Radio Free Europe and Voice of America that the Soviet
Union and the Eastern European governments made the same claims about those. And
people listened to them in droves anyway and they got the information they needed. And

675

Ibid.
Condoleezza Rice, State Department's Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations for Foreign Assistance Programs
(Washington, DC: Federal News Service, 2006), www.lexisnexis.com.
677
Ibid.
676

142

they sustained their hopes of one day being part of a democracy, even though their
governments said the same things. 678
“I think we do have to be very public about it,” she added, since budgetary process requires the
administration to be public about the Iran program.
But one of the senior State Department officials who participated at the background
briefing on Secretary Rice’s new Iran initiative on February 15, 2006, acknowledged that the
administration would be somewhat secretive about its operations. “We don’t want to hurt the
people we’re trying to help,” the official said. 679 “We understand very well that people that we
begin to work with will become targets and so, I think that you will see us not being as public as
we might otherwise be about specific individuals we’re working with.” 680
According to a January 2009 Congressional Research Service report, in 2008 State
Department renewed its request for an additional $75 million, of which Congress approved $60.7
million. 681 Of the funds appropriated, $21.6 million was set aside for pro-democracy programs,
“including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries.” 682 An additional
$7.9 million was approved for use by the State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor
(DRL) as “Development Funds.” Another $5.5 million was appropriated for educational and
exchange programs with Iran, and $33.6 million for broadcasting. The Department of State has
made a request for $65 million for fiscal year 2009 “to support the aspirations of the Iranian
people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civil participation, media
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freedom, and freedom of information.” The funds are to provide $20 million “for democracy
promotion in Iran to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza.” 683
Notably, original House and Senate bills provided only $25 million for Iran democracy
programs citing concerns over State Department’s inadequate justification for the requested
funding, State Department’s inability to obligate the amount of funding appropriated for FY
2006, and the threat posed to the recipients of such funds. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) voiced
the committee’s concerns thus:
The Committee supports the goals of promoting democracy in Iran, but received a total of
only one page of justification material for the request of $75,000,000 for this program.
The Committee is particularly concerned that grantees suspected of receiving U.S.
assistance have been harassed and arrested by the Government of Iran for their prodemocracy activities. 684
Senator Leahy, then, recommends that the administration seek funding for Iran democracy
project under the guise of a different appropriation function. Similar concerns were voiced by
Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) of the House Appropriations Committee:
The Committee recommendation includes $25,000,000 for programs in Iran, which is
$50,000,000 below the request. The Committee is concerned that of the $25,000,000
appropriated for democracy programs in Iran in fiscal year 2006, less than $2,000,000
had been expended as of the end of May 2007. The Committee is further concerned at the
lack of adequate justification for the funds that have been requested in fiscal year
2008. 685
On June 19, 2007, Representative Ander Crenshaw (R-FL) 686 and Senator Joe Lieberman
(I-CT) proposed amendments that increased the funding in the House and Senate bills to $50 and
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$75 million, respectively. 687 The final $60 million was enacted as a result of a compromise
between the House and Senate in conference. 688
On June 4, 2007, a State Department report indicated that it had expended about $16.05
million (out of $20 million) for Iran democracy programs from the FY 2006 regular and
supplemental budgets, administered through MEPI ($11.9 million) and the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL $4.15 million). Also, $1.77 million (out of $5
million) had been used for information programs, and $2.22 million (out of $5 million) had been
obligated through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. 689
In late September of 2008, Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) introduced the “Fair
Dealing with Iran Act of 2008” which prohibits the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of Defense from covert operations to overthrow the government of Iran except in
time of war. 690 The bill is based on Representative Lee’s unsuccessful attempt to make an
amendment to the House Committee on Rules for consideration to the 2009 Intelligence
Authorization Act, H.R. 5959. The amendment would have prohibited the use of authorized
intelligence funds to support or maintain covert action aimed at overthrowing a government of a
member nation of the United Nations. No congressional action has been made, however, to
prohibit the use of democracy promotion programs for regime change purposes. 691
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The Reaction of Iranian Opposition Groups
Iranian opposition activists almost unanimously disagreed with the Bush administration
decision to finance Iranian opposition groups. Most expressed the belief that the policy of
funding Iran’s dissidents will prove to be counterproductive. In an interview on “The NewsHour
with Jim Lehrer” on PBS television, for example, winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize Shirin
Ebadi said, “I don’t think that it [U.S. funding of Iran’s dissidents] benefits me or people like me,
because whoever speaks about democracy in Iran will be accused of having been paid by the
United States.” 692
In an April 4, 2006, report for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Golnaz Esfandiari wrote
“prominent activists and political opponents of Iran’s hard-line administration are warning that
U.S. funds designated to help civic groups could backfire” and have “rejected such aid as ‘an
insult’ to the Iranian people.” 693 The RFE/RL report quoted Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, a cofounder of the Center for Human Rights Defenders, saying:
Democracy is not a product that we can import from another country. We have to
prepare the ground for it so that it can grow and bear fruit – especially because
independent and national forces, and also self-reliant forces, in Iran will never accept a
foreign country telling them what to do and which way to take. 694
Voice of America’s Gary Thomas, in a report from Tehran on July 14, 2006, quoted
Emadeddin Baghi, another prominent opposition figure as saying, “I admire America as a
dynamic democratic country, but I cringe at U.S. statements about promoting democracy in Iran.
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Democracy has to be indigenous and homegrown so people do not think that it was bought with
Bush administration broadcasts and money.” 695
The Washington Post writer Robin Wright reported on October 11, 2007, that 25 prodemocracy groups had signed an open letter to appeal Congress to cut or eliminate the Iran
democracy promotion fund. An excerpt from the letter organized by the National Iranian
American Council, the American Conservative Defense Alliance, and the Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation read, “Iranian reformers believe democracy cannot be imported
and must be based on indigenous institutions and values. Intended beneficiaries of the funding –
human rights advocates, civil society activists and others – uniformly denounce the program.” 696
Opponents of the “Iran democracy slush fund” urged the Bush administration and Congress to
scrap the counterproductive initiative “in favor of a more permissive U.S. stance toward the
operation of U.S. nonprofit organizations in Iran.” 697 As of now, U.S. sanctions prohibit
American NGOs and non-profit organizations from dealings with Iran unless they apply for a
license from the Department of Treasury. Under the present conditions, the U.S. government
effectively controls which non-state actors it deems suitable to engage in pro-democracy
activities in Iran.
Against this current of public outcry from Iranian, American, and Iranian-American
individuals and organizations, some Iranian opposition figures defended the Bush
administration’s request for the funding. “Don’t believe it when people say Iran’s democracy
activists don’t want U.S. help,” wrote Akbar Atri, a former Iranian student leader and a member
695

Gary Thomas, "Iran Reformists Say they are Down, but Not Out," Voice of America, July 14, 2006,
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/jul/1121.html.
696
Robin Wright, "Cut Iran Democracy Funding, Groups Tell U.S.: Iranian Americans, Others Say Program has
Backfired," Washington Post, October 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/10/AR2007101002441.html.
697
Haleh Esfandiari and Robert S. Litwak, "When Promoting Democracy is Counterproductive," The Chronicle of
Higher Education, October 19, 2007, http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i08/08b00701.htm.

147

of the Committee on Present Danger, in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal. 698 Atri
intensely questioned the merits of Iranian-American opposition to the new Iran policy, saying
they do not represent the people of Iran. “With some help from their American allies,” insisted
Atri, “Iranian democrats are brave enough and capable enough to achieve for their country what
the likes of Mahatma Gandhi and Vaclav Havel achieved for theirs.” 699
Some exiled opposition groups were also quick to lobby for a prominent role in the
regime change agenda. Ramesh Setehrrad, president of the Washington-based National
Committee for Women for a Democratic Iran, told the Boston Globe that the administration
would find it hard to fund any outside opposition organizations as they are mostly associated
with the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO) or with monarchists. 700 A number of MKO
supporters in the Congress, including Representatives Tom Tancredo (R-CO) and Bob Filner (DCA), have been pressing for the removal of the group from State Department’s list of terrorist
organizations. 701 Also a government team, accompanied by David Denehy, the State
Department Iran policy coordinator, and Ladan Archin, a Pentagon Iran specialist, made a trip to
Los Angeles in 2006 to meet with monarchists and their affiliated media outlets. 702 The move
may have been made in part “to create a buzz within the Iranian American diaspora and its
satellite media outlets, which are beamed into Iran,” Los Angeles Times reported. 703
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National Endowment for Democracy
In its concerted effort to undermine Iran’s government, the Bush administration used all
public diplomacy assets available for influencing the elite and general Iranian public, including
the National Endowment for Democracy. As was mentioned earlier, in her February 15, 2006,
testimony, Secretary Rice specifically noted that the $15 million of requested funding (increased
to $20 million by Congress) was to be administered mainly through the NED and two members
of its family of grant-seeking organizations, namely the International Republican Institute and
the National Democratic Institute. Working through these organizations, Rice said, “we will
support civic education and work to help organize Iranian labor unions and political
organizations.” 704
By this time, the Bush administration had substantially increased NED’s role in
democracy promotion activities in the Middle East. In his remarks on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of NED’s establishment in 2003, President George W. Bush inaugurated his vision
of a Middle East transformed by democracy, given as an intended by-product of the Iraq War.
With regard to Iran, Bush said, “The regime in Tehran must heed the democratic demands of the
Iranian people or lose its last claim to legitimacy.” 705 President Bush requested Congress to
double funding for NED to $80 million (in FY 2005) from $40 million (in FY 2004).
Congressional appropriation, however, increased NED’s budget to just $59.8 million. With the
addition of $19.5 million for specific countries and regions, the final NED funding amounted to
about $79 million for FY 2005. The increased funding was restricted to democracy promotion
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efforts in the Middle East. The administration again requested $80 million of funding in its FY
2006 budget request, and received $74.1 million for NED. 706
NED was founded through an act of Congress in 1983 (Public Law 98-164) as one of
several means to promote democracy around the world. 707 This act also authorized
congressional funding of projects to support the growth of democratic institutions abroad through
the United States Information Agency (USIA), United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of State. NED was established to carry what
had been done through the clandestine auspices of the CIA during the initial decades of the Cold
War. As Allen Weinstein, the acting president of the NED in 1984, said in a 1991 interview with
the Washington Post, “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” 708
NED explicates its connection with the CIA in the “NED History” page of its website:
In the aftermath of World War II, faced with threats to our democratic allies and without
any mechanism to channel political assistance, U.S. policy makers resorted to covert
means, secretly sending advisers, equipment, and funds to support newspapers and parties
under siege in Europe. When it was revealed in the late 1960's that some American
PVO’s [Private Voluntary Organizations] were receiving covert funding from the CIA to
wage the battle of ideas at international forums, the Johnson Administration concluded
that such funding should cease, recommending establishment of "a public-private
mechanism" to fund overseas activities openly. 709
Some doubt that NED’s democracy promotion activities are anything but the promotion
of favored politicians and political parties abroad at the expense of U.S. taxpayer dollars. As
Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) writes, “It is particularly Orwellian to call U.S. manipulation of
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foreign elections ‘promoting democracy.’” 710 This is especially the case in poorer countries
were the injection of a hundred thousand dollars will greatly skew election results in favor of the
helped politicians. “How would Americans feel if the Chinese arrived with millions of dollars to
support certain candidates deemed friendly to China? Would this be viewed as a democratic
development?” Ron Paul asks. 711
Although it is almost entirely government-funded, NED benignly introduces itself as “a
private, nonprofit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the
world through nongovernmental efforts.” 712 According to NED’s 2007 annual report, of its total
support and revenue funding ($106,581,863), 99.8 percent ($106,408,363) comes from the U.S.
government (i.e. congressional appropriation and funding flowing through other government
bodies such as the State Department). The other 0.2 percent ($173,500) is from nongovernmental sources. 713 “The convoluted organizational structure seems to be based on the
premise that government money, if filtered through enough layers of bureaucracy, becomes
‘private’ funding, an illogical and dangerously misleading assumption.” 714
More than half of NED grants flow down to its four “core” grantees that represent the
two U.S. political parties, a segment of the U.S. labor, and organized business interests.
Specifically, the NED family constitutes the Republican Party’s International Republican
Institute (IRI); the Democratic Party’s National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(NDIIA); the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), associated with the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce; and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS),
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associated with the AFL-CIO. 715 Former House speaker Richard A. Gephardt serves as NED’s
current chairman.

NED’s Work in Iran and Non-State Actors
One of the venues for non-state actors to participate in U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to
implement projects as grantees of NED. According to the NED’s online Democracy Projects
Database, the following groups have received grants from the NED between 1990 and 2007: Iran
Teachers Association in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2002, and 2003 (a total of $316,860);
Foundation for Democracy in Iran in 1995 and 1996 (a total of $75,000); National Iranian
American Council in 2002, 2005, 2006 (a total of $196,000); Women’s Learning Partnership in
2003 ($115,000); Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and
2007 (a total of $450,000); Vital Voices Global Partnership in 2004 ($40,500); Institute of World
Affairs in 2005 ($45,800); Civic Education and Human Rights in 2006 ($100,000); and Freedom
of Information and Human Rights in 2007 (amount not reported). In addition, three of NED’s
core grantees were among its Iran-focused grant recipients: Center for the International Private
Enterprise (CIPE) in 2004 and 2006 (a total of $212,497); International Republican Institute (IPI)
in 2005 ($110,000); and American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) in 2005
($185,000). 716 Appendix C gives the highlights of the NED-funded projects as provided in
NED’s online Democracy Projects Database.
NED also has a Farsi website, Panjereh (window in Farsi), that targets both Iranian and
Afghan populations. While the information for the Afghan target audience appears to be benign,
such as a book about family rights, the information targeting the Iranian public openly espouses
regime change in Iran. The site features a Farsi translation of the book Nonviolent Struggle – 50
715
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Crucial Points – A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics. 717 The book is a publication of
Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in Belgrade, Serbia, and is
available for download in five languages (French, Spanish, English, Farsi, and Arabic) from the
official website of CANVAS. 718 CANVAS is an NGO formed in 2003 by anti Slobodan
Milosevic activists after the overthrow of Milosevic in 2000. According to the organization’s
website, “CANVAS trainers and consultants support nonviolent democratic movements through
transfer of knowledge on strategies and tactics of nonviolent struggle.” 719 CANVAS lists Iran
among five countries that is said to be the scene of “non-violent movements that are struggling to
overthrow their authoritarian regimes.” 720 The other four are: Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe, and
West Papua. The book comes under the title of civil society education.
It appears that the State Department-sponsored Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
workshop in Dubai used the same group to train Iranian dissidents to bring down Iran’s
government, as is evident from the reports on the Dubai conference organized in 2005. 721

Freedom House
Freedom House is another important actor in United States public diplomacy toward Iran.
Like the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House is said to be an “independent
nongovernmental organization” 722 that, nevertheless, receives more than 80 percent of its
funding through congressional appropriations and other government grants. Freedom House’s
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2006 Form 990 tax return indicates that, of Freedom House’s total revenue ($26,266,878), about
85.4 percent ($22,436,883) comes from government contributions. 723
The organization was founded in 1941 by Wendell Willkie and Eleanor Roosevelt to give
support to President Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy for United States to enter World War II.
Upon the ending of the war, “Freedom House took up the struggle against the other 20th century
totalitarian threat, Communism.” 724 Today, the agenda of the organization is to fight the threat
of “radical Islam.” 725
On March 31, 2006, Financial Times reported that Freedom House was among several
NGOs “selected by State Department for ‘clandestine activities’ inside Iran.” 726 In a 2006
testimony before the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Palmer, then vice-chairman of
Freedom House’s board of trustees, advocated an increase in U.S. government funding for NGOs
to help support the non-violent overthrow of non-democratic governments. Palmer argued that
funding should be shifted away from already democratic nations to higher priority “Not Free”
nations. 727
In the case of the Freedom House’s efforts in this regard, Palmer said, “Our NGO
funding for media is overwhelmingly for training. Imagine the credibility and influence if Iran’s
national student movement had its own radio and therefore voice.”728 Palmer also advocated
regime change in Iran saying, “A non-violent overthrow is precisely the main topic on the minds
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of a majority of Iranians.” 729 He made a proposition that U.S. government establish “an
Independent TV and Radio Fund” to have “its own board to ensure that stations receiving
support adhere to international broadcasting standards and promote non-violent transitions to
democracy.” 730 Palmer believes that such a fund could spend $100 million per year. Palmer, in
the position of the chairman of the Freedom House’s board of trustees, is in effect advocating a
return to clandestine funding of purportedly local media, i.e. the CIA’s clandestine establishment
and funding of Radio Free Europe and its sister stations. Palmer also made the recommendation
for “a special Students for Global Democracy Fund” run by students and youth leaders from the
universities and youth groups of democratic countries to provide training and financial support to
“student and youth groups committed to action” in “Not Free” societies. 731 He said this is an
imperative given the hesitation on the part of existing NGOs to render such support.
According to Freedom House’s 2007 annual report, the quasi-governmental organization
supports Iranian “pro-democracy reformers and human rights defenders by connecting them, via
the internet, to resources and counterparts worldwide.” 732 Most prominently, it established in
September 2006 a monthly, bilingual Farsi/English online journal, entitled Gozaar
(“Transition”), devoted to “democracy and human rights in Iran.” 733 Gozaar also features
relevant educational and informational resources for Iranian reformists. Ladan Boroumand is
one of Gozaar’s Advisory Council members. She is the co-founder and research director of the
Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, which is one of the regular grantees of the National
Endowment for Democracy. 734
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U.S. International Broadcasting
The origin of American international broadcasting goes back to the birth of Voice of
America in 1942 during the Second World War. Ever since, international broadcasting has been
an important element of United States propaganda measures. This has been the case during the
Second World War, the Cold War, and in the years following the September 11 terror attacks.
Broadcasting to Iran has been a high priority, especially after September 11, 2001. This section
gives an overview of the structure of U.S. international broadcasting, paying special attention to
those targeting Iran. These include, the Voice of America Persian News Network and Radio
Farda (which means tomorrow in Persian). Today, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has
operational authority over all elements of U.S. international broadcasting.

Broadcasting Board of Governors
In 1994, through the United States International Broadcasting Act, Congress created the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) within the USIA and brought all the elements of U.S.
international broadcasting under its control and supervision. In 1999, the board became a selfstanding federal agency when the USIA was absorbed into the State Department by the Clinton
administration. BBG introduces itself as an “independent” and “bipartisan” federal agency with
a mission “to promote freedom and democracy and to enhance understanding by broadcasting
accurate, objective, and balanced news and information about the United States and the world to
audiences abroad.” 735 The congressionally-funded board consists of eight presidentially
appointed members confirmed by U.S. Senate, with the Secretary of State serving as BBG’s
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ninth member. BBG’s budget for fiscal year 2008 was $671.3 million. 736 BBG’s requested
budget for fiscal year 2009 is $699.5 million. 737
D. Jeffrey Hirschberg was appointed by George W. Bush in June 2008 to serve as BBG’s
chairman. Hirschberg succeeds James Glassman, who left BBG to become the last Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Bush Administration. Kenneth
Tomlinson preceded Glassman and was forced to resign in March 2007 after a State Department
investigation revealed that he had run his “horse racing operation” from his federal office, had
billed the government for more work days than U.S. law permits, and had improperly hired and
paid a friend as a contractor. 738 Tomlinson had earlier been ousted on November 3, 2005, from
his post as chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting one day after an Inspector
General report revealed evidence that he had violated rules set up to shield public broadcasting
from political influence. 739
BBG oversees and is supported by the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), a federal
entity that provides engineering, technical, and marketing support for all U.S. radio and TV
broadcasts and is responsible for managing the Voice of America and Radio/TV Marti. 740 IBB’s
director is appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate and reports directly to
the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Danforth W. Austin is currently serving as IBB’s Acting
Director. Austin has also been the director of the Voice of America since 2006. BBG also
oversees the operations of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle
East Broadcasting Networks.
736
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VOA broadcasts radio and television programs in 45 languages including Persian. The
Office of Cuba broadcasting manages Radio and TV Marti that broadcast 24 hours of radio and
eight hours of TV Spanish programming to Cuba. RFE/RL broadcasts in 28 languages and
houses Radio Farda, a 24 hour Persian-language service that started as a joint venture between
RFE/RL and VOA, Radio Free Iraq, and Radio Free Afghanistan. Radio Free Asia broadcasts in
nine languages to Asian listeners. The Middle East Broadcasting Networks houses the 24 hour
Arabic language Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV stations. 741
According to the BBG, RFE/RL, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting
Networks operate as private, non-profit organizations that are nevertheless entirely governmentfunded “grantees” of BBG. The 1994 United States International Broadcasting Act, however,
did not distinguish between these surrogate stations and those like VOA that are official voices
of the U.S. government. Under the act, the BBG was given clear legislative authority to direct
and supervise all non-military broadcasting activities of the United States government. The
Secretary of State, as the ex officio member of the board, is required under the provisions of the
act to provide the board with “information and guidance on foreign policy issues.” 742 The act
also required that the board report directly to the USIA; the board now has to report to the State
Department.
Congress is considering yet another restructuring of U.S. broadcasting infrastructure.
The United States Broadcasting Reorganization Act of 2009 amends the U.S. International
Broadcasting Act of 1994 to replace BBG with the United States International Broadcasting
Agency (USIBA). The new agency will be headed by a Board of Governors that oversees all
international broadcasting entities. The act also eliminates the IBB and transfers its
741
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responsibilities to the newly formed agency. 743 Similar to the BBG, USIBA shall consist of
eight presidentially appointed members, with the Secretary of State acting as the ninth member.
The eight members are to be selected “from among citizens distinguished in the fields of mass
communications, print, broadcast media, or foreign affairs.” 744

Post 9/11 Media Initiatives – Operation Middle East
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a successful public diplomacy
campaign targeting the Middle East became an imperative element of the U.S. war on terror. To
achieve this goal, international broadcasting was deemed a vital weapon in the “war of ideas.”
To increase credibility and to inoculate its target audience against perceiving U.S.-sponsored
media as propaganda, the U.S. government began to rebrand its international media. Radio Sawa
management, for example, banned its staff (mostly former VOA Arabic staff) from using VOA
newsroom items and current affairs scripts, and VOA Arabic archival tapes were discarded. In
short, VOA’s brand name was either silenced or downgraded in Middle Eastern language
services. 745 Alhurrah’s description of the station is also indicative of the attempt to distance
itself from the U.S. government: “Alhurra is operated by non-profit corporation ‘The Middle
East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.’ (MBN).” MBN is financed by the American people through
the U.S Congress.” 746 All this rebranding appears to have taken place to achieve higher
credibility among foreign publics. In the words of Jeffrey Gedmin, RFE/RL’s president, “to be
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credible, it can’t be the voice of Jeff Gedmin, it can’t be the voice of Washington.” 747 In sum, it
cannot be the Voice of America.
In addition to the rebranding aspect, the U.S. government directed its new media
initiatives to the general masses of target countries. This strategy is in contrast with the Cold
War elite-oriented broadcasting style, which is also a staple of Voice of America tradition. With
this framework, Radio Sawa and Radio Farda, the 24 hour music and news radio stations in
Arabic and Persian respectively, were launched in 2002. In the years that followed, BBG
funneled resources from the other broadcasting entities it supervised to these and other newly
founded media outlets for the Middle East (i.e., Alhurrah TV and VOA Persian TV).
VOA enthusiasts complained, “The BBG has thrown money at Middle East public
diplomacy while at the same time neglecting and starving the traditional instruments of public
diplomacy directed to the rest of the world.” 748 As an example, BBG closed down VOA’s
Portuguese Service to Brazil. Also, according to a 2004 United States General Accounting
Office report, BBG reallocated $19.7 million from “lower-priority or lower-impact language
services to higher-priority broadcast needs, including Radio Farda and Radio Sawa.” 749 In 2003,
the board identified another $12.4 million that could be reallocated from lower-priority services
or redundant language services for the expansion of Urdu language broadcasting to Pakistan and
Persian television service to Iran. Based on its annual review process, BBG recommended the
elimination of 17 of VOA’s Central and Eastern European language services, cutting back a
projected $20.9 million for fiscal year 2004 and 2005. 750
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The U.S. government shifted its resources because according to BBG board member
Joaquin Blaya the local media in the lower-priority areas “are increasingly free and robust.” 751
This is while, in a 2004 testimony before the Senate’s Subcommittee on International Operations
and Terrorism, director of international affairs and trade at the U.S. General Accounting Office
Jess T. Ford notes that BBG’s process for allocation of resources among its language services
“lacks an adequate measure of whether domestic media provide accurate, balanced, and
comprehensive news and information to national audiences.” 752
In 2004, BBG launched the Virginia-based Arabic Alhurra TV, which also includes a
dedicated version for Iraq called Alhurra Iraq. The board allocated $102 million for starting
Alhurra, $40 million of which was dedicated to Alhurra Iraq. 753 The move was coupled with the
elimination of 10 VOA Central and Eastern European language services, sparking a revolt
among Voice of America’s staff. Nearly half of the VOA’s staff signed a petition to protest
BBG’s “dismantling” of the Voice of America “piece by piece.” 754 Petitioners protested the
reallocation of VOA resources to finance the two Arabic language radio and TV stations that
they said are not subject to VOA standards of objectivity and accountability. The petition
concluded:
The BBG is creating radio and television entities that circumvent a Congressional Charter
(Public Law 94-350) – designed to shield VOA from political interference and to ensure
accurate, objective, and comprehensive broadcasts. No such editorial protections apply
to the new broadcast entities. 755
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Then-BBG chairman Tomlinson also confirmed that these services were eliminated “to focus
more resources on services to the Middle East.” 756 In 2002, BBG had replaced VOA’s Arabic
Service with Radio Sawa.
It may well be that the U.S. government aims to have a more direct supervision of these
new radio and TV stations to maximize their public diplomacy value to the United States. In
June of 2007, for example, BBG took action against Alhurra’s allegedly anti-Israeli
broadcasts. 757 The decision to review Alhurra’s programming for “journalistic integrity and
adherence to the standards and principles of the U.S. International Broadcasting Act” came in
response to neoconservative public attacks against Alhurra’s Vice President for News Larry
Register. 758 Register, a 20-year CNN executive, had given permission for the uninterrupted
airing of two speeches by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, and
Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian leader of Hamas. On May 15, 2007, the network had also used the
word “AlNaqba” (meaning catastrophe in Arabic) in its onscreen ticker to refer to the
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. 759 The term, which is widely used in the Arab world
to refer to the event, was removed within an hour. The network’s coverage of a Holocaust
conference in Iran was also deemed “insufficiently skeptical.” 760 “Our taxpayer-financed Arabic
network was set up to counter Al-Jazeera, not echo it,” wrote Joel Mowbray in an opinion piece
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in the Wall Street Journal on June 7, 2007. 761 Mowbray first broke the story on March 18, 2007,
in the Wall Street Journal, calling the station “a platform for terrorists.” 762
Shortly after the Alhurra controversy, the House State and Foreign Operations
Subcommittee refused to grant BBG’s request for $11.1 million for expanding Alhurra’s news
programming in June 2007. 763 On June 8, 2007, Register resigned after about seven months on
the job. Representative Steve Rothman (D-NJ), a member of the House State and Foreign
Operations Subcommittee, rejoiced: “Mr. Register’s resignation is welcome news. It is my
sincere hope that Alhurra has learned from Mr. Register’s failures and is prepared to ensure that
no terrorists are allowed to espouse hate speech on a television network paid for by U.S.
taxpayers.” 764 He also urged Alhurra to implement his transparency proposal “through the 24/7
live streaming, archiving, and translation of Alhurra’s original programming.” 765 Daniel Nassif,
a Washington representative of Council of Lebanese-American Organizations who had no prior
television experience, succeeded Register as Alhurrah’s news director. 766
In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia,
BBG board member Joaquin Blaya explained that Alhurra’s inappropriate editorial decisions
were mistakes and that the anti-Israel contents were aberrations. 767 He nonetheless emphasized,
“Our most precious commodity is our broadcast credibility and program excellence. Credibility
is key to success in broadcasting, and it is our greatest asset.” 768
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It is hard to see how Muslim populations are expected to find U.S.-funded news as
credible if these media outlets are forced to censor voices critical of American policy. This is
especially the case in the Arab and Islamic countries where more than 100 TV satellite channels,
including Alhurra, Aljazeera, Alalam, and Hezbollah’s Almanar, seek to more persuasively
frame world events from their point of view. Moreover, media credibility is deemed a necessary
prerequisite for the success of international broadcasting. Without such credibility, U.S.-funded
media will be dismissed as propaganda. And the “p-word” is what leading officials in U.S.
international broadcasting dread being associated with. A telling example is RFE/RL’s president
Jeffrey Gedmin’s response to an interviewer asking, “Does the United States government or
Congress have a say in what you broadcast?” Gedmin replies:
In the sense that our funder, the U.S. Congress, decides what it finances, yes. But if
you’re asking whether they tell us what to put in the programs, the answer is no. It may
sound strange, even implausible. But it’s true and it’s a crucial point. Credibility is
everything in this business. Our board, the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG) – they
oversee all U.S. International broadcasting – serves by law as a firewall to protect our
editorial independence. The moment our audiences think we’re pushing propaganda, that
we’re the mouthpiece of the U.S. government or a particular faction in Washington,
we’re dead in the water. I’m happy to say I’ve not encountered a single instance where
someone in Washington has tried to meddle in our editorial affairs. 769
In February 2007, a month before Gedmin’s appointment as president of RFE/RL,
concerns over proper editorial control of content troubled Voice of America Persian TV, a joint
venture with Radio Farda. In a letter to President Bush, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) wrote,
“Voice of America [Persian TV] failed to provide Iranians a clear and effective presentation of
our foreign policy but provided another platform for its critics.” 770 Coburn then urges the

769

Pilon, "An Interview with RFE/RL Chief Jeffrey Gedmin."
Tom Coburn, "Letter to President George W. Bush,"
http://coburn.senate.gov/ffm/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=dc2fb01e-d537-4bdc-b46aacca3d543741.

770

164

president to more carefully consider his nomination for the new BBG chairman. 771 In April
2008, Coburn put a hold on the confirmation of then-BBG chairman James Glassman, whom
President Bush had nominated as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs. The move came in response to Coburn’s repeated failed attempts to get the English
transcripts of VOA Persian TV and Radio Farda broadcasts. 772 The controversies regarding
Persian language broadcasting content will be discussed in more detail in the coming section.
Here, I will turn to a closer examination of Voice of America and Radio Farda.

Voice of America Persian News Network
United States initiated the Voice of America, a short-wave radio station, on February 24,
1942, during the Second World War, under the supervision of the Foreign Information Service
(FIS). 773 At its inception, it only carried news in German and French to occupied Europe. In the
later years of the war, VOA services expanded to include many more languages, including
Persian. VOA operation continued under the command of the Office of War Information, which
was created by President Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order in June 1942. 774 In 1953, the
radio station’s headquarters moved from New York City to Washington, DC, where it became
part of the newly established United States Information Agency 775.
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In August 1945, following the close of the Second World War, VOA discontinued many
of its foreign language broadcasts including its Persian Service. 776 The Persian Service resumed
operation at the onset of the Cold War. Its programming was carried on in two intervals during
the 1950s and 1960s, first from 1949-1960 and then from 1964-1966. VOA restarted
broadcasting to Iran shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ousted the Shah of Iran.
Beginning in October 1996, VOA supplemented its radio broadcasting with a weekly, call-in
radio and TV simulcast in Persian, titled Roundtable with You, in partnership with the U.S.sponsored Worldnet Television. 777
With the addition of its newest program, Today’s Woman, which debuted on September,
27, 2007, VOA Persian TV is now producing six hours of original TV programming, which is
simulcast on Radio Farda, and an additional hour of original radio programming daily. The
increase in satellite TV Persian programming materialized with the supplemental funding VOA
Persian TV received through Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February, 15, 2006, $75
million supplemental budget request for democracy promotion in Iran. At the time of the
request, VOA Persian Service produced four hours of original TV programming. 778 Congress
ultimately approved $36.1 million supplemental funding for VOA TV and Radio Farda
broadcasting, which was $13.9 million less than requested. 779
BBG budget request for FY 2009 shows that VOA Persian TV’s actual cost for 2007 was
about $11.3 million and its estimated cost for 2008 was about $16.8 million. BBG is requesting
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$17.0 million for VOA Persian TV for FY 2009. 780 Radio Farda received about $4.9 million of
funding in 2007 and cost an estimated $5.4 million in 2008. The board is requesting about $6.0
million of funding for Radio Farda for FY 2009. 781
VOA Persian Service, originally part of VOA’s West and South Asia Division, became a
separate unit in July 2007 and was officially named Persian News Network. 782 Currently, VOA
Persian News Network is no longer managed by Voice of America leadership. It works in
conjunction with Radio Farda and is run under the leadership of RFE/RL. 783 VOA broadcasts
consist of one hour of radio programming in the morning (6:00 to 7:00 a.m. Iran time) and six
hours of primetime radio and TV simulcast (6:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Iran time). VOA broadcasts
its Persian programs from its headquarters in Washington, DC. VOA Persian TV can be
accessed by satellite in Iran and Europe. The programs are available live on VOA’s Persian
website and are archived as well. 784 The 24 hour VOA Persian News Network also provides
“acquired” news programs from American domestic media such as CNN and the History
Channel as well as two repeats of VOA’s original programming. 785
VOA Persian programs are mainly elite-oriented with the exception of a daily hour-long
youth-oriented, magazine-style program that covers general interest news, sports, music, fashion,
and entertainment issues (Shabahang). As of 2009, the elite-oriented political programs include
a two-hour daily news broadcast (News and Views), two interview-style news analysis programs
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(Roundtable with You and News Brief, each of which have special editions), and an hour-long
program featuring female guests on political issues (Today’s Woman). 786
According to BBG member Joaquin Blaya a December 2006 survey shows the total VOA
Persian TV audience is just over 20 percent of the Iranian population and Radio Farda has a 10.3
percent weekly listenership. 787 And according to a 2008 BBG surveys, 31.9 percent of Iranian
adults (15+) either viewed VOA Persian TV or listened to Radio Farda broadcasts at least once
during the week prior to the survey. 788

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Radio Free Europe and its sister station Radio Liberation from Bolshevism were born
under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950 and 1953 respectively. RFE
operated as the broadcasting arm of the New York-based, CIA-founded National Committee for
a Free Europe, established in June 1949. 789 The “surrogate” stations aimed to bring about the
peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite governments through critical coverage of
the target countries’ local news. The CIA secretly funded the stations until, in 1967, the New
York Times brought the secret sponsorship in public spotlight. In 1973, they were merged as a
non-profit organization and renamed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL was placed
under the direction of the newly established Board of International Broadcasting. RFE/RL is
often credited for a positive and significant role in winning the Cold War. 790 In the post Cold
War era, RFE/RL reallocated some of its services to new priority targets of interest, mainly in the
Middle East. In 1998, under the leadership of Thomas Dine, a former executive director of
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American Israel Public Affairs Committee, RFE/RL launched Radio Azadi (“Liberty” in Persian)
in Persian and Radio Free Iraq in Arabic. In 2002, Radio Farda succeeded Radio Azadi. The
suspended Dari and Pushtu services of Radio Free Afghanistan (1985-1993) were revived in
2002.
On June 28, 2005, Thomas Dine, who had served as president of RFE/RL for eight years,
left the broadcasting entity. Dine’s departure left a leadership gap for more than a year, until
Jeffrey Gedmin, a former resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, was appointed the
president of RFE/RL by the BBG board in March 2007. 791 Gedmin is a founding member of the
Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Established in June 1997, the PNAC is devoted
to promoting “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” through a significant
increase in defense spending and interventionist democracy promotion policies. 792

Radio Farda
In December 2002, BBG started Radio Farda, a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week Persianlanguage radio station that features news and music aimed at the under 30 Iranian population.
Radio Farda’s 2008 budget was $5.3 million.793 The new station was launched as a joint venture
between RFE/RL’s Persian language Radio Azadi and VOA Persian radio and satellite TV
programs to Iran. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Radio Azadi had increased its
broadcasting to eleven hours from the original eight hours. The programs consisted of eliteoriented news and analysis originating from RFE/RL’s headquarters in Prague,
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Czechoslovakia. 794 Radio Azadi stopped its operation on December 1, 2002. Meanwhile, in
preparation for the commencement of Radio Farda the team continued to air 30 minutes of news
and 2.5 hours of music daily, using the name of Radio Farda in its broadcasts. Radio Farda is
heard on AM, FM, short wave, digital audio satellite and on the internet. 795 Shortly after Radio
Farda went on air, President Bush addressed Iranians: “I’m pleased to send warm greetings to the
people of Iran and to welcome you to the new Radio Farda broadcast.” 796 The president
continued by telling Iranians they “deserve a free press to express themselves and to help build
an open, democratic, and free society.” 797 Radio Farda has now increased its evening newscast
to one hour from the original 30-minutes and launched a news-oriented website. 798 BBG is
“proposing to transfer to RFE/RL the eight-hour news shift previously produced by VOA.” 799
This move would make Radio Farda the sole news producer for the station, making VOA
programming exclusive to satellite TV.
Since its inception, Radio Farda became subject to a barrage of criticism from
conservative and neoconservative circles regarding its entertainment focus and weak
performance in countering Iran’s government. These criticisms peaked in 2006 and subsided
when in February 2007 Jeffrey Gedmin took over the leadership of Radio Farda as president of
RFE/RL.
Like Radio Sawa, Radio Farda broadcasts a mix of news and music to appeal to its young
target audience. A typical hour consists of 16.5 minutes of news, with the rest of the time slots
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devoted to a mix of Iranian and Western pop music. The music is mostly “adult contemporary”
with “a happy beat to it.” 800 Some typical Western singers broadcast include, “Madonna,
Michael Jackson, The Gipsy Kings, Bob Marley, Abba, Enrique Iglesias, Phil Collins, [and]
Celine Dion.” 801 The Iranian songs are from the popular singers of the deposed Shah’s era all of
whom live outside Iran. The non-news content is prepared and delivered from Radio Farda office
in Northern Virginia. According to Bert Kleinman, a consultant to Radio Farda, the radio’s news
team consists of a 10-member news staff in Washington and a 28-member news staff in
Prague. 802
The late Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was one of the harshest critics of Radio Farda’s
music-oriented format. In a December 16, 2002, Wall Street Journal article Senator Helms
wrote: “It’s difficult to believe that the Bush administration has agreed to support this shift from
a proven program of serious policy discussion to a teeny-bopper music-based format. It likely
will insult the cultural sensitivities of Iranians, as well as their intelligence.” 803
Former head of RFE/RL S. Enders Wimbush (1987-1992), also, lamented the decline of
what he terms “the idea menu” on Radio Farda’s broadcasts to Iran as compared to its
predecessor Radio Azadi. In an article for the Weekly Standard entitled “Radio Free Iran; Down
with music, Up with ideas,” Wimbush presses for the new station to stimulate debate within Iran
rather than merely advocate for America. 804 “To become an effective instrument in the war of
ideas, Radio Farda should be completely overhauled, not just tinkered with,” he says. 805 He
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suggests six themes need to be tackled at great depth: 1- “question the regime’s legitimacy,” 2“highlight the [Iranian] leadership’s disunity,” 3- “highlight threats to Iran’s culture” due to its
isolation from the rest of the world, 4- “describe Iran’s isolation, economic decline, and growing
lack of competitiveness,” 5- “build critical/pragmatic thinking,” and 6- “empower alternative
power centers with new ideas.” 806 Wimbush, who is currently the senior vice president for
International Programs and Policy at the Hudson Institute, is seriously doubtful of the capacity of
the current Radio Farda, with its emphasis on music, for becoming a forum of debate for the
above themes.
Perhaps the most damning criticism of Radio Farda came from a 2006 study by the nowdissolved Iran Steering Group, a joint task force between National Security Council and the
Pentagon. The report was based on a six-month study of Radio Farda and VOA Persian TV
broadcast content. While acknowledging the professional look of the radio and TV programs,
the report charged both for “fall[ing] short of realizing their stated mission and mandate.” 807
According to the report, VOA Persian TV invited too many guests representing “the Islamic
Republic viewpoint” and failed to effectively counter those views. The programs were found to
at times become, in effect, a “debunking of U.S. policy.” 808
As an example, in an interview with Abbas Milani, a research fellow and co-director of
the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, on March 15, 2006, the VOA interviewer
asks, “Dr. Milani, how can a country that violates human rights be a defender of international
human rights?” Milani replies,
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I think that what you are saying is 100 percent correct, that is why the U.S. is in a
problematic position because of this. An America that has the Guantanamo Bay jail in it,
an America in which minorities, blacks, have suffered from legal deprivations, without a
doubt has international issues with regards to this. However, the reality is that with all
these violations, America has other advantages. Throughout Iran’s history, even though
there were the likes of [the coup in] 1953, there are tens of other examples where
America has tried to establish democracy … But in total, we have to analyze the sum
total of all of this, despite these shortcoming, and despite what I think is America’s
shameful record of violation of human rights laws, despite all that, I think America’s
interests lie in establishing democracy in the region. Ms. Rice spoke about this, I
think. 809
The interviewer then says, “Thank you very much, Professor Milani. Of course, the country I
was referring to as the violator of human rights which cannot be a defender of international
human rights was the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 810
During the six months duration of the study, 23 VOA guests were said to have presented
“anti-American and/or pro-Islamic stances” on multiple occasions, while only 10 guests
advocated “structural changes to the Islamic Republic” and did not make “consistent adversarial
or pejorative statements about United States policy.” 811 Hooshang Amirahmadi, founder and
president of the American Iranian Council and professor of Planning and Public Policy at
Rutgers University, is among the guests in the “anti-American and/or pro-Islamic” camp. The
report incorrectly says that Amirahmadi is “one of the few candidates vetted and accepted by the
Guardian Council for the 2005 Iranian presidential race.”812 While Amirahmadi did run for the
presidential race, he was disqualified by the Guardian Council because of his American
citizenship. 813
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It is noteworthy that the personalities under question are not pro-Islamic Republic of Iran
figures; rather, their stances are seemingly judged inappropriate as they do not pass the threshold
of neoconservative ideological principles. As an example, Abbas Milani, as co-director of the
Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, advocates greater contact between Iranian and
American societies because he views such an approach would eventually lead to the weakening
and possibly the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here is an excerpt from a commentary
he co-wrote for the Washington Post on December 29, 2007:
Greater contact between Iranian and American societies will further undermine the
regime's legitimacy, strengthen the independence of Iranian economic and political
groups, and perhaps even compel some regime leaders to cash out and exchange their
diminishing political power for enduring property rights. Over the past four decades,
autocratic regimes have rarely crumbled as a result of isolation but more often have
collapsed when seeking to engage with the West. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union
occurred not when tensions between Moscow and Washington were high but during a
period of engagement. 814
The NSC/Pentagon report’s assessment of Radio Farda was not any more positive. The
report charged Radio Farda of failing to perform as an effective “surrogate” news source because
it lacked rigorous local coverage of Iranian news. The report said that Radio Farda heavily relied
on Iranian sources of news such as the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and
BAZTAB news website (now renamed TABNAK), which is said to be affiliated with Mohsen
Rezai, formerly head of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. The rest of its news is said to be
from other sources such as BBC. In sum, the report charges Radio Farda for failing to lead in the
fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other hand, the Iran Steering Group judged the
station to have been strongly critical of President Ahmadinejad. 815
Tomlinson, BBG chairman at the time, dismissed the Iran Steering Group’s authority to
critique Iran programming. “The author of this report is as qualified to write a report on
814
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programming to Iran as I would be to write a report covering the operations of the 101st Airborne
Division,” Tomlinson said to Knight Ridder Tribune. 816 According to the New York Times, the
report was prepared by Ladan Archin, a former student of Paul Wolfowitz who was serving in
the Defense Department at the time of the report. 817 In response to critiques that see Radio Farda
as too soft on the Islamic Republic, the station’s staff argued that, to be taken seriously, Radio
Farda has to avoid being viewed as an instrument of U.S. propaganda. 818
In 2008, Radio Farda conducted exclusive interviews with President George W. Bush 819
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 820 on March 19 and July 8 respectively. President
Bush, who spoke from the White House, and Secretary Rice, who spoke at RFE/RL headquarters
in Prague, both reiterated that Iran’s government could not be trusted with the technological
know-how that could lead to nuclear weapons. They also voiced support for democracy
movements inside Iran. In 2007, a number of prominent American and Israeli officials appeared
on VOA’s political talk shows. Among the guests were Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, late
Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), and Israeli Consul General in Los Angeles Enod Danuch.
Interviews also included Iranian student leaders and lawyers involved in Amir Kabir University
(Tehran) demonstrations. 821
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On April 1, 2007, a few days after Gedmin became president of RFE/RL, VOA Persian
TV featured an interview with Abdolmalek Rigi, the head of the militant Jundullah that operates
in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan from the Pakistani Baluchistan
province. 822 Rigi, who was introduced in the VOA program as “head of Baluchis Resistance,”
was invited to discuss “internal resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 823 As the head of
Jundullah, Rigi has led a number of hostage takings and deadly terrorist attacks in the Sistan
Baluchistan province along the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan tri-border region. 824 On April 3, 2007,
the ABC News reported that the group “has been secretly encouraged and advised by American
officials since 2005.” 825 On May 22, 2007, ABC News reported that “President Bush has signed
a ‘nonlethal presidential finding’” for “a covert ‘black’ operation to destabilize the Iranian
government.” 826
According to a report prepared by Sam Gardiner, a U.S. Air Force retired colonel, “the
covert programs of the United States involve efforts for propaganda and disinformation and the
support of political minorities” including the Jundullah, the Ahwazi Arab group, and the Free
Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). 827 Gardiner maintains that some of the over $120 million Iran
Democracy Fund, most of which has gone to fund broadcasting, “seems to have been passed to
exile groups that can make connections with opposition groups inside Iran.” 828
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VOA Persian TV and Radio Farda’s Internet Face
An important element of U.S. public diplomacy is its use of the internet to supplement its
broadcasting efforts. This is especially the case in countries where BBG is “facing serious
challenges to reach strategically important audiences,” namely Russia, Venezuela, China,
Vietnam, and Iran. 829 These challenges emanate from local government attempts to jam U.S.
broadcasting as well as the changing media consumption habits of target populations. In Iran,
for example, internet use has jumped 29 folds since 2000. 830 BBG is to invest an additional $6.4
million in internet programming for the 2009 fiscal year, $4.4 million of which comes from
reallocation of BBG resources resulting in a $2.0 million net increase in BBG budget. BBG is
adding 18 positions to its current staff to implement its internet programming. 831
The use of new media technologies has been especially significant in the Persian
services. 832 Both Radio Farda and Voice of America Persian News Network have strong newsoriented Persian language websites, with frequent news updates and interactive features such as
podcast and RSS feed capabilities. Programs are available live from the websites and are
archived. VOA also has started a Persian News Blog.

Azeri Language Broadcasting
In its latest efforts to boost its public diplomacy programs for Iran, the United States
Government has decided to create a specific Azeri language radio targeting Iran’s largest ethnic
minority. In its 2009 budget request to Congress, BBG has proposed to start a daily one-hour
Azeri radio program and a companion website as part of the RFE/RL network. 833 The program
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targets Iran’s Azerbaijani population, the largest Azerbaijani population anywhere in the world
including in Azerbaijan, and aims to reach 1.5 million Iranian Azerbaijanis in the future. 834 The
new Iranian Azerbaijani programming will draw on the reporting and technical resources of
Radio Farda and RFE/RL’s current Azerbaijani Service. The board has requested Congress for
$1.2 million to launch this program. 835
BBG argues that this programming is necessary in part because the Iranian government
represses its minorities’ constitutional right to use their languages in the mass media. In fact,
Iran has provincial television stations in each of its 30 provinces in addition to its six national TV
channels and 14 national radio stations. 836 The provincial television satiations in Iran’s Azeri
speaking provinces regularly broadcast Azeri language programs. 837 Iran also broadcasts in
Azeri language to its neighboring Azerbaijan as part of its international broadcasting. 838 U.S.
government’s strategy of exploiting ethnic strife as a regime change strategy fails to take into
account the fact that Azeri community is represented in every asset of Iranian society, including
its religious and political strata. For example, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme
Leader who is Iran’s head of state and holds the highest political office in the country’s political
system, is an ethnic Azeri originally from Khamene, a town in Iran’s East Azerbaijan
province. 839
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Conclusion
With this extensive account of the different elements of U.S. public diplomacy toward
Iran, it is now possible to examine similarities between the public diplomacy recommendations
of the four Iran policy communities and the policies of the Bush administration. This chapter
showed that the underlying goal of public diplomacy toward Iran has been regime change. This
approach is contrary to the recommendations of the Strategic Engagement policy community and
the Fundamental Change policy community, who advise the U.S. government to drop its socalled “democracy promotion” activities aimed at changing Iran’s government. As was said in
the previous chapter, members of the Strategic Engagement policy community, in particular,
believe that public diplomacy should aim to decrease tensions and hostilities between the United
States and Iran and facilitate the normalization of relations between the two countries. The
Strategic Engagement policy community makes the recommendation for facilitative public
diplomacy on the grounds that “democracy promotion” efforts have backfired and are thus
pragmatically unjustifiable. The Fundamental Change policy community, on the other hand,
disapproves of such measures on moral and legal grounds. What is evident, despite this
difference, is that the recommendations of these two policy communities do not coincide with
the policies that have driven public diplomacy targeting Iran in the Bush administration.
The two other policy communities, namely Punitive Nonengagement and Hawkish
Engagement, agree with the Bush administration’s strategic decision to employ all public
diplomacy means to achieve regime change in Iran. Their public diplomacy recommendations,
nonetheless, embody tactical differences that make the recommendations made by the Punitive
Nonengagement policy community more in line with the tactics employed under the Bush
administration. Specifically, the Punitive Nonengagement policy community discredits any
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public diplomacy move that would benefit political parties or other organizations operating
within the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The very idea of reformists vs. hardliners
is downplayed in favor of the generic “Iranian people” vs. “the regime.” Helping the reformists
is perceived as giving the Islamic Republic a life line, when it is on the verge of collapse. As this
chapter has shown, this mentality emerged as the central element in the Bush administration
policy toward Iran. Not only did the U.S. government refrain from engaging Iranian reformists,
but it also abstained from engaging existing Iranian NGOs on the grounds that they are all
infiltrated by the Iranian government. The Hawkish Engagement policy community, in contrast,
finds it in the long term interest of the United States to support the ascendance of Iranian
reformists to centers of power in Iran’s government.
Supporting exiled opposition groups is another tactical difference between the Punitive
Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities. The Hawkish Engagement
policy community did not recommend the use of exiled opposition groups for achieving regime
change in Iran, as most have not demonstrated to command the support of Iranian public. This is
said to be especially the case with MKO, who are said to be widely hated in Iran. The Punitive
Nonengagement policy community, on the other hand, believes that the U.S. government should
enlist the MKO and the monarchists in their efforts at regime change. While it is not clear as to
how the Bush administration might have used the services of the MKO, it did vet monarchist
groups in preparation for Secretary Rice’s Iran initiative.
Another area of divergence between the Bush administration policy and the Hawkish
Engagement policy community is the viability of exploiting ethnic strife in achieving regime
change. The Hawkish Engagement policy community believes that exploiting ethnic diversity as
a regime change strategy is counterproductive because Iranians have a nationalistic sense of
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identity despite their heterogeneous composition, and ethnic minorities are well integrated in the
ruling structure. The Punitive Nonengagement policy community, however, does not preclude
the use of ethnic diversity as a means for regime change. In line with this stance, the Bush
administration decided to create Azeri language radio broadcasting targeting Iran’s Azeri
population.
The Punitive Nonengagement policy community was at times highly critical of the
quality of the Bush administration public diplomacy for achieving regime change. The members
of this policy community were most disapproving of the entertainment orientation of Radio
Farda. They also advocated substantial funding of expatriate Los Angeles-based Iranian media.
While aspects of both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy
community recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy correlate with Bush administration
policies, neither one does so perfectly. The evidence provided in this chapter, nonetheless,
shows that the Punitive Nonengagement policy community’s policy preferences correlates more
readily with the various components of the U.S. government public diplomacy toward Iran.
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7. CONCLUSION: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN AND THE
TWO-WAY SYMMETRICAL MODEL
The present study’s final research question asked whether U.S. public diplomacy
initiatives toward Iran fit with the two-way symmetrical model, which is in line with the new
public diplomacy paradigm. To address this inquiry, this section seeks to assess whether the
criteria for two-way symmetrical public diplomacy and new public diplomacy, as explicated in
the theory and methodology chapters, have been present in different elements of the Bush
administration’s U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran.
The previous chapter showed that regime change was the overarching objective of U.S.
public diplomacy toward Iran during the Bush administration. Hundreds of millions of dollars
were spent in overt and covert public diplomacy initiatives to “support the aspirations of the
Iranian people,” to use Secretary Rice’s terms. 840 Other U.S. public diplomacy officials, as
quoted in the previous chapter, expressed the opinion that the Iranian people fervently desire
regime change. The question remains whether regime change is indeed the aspiration of the
Iranian people. As public diplomacy involves “informing, engaging and influencing foreign
publics,” 841 it is important to assess the state of Iran’s public opinion before determining the
presence of symmetry in United States public diplomacy toward the Iranian people. Recent
public opinion polls indicate that international publics especially those in the Middle East hold
persistently negative views of the United States and its policies. 842 Earlier, a 2004 Department
of Defense report on U.S. strategic communication to the Middle East observed that “the
overwhelming majority” of Muslim populations are in “soft opposition” to the U.S.
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government’s foreign policies. 843 In the following pages, I would present a summary of recent
public opinion polls of the Iranian people to see if Iran’s public opinion environment compares
with that of the Middle East as a whole.

The Myth of the Yearning Masses
In her February 15, 2006 congressional testimony, Secretary of State Rice likened the
Bush administration’s Iran Freedom Agenda to U.S. experience in Poland during the Cold War.
Rice said,
I think the Solidarity model is a good one, where you had numbers of people come
together. You had the labor unions in Poland come together, but they also then were
joined by the academics, by human rights activists. When people organize themselves
and really become unified in calling for change, then you get the change that you need,
and we believe that the Iranian people deserve change.” Rice added, “No one wants to
see a Middle East that is dominated by an Iranian hegemon. 844
The comparison to Poland, however, may not be a good one because the Iranian
government is not as weak and as unpopular as Poland’s dictatorship was when an externally
supported Solidarity challenged it. In this regard, a January 2009 Congressional Research
Service report for Congress asserts, “Many question the prospects of U.S.-led Iran regime change
through democracy promotion or other means, short of all-out-U.S. military invasion, because of
the weakness of opposition groups.” 845 Moreover, recent polls of the Iranian public, conducted
by American and European polling agencies, show that Iranian public opinion is much in line
with the stance of Iran’s government on key issues, including Iran’s nuclear energy program.
The polls show that while Iranians strongly favor democracy they view their system of
governance as democratic. Contrary to the U.S. government depiction of the Iranian public as a
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pro-American populace, polls show that a large majority of Iranians hold negative views of the
United States.
According to a 2006 nationally representative survey of 1000 Iranians – conducted jointly
by United States Institute of Peace, University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy
Attitudes, and Search for Common Ground – there is solid popular support among Iranians for
Iran’s nuclear program. Of all the respondents, an extraordinarily large majority (91 percent)
said it was important for Iran to develop a “full nuclear fuel cycle” (enrichment capacity for
nuclear fuel) with an overwhelming majority (84 percent) saying it was very important for Iran
to do so. 846 “Notably, there was no statistically significant variation in responses to the question
by gender, age, geographical location, and most other demographic factors.” 847 A 96 percent of
the respondents believed Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear energy is important for Iran’s
economy, with 89 percent of the respondents thinking it is very important. 848 An interest in
current affairs and residence in Tehran and its vicinity had a statistically significant positive
effect on the respondents’ belief that Iran’s nuclear program was important for its economy. 849
In response to a question asking about the degree to which respondents felt their country
is “governed by representatives elected by the people on a scale of 1 to 10” (where 1 means “not
at all” and 10 means “completely”), Iranians gave their country an average score of 6.9 with 61
percent giving a score of 7 or higher. In a concurrent poll, sponsored by the same organizations
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and conducted through Knowledge Networks, Americans gave the United States a comparable
rating of 7.3. 850
Large majority of Iranians polled held negative views of the United States and its foreign
policy, with 93 percent indicating unfavorable attitudes about the U.S. government, 76 percent
displaying a negative attitude toward the United States in general, and 78 percent holding
unfavorable views of American culture. Views of American people were ambivalent (49 percent
unfavorable and 45 percent favorable). When asked about the effect of American bases in the
Middle East, 79 percent said the bases have a negative effect with 59 percent saying they have a
very negative effect. The poll found strong opposition to American presence in the region with
89 percent saying they opposed such presence and 80 percent saying they were strongly opposed
to it. Iranians were very skeptical of United States’ primary goal in its war on terrorism, with
only one in ten believing the U.S. primarily seeks to protect itself. A solid majority (76 percent)
believed that the primary goal of the U.S. war on terrorism was to either “weaken and divide the
Islamic world, the Islamic region, and its people” (29 percent) or to “achieve political and
military dominance to control Middle East resources” (47 percent). 851
Based on an analysis of the above poll data, Christine Fair, a senior political scientist
with the RAND Corporation, and Stephen Shellman, a professor of International Relations at the
University of Georgia, find that in addition to the economic benefits of nuclear energy, Iranians
believe that a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity confers the following benefits: serving as an
indication of technical competence (74 percent) that adds to Iran’s status (61 percent), serving as
“an independent source of energy that reduces Iranian vulnerability to outside pressure [76
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percent], and providing at least an existential nuclear deterrent [50 percent].” 852 Of all the
benefits, fewest people believed that full nuclear fuel cycle was important because of its
deterrence benefit, which was worded as follows, “will deter other countries from trying to
economically and politically dominating Iran.” 853
Interestingly, while Fair and Shellman find a statistically significant positive association
between respondents’ negative American opinion and their support for a full nuclear fuel cycle
capacity, they find no statistically significant relationship between such support and Iranians’
belief about the vulnerability of a conflict with the Western world or their opinions about nuclear
Israel and Iran’s nuclear neighbors. Fair and Shellman conclude, “There is less distance between
the sentiment of the [Iranian] public and that of the regime than may be popularly believed.
Indeed in some measure the premise of American ‘regime change’ funds presumes a degree of
difference that is not supported by these data.” 854
Other polls of the Iranian public conducted by western polling agencies have produced
similar results, pointing to an often overlooked congruency between Iranian government’s
policies and Iranian public opinion. A 2008 BBC poll of 4,163 Iranians showed that there is
strong public support (94 percent) for Iran’s nuclear program. In response to a question that
asked about the two most important issues facing Iran today, only one percent said lack of
democracy or need for political reform. The number one issue for most Iranians was the
economy (45 percent). 855
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A 2008 World Public Opinion survey of more than 17,000 adults in 19 countries on
governance and democracy shows that Iranians’ view of their country “being governed according
to the will of the people” is higher than all but one of the 19 countries polled. Iranian
respondents gave their country an average score of 5.9, compared to 4.9 for Great Britain, 4.7 for
Russia, and 4.0 for the United States. According to the poll, a substantially large majority of
Americans (80 percent) say that “their country is run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves,” which might explain the low mark for Americans’ view on the United States being
run according to the will of the people. 856 According to the same survey, a significant majority
of Iranians express trust in their government to do the right thing most of the time (48 percent) or
some of the time (26 percent). 857
A 2006 Zogby International poll of 810 Iranians indicates that the majority of Iranians are
either hoping for a change toward a “more religious and conservative” society (36 percent) or are
satisfied with Iranian society as is (15 percent). Only 31 percent of respondents said they wish to
see Iranian society “more secular and liberal” in the future. Notably, more respondents from the
youngest age group expressed support for a more religious direction compared to other age
groups (38 percent). Another 18 percent of the 18-29 age group said they wish Iranian society
stay as is, which is also higher than the percentage for all respondents (15 percent). Fully 28
percent of the respondents in the younger cohort said that they hope to see Iran more secular and
liberal. 858 Evidently, the U.S. government is hoping to increase this substantial minority of
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Iranians, who envision a secular and liberal Iran, to achieve a viable popular force for regime
change.
In addition to these and similar survey results, the relatively high voter turnout among
Iranians is another indication of their overall political attitudes. Despite dissidents’ call for a
boycott of elections, mainly voiced through Radio Farda, VOA Persian TV, and the Los
Angeles-based expatriate Iranian satellite TV broadcastings to Iran, 63 percent of Iranians
participated in the 2005 presidential election.
The high rate of Iranian participation in their present political system and the above
survey results show the fallacy of the underlying assumption for a proactive U.S. policy of
regime change in Iran that the Iranian public, especially its youth, are strongly pro-U.S., fed up
with their system of governance, and longing for the United States to rescue them by changing
the regime that has been ruling them since 1979. Such an expectation is what Roger Howard
calls “the illusion of popular support.” 859 The assumption is made that “‘enemy regimes’ are not
merely oppressive of ‘the people’ but of a populace distinctly sympathetic to the United States
and its values.” 860 From this premise, the illusion follows that “the imposition of regime change
is likely to be widely welcomed inside that country.” 861 Sariolghalam maintains that this line of
argumentation is advancing an unrealistic picture of Iranian politics. “The overwhelming
majority of the people from all walks of life are interested in the state’s efficiency, not in
overthrowing it,” he says. 862
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Has Iran-Focused U.S. Public Diplomacy Been Symmetrical?
As was explicated in the theory chapter, symmetrical models of public diplomacy
(whether one-way or two-way) underscore a willingness on the part of the sponsoring
government to be responsive to its stakeholders’ views. In other words, to be symmetrical, the
United States has to balance its foreign policy goals and objectives with the needs, goals, and
objectives of its various stakeholders. Such an approach to public diplomacy would harmonize
the advocacy of the sponsoring government’s policies with an accommodation of the wishes and
aspirations of the targeted public. In the case of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran, the different
segments of the Iranian public serve as strategic stakeholders of the United States. While the
Bush administration spent hundreds of millions of dollars to promote regime change, it ignored a
significant portion of Iran’s population (a majority according to the above polls) that opposes
U.S.-sponsored regime change. The Bush administration simply ignored this strategic
stakeholder by lumping together the entirety of the Iranian population into its own camp. This
refusal to consider the needs and aspirations of that segment of Iranian public who oppose
United States’ policy of regime change is indicative of the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public
diplomacy. Evidently, U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran was aimed at changing the attitudes
and behavior of the Iranian public but not those of the United States regarding Iran. It embodied
a top-down directive to change the social and political structure of the Iranian society.
Another indication of the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public diplomacy is the Bush
administration’s “hierarchical state-centric” approach to public diplomacy, as compared to a
“new public diplomacy” approach. In a “hierarchical state-centric model” of international
relations, “the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic system over which it presides act as
gatekeepers, monitoring interactions between domestic and international policy

189

environments.” 863 As was said in the previous chapter, for example, because of the sanctions
that are in place, American NGOs are legally constrained from transacting with the Iranian
society unless they obtain a permit from the U.S. Treasury Department. In addition to the
Treasury Department, NGOs had to pass through the Department of State’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative or the USAID grant application processes. This specific situation, allows
the U.S. government to act as a gatekeeper between American NGOs and the Iranian society.
The hierarchical state-centric approach to U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran stands in contrast to
the paradigm of new public diplomacy which is not a mere state activity. While NGOs were
used as links between the Bush administration and the Iranian society, they operated as grantees
of the U.S. government rather than independent actors. In addition, the Bush administration
excluded all existing Iranian NGOs on the grounds that they have been infiltrated by the Iranian
government. Knowing the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran, the
question remains whether the United States employed two-way communication in this regard.

Has Iran-Focused Public Diplomacy Employed Two-way Communication?
In the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations, as discussed in the theory
chapter, two-way communication is employed as a mechanism for achieving greater influence in
the target audience but no change in the organization. The organization actively employs social
science research (e.g., polls and focus groups) to obtain feedback from its target public in order
to fine-tune its informational campaign. Thus, for the U.S. public diplomacy to be qualified for
the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations, it should have mechanisms for gauging the
effectiveness of its public diplomacy outreach.
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The Broadcasting Board of Governors conducts annual measures of audience reach as
well as audience perception of program quality, reliability, and credibility. BBG is working to
add a new measure for gauging audiences’ enhanced understanding of American culture,
institutions, values, and policies as a result of listening to or viewing U.S. government
international media. All BBG broadcasting entities will be reviewed on this basis from 2008 to
2013. 864
In 2008, BBG spent $26 million for audience research. 865 The office of Audience
Development for U.S. International Broadcasting is responsible for carrying out audience
research to assist BBG in gauging the effectiveness of the broadcasting entities it supervises. In
2008, the program received a “performing – effective” rating for the PART (Program
Assessment Rating Tool), which is carried by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 866
The Audience Development program measures each language service’s audience reach, program
quality, and credibility.
Audience reach is a measure of language services’ audience size, calculated as the
percentage of the target audience that regularly listen/view the relevant broadcasting entities.
Regular audience is defined as the percentage of the adult (15+) population listening/viewing at
least once a week, as determined by an audience survey that has an adequately designed
sample. 867 According to the measure, 31.9 percent of all adult Iranians listen to Radio Farda or
view VOA Persian TV at least once a week. Audience reach in Afghanistan is said to be 75.7
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percent. 868 Audience reach for all broadcasting services in Arabic is reported to be 35.1 million
people, 25.7 million of whom are reported to view Alhurra TV. 869
The assessment results indicate that all VOA language programs received a rating of
good or better (at least 2.7 out of 4.0 possible points). The rating system is said to be an industry
standard used to assess the target audience’s evaluation of the quality of the media. A
monitoring panel of regular viewers/listeners from the target audience rates the program’s
“accuracy, reliability, authoritativeness, objectivity, comprehensiveness, and other variables
reflecting distinct statutory, policy, and mission mandates for the different stations.” 870 In
addition, internal and external reviewers assess the quality of “delivery systems (engineering and
transmission), marketing and program placement efforts, and other broadcasting support
functions.” 871 The resulting cumulative score is determinative of the overall Program Quality
Score, which ranges from 1-4. Ironically, the audience-rated quality score is not presented
separately. It appears that the addition of the quality of program delivery systems (which is
probably high) is used to boost the score for audience’s perception of program quality. Radio
Free Iraq has received a quality score of 2.9 (good), 872 and Afghan Radio Network has received a
quality score of 3.6 (good to excellent). 873
The credibility score is determined based on survey responses to questions about
“trustworthiness of news and information.” The questions are five-point likert scales with
options ranging from very trustworthy to very untrustworthy. The credibility index is the
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percentage of respondents answering very or somewhat trustworthy. 874 The credibility index for
Radio Sawa is reported to be 83 percent, and that of Alhurra TV is said to be 72 percent. 875
No scores for program quality or credibility are given for Radio Farda and VOA Persian
TV, which are directed to Iran. It is not clear whether this lack of information is due to
inadequate survey research in Iran, or rather the information is just not presented as is the case
with that of most other language services.
BBG received a “performing – effective” rating for broadcasting in Arabic, with an 84
percent score for program results and accountability.876 The agency received a “performing –
moderately effective” rating for its broadcasting to Near East Asia and South Asia (which
includes Iran), with a 67 percent score for program results and accountability. 877 BBG is
designing new assessment programs to gauge the impact of U.S. government broadcasting to
enhance audience understanding of United States culture, institutions, and policies. 878
During the last six years, the Washington-based InterMedia corporation has been the
recipient of BBG’s audience evaluation contract. According to its web site, the corporation
“carries out a combination of market, audience and social science evaluation and research in
some 60 countries annually,” 879 including in “difficult-to-access populations” such as those in
Iran. 880 The corporation has the capacity to do large-scale national surveys with up to 10,000
interviews.
InterMedia also conducts longitudinal studies gauging the effectiveness of the U.S.
Department of State Youth Exchange and Study Program (YES) “that brings approximately 600
874

———, "Detailed Information on the Audience Development for U.S. International Broadcasting Assessment."
———, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting in Arabic Assessment."
876
Ibid.
877
———, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting to near East Asia and South Asia Assessment."
878
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Broadcasting Board of Governors 2008-2013 Strategic Plan.
879
InterMedia, "About InterMedia Clients," http://www.intermedia.org/about_clients.php.
880
———, "About InterMedia Overview," http://www.intermedia.org/about_firm_overview.php.
875

193

students from across the Islamic world to the United States.” Using the indicators and
methodologies it has developed for this project, “including online surveying and focus groups,”
the corporation reports on the success of the YES program on a regular basis. 881 InterMedia was
founded in 1996, bringing together individuals who had previously worked in Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. 882
While this study finds that U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran has not been symmetrical,
the use of polling and focus groups for assessing the effectiveness of public diplomacy indicates
that it does fit with the two-way asymmetrical public relations model. This finding confirms the
study’s hypothesis that the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran do not employ the
two-way symmetrical model.
It may appear that a two-way symmetrical approach to public diplomacy is paradoxical
given the fact that public diplomacy, by its very nature, entails an advocacy of foreign policy. It
is indeed paradoxical to ask for symmetrical public diplomacy when the U.S. foreign policy
establishment for the most part is resistant to reconsider its aim of regime change to
accommodate the needs and aspirations of a large segment of the Iranian people. The emergence
of a symmetrical approach to Iran-focused public diplomacy is dependent on a change in the
mindset of U.S. foreign policy elites toward Iran. The Strategic Engagement and Fundamental
Change policy communities envision such a change in mindset so that the relationship between
the United States and Iran is based on mutual respect and reciprocal accommodation and not on
coercion, threats, and intimidation.
The findings of this dissertation predict that the Obama administration’s approach to
public diplomacy toward Iran will remain asymmetrical. This conclusion is based on the views
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expressed by the group of advisors guiding the Obama foreign policy. In an op-ed piece on
January 12, 2009, New York Times columnist Roger Cohen sarcastically points to the lack of
diversity of viewpoints in the Obama administration team of advisors. “The Obama team is tight
with information, but I’ve got the scoop on the senior advisors he’s gathered to push a new
Middle East policy as Gaza war rages: Shibley Telhami, Vali Nasr, Fawaz Gerges, Fouad
Moughrabi, and James Zogby,” Cohen writes. 883 “This group of distinguished Arab-American
and Iranian-American scholars, with wide regional experience, is intended to signal a U.S.
willingness to think anew about the Middle East, with greater cultural sensitivity to both sides,
and a keen eye on whether uncritical support for Israel has been helpful,” Cohen fantasizes.
In reality, as Cohen writes, the new Middle East policy team is anything but a departure
from the U.S. foreign policy establishment. “They include Dennis Ross (the veteran Clinton
administration Mideast peace envoy who may now extend his brief to Iran); James Steinberg (as
deputy secretary of state); Dan Kurtzer (the former U.S. ambassador to Israel); Dan Shapiro (a
longtime aide to Obama); and Martin Indyk (another former ambassador to Israel who is close to
the incoming secretary of state, Hillary Clinton).” 884 There is nothing wrong with a foreign
policy guided by a group of “smart, driven, liberal, Jewish (or half-Jewish) males; I’ve looked in
the mirror,” Cohen writes. 885 What is wrong with this setup is its failure “on the diversity front”
and “on the change-you-can-believe-in front.” 886 It is ironic to hope for success using the failed
approach of previous administrations.
As was mentioned in chapter 5, all of the seven Iran issue network members holding key
positions in the Obama administration believe in a hawkish engagement strategy with Iran. As
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members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community, these individuals recommend that the
United States should in the short term force Iran to change its foreign policy and give up its right
to have a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity. But more importantly, like the Bush administration,
these individuals agree that regime change remains the ultimate goal of the United States.
Such a perspective entails an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and
Iran, the country whose behavior is deemed contrary to American interests in the region. Unlike
the position of the Strategic Engagement policy community, the Hawkish Engagement
community is not concerned with cooperation with Iran. As such, harmonizing of interests is a
nonissue. Instead, the aim is to achieve U.S. objectives by forcing Iran to change through the use
of necessary sticks and carrots. Under this framework, the purpose of communication is not
cooperation and collaboration, as in symmetrical public relations; rather, it is the asymmetrical
goal of changing Iranian society and politics only.
A public diplomacy that is at the service of these foreign policy goals is unlikely to
balance these objectives with the interests of the various segments of the Iranian public who hold
views contrary to those of the United States. The unchanged substance of U.S. foreign policy
will inevitably exacerbate anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, in general, and in Iran, in
particular. This lack of reform when coupled with a rhetoric that promises change in the U.S.
approach is likely to prove counterproductive.
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APPENDIX A. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS
January 1883: S. G. W. Benjamin, the first American Ambassador to Iran meets with
Mozafaredin Shah Qajar in Tehran and delivers the letter of President Chester Alan
Arthur.
October 1888: Haj Hossain Nuri, the first Iranian Ambassador to the United States, meets with
President Grover Cleveland in Washington and delivers the letter of Mozafaredin Shah
Qajar.
August 1953: The CIA overthrows the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq by
covertly staging a coup and installing the Shah.
January 1976: President Gerald Ford permits the sale of nuclear technology to Iran.
January 16, 1979: The deposed Shah of Iran is forced to leave Iran for Egypt after his regime is
unable to contain widespread revolutionary demonstrations and strikes.
February 1, 1979: The leader of the Islamic Revolution Imam Ruhollah Khomeini returns from
15 years of exile.
October 22, 1979: The U.S. government allows the Shah to enter the United States despite
objections from Iran’s new revolutionary government.
November 4, 1979: Shah’s regime collapses.
November 4, 1979: Iranian university students seize 63 Americans at U.S. embassy in Tehran,
making their release conditional on U.S. return of the Shah to Iran to face trial.
November 14, 1979: President Carter orders the freeze of $12 billion of Iranian government
assets held in U.S. banks.
April 7, 1980: The United States cuts off diplomatic relations with Iran and starts economic
sanctions.
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January 19, 1981: United States and Iran sign the Algiers Accords, which obliges the United
States to transfer Iranian assets held in US banks back to Iran. The agreement also
requires the United States to pledge not to interfere in Iran’s affairs politically or
militarily.
January 20, 1981: Iran releases the imprisoned Americans 444 days after the U.S. embassy’s
seizure.
1985-1986: The Iran-Contra affair, in which the Reagan administration used the funds from the
sales of arms to Iran to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.
1987-1988: U.S. forces engage in a series of military encounters with Iranian forces. The
American forces carry strikes on Iranian Persian Gulf oil platforms.
July 1988: U.S. cruiser Vincennes shoots down an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf,
killing all 290 people on board. The U.S. government states the shooting was a mistake.
March 1995: The Clinton administration imposes oil and trade sanctions on Iran.
June 1996: The U.S. Congress passes the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which places a penalty for
any company that engages in oil and gas investment projects in Iran and Libya that equal
or exceed $40 million. 887
January 2002: In his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush places Iran, Iraq and
North Korea in an “axis of evil.”
December 2002: The U.S. government revives its allegations that Iran has a secret nuclear
weapons program. The allegation comes after the publication of satellite images of a
uranium enrichment plant under construction in the Iranian city of Natanz.
May 2003: Iran offers U.S. officials a proposal for comprehensive bilateral talks.
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Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., (June 18, 1996).
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February 2007: U.S. officials allege they have proof that Iran has provided Iraqi insurgents with
sophisticated weaponry which have been used to kill American soldiers. Iran rejects the
allegation.
May 2007: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, meets with his Iranian counterpart,
Hassan Kazemi Qomi, to discuss Iraq’s security. The meeting marks the first high-level
U.S.-Iran talks in almost 30 years.
November 2007: The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran did not, at the time,
have a nuclear weapons program. NIE claimed that Iran had stopped one such program
in 2003.
November 2008 - President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sends a letter to President Barack Obama
congratulating his election as U.S. president. President Obama offered to talk with Iran.
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF DATABASES
Database Name
Academic Search
Complete
CIAO (Columbia
International Affairs
Online)

Communication & Mass
Media Complete
Factiva
GuideStar
Humanities International
Complete
Index Islamicus

International Security &
Counter-Terrorism
Reference Center
LexisNexis Congressional

Middle Eastern & Central
Asian Studies Collection

Military & Government
Collection

Database
Provider
EBSCO

Database Provider’s Description of the
Database
A multi-disciplinary database, with more than
6,100 full-text periodicals, including more than
5,100 peer-reviewed journals.
Columbia
A database for theory and research in
University
international affairs. Includes working papers
Press
from university research institutes, occasional
papers series from NGOs, foundation-funded
research projects, and proceedings from
conferences.
EBSCO
A database with full-text of 350 journals in areas
related to communication and mass media.
Dow Jones
Provides full-text access to major national and
international newspapers.
Philanthropic A source of information about U.S. nonprofits,
Research,
with information on the programs and finances of
Inc.
more than 1.7 million IRS-recognized nonprofits.
EBSCO
Includes all data from Humanities International
Index (more than 2,100 journals and 2.47 million
records). The database includes full text for more
than 890 journals.
EBSCO
Indexes worldwide literature in European
languages on Islam, the Middle East and the
Muslim world. Includes a wide range of
periodicals and collective publications, as well as
monographs.
EBSCO
Includes hundreds of full text journals and
periodicals, hundreds of thousands of selected
articles, news feeds, reports, summaries, and
books that pertain to terrorism and security.
LexisNexis
Provides access to Congressional Indexes
produced by or pertaining to the United States
Congress. Provides full text for legislation and
public policy.
EBSCO
A bibliographic index of research, policy and
scholarly discourse on the countries and peoples
of the Middle East, Central Asia and North
Africa. This database contains more than 413,530
records.
EBSCO
Provides indexing and abstracts for over 500
(with full text for 400) military and general
interest publications.
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OCLC WorldCat

FirstSearch

Peace Research Abstracts

EBSCO

PolicyFile

ChadwyckHealey

Provides access to over 49 million bibliographic
records for books, audio-visual materials, maps,
etc.
Includes bibliographic records covering areas
related to peace research, including conflict
resolution and international affairs.
Is a resource for U.S. public policy research.
Users are able to access information from over
350 public policy think tanks, non-governmental
organizations, research institutes, university
centers, advocacy groups, and other entities.
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APPENDIX C. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IRANRELATED PROJECTS GRANTS 888
Grant Recipient
Abdorrahman
Boroumand
Foundation

American Center
for International
Labor Solidarity

Center for
International
Private Enterprise

Civic Education
and Human
Rights
Foundation for
Democracy in
Iran

888

Year and
Amount of the
Grant
2007 - $140,000
2006 - $120,000
2005 - $85,000
2004 - $50,000
2003 - $30,000
2002 - $25,000
2005 - $185,000

Highlights of the Programs as Provided by the
National Endowment for Democracy
To launch the Iran Human Rights Memorial web site,
develop an electronic library of human rights
documents in Farsi, conduct outreach and media
campaigns.

To support the emergence of a sustainable independent
labor movement. ACILS will develop and translate
labor education and worker rights resources into Farsi,
hold a strategic planning meeting to foster an
international network of Iranian labor leaders and to
develop a work plan, and develop advocacy manuals
addressing challenges to the rights of Iranian labor
activists. ACILS will also conduct an international
workshop for Iranian labor leaders to acquire skills and
benefit from the experiences of other trade unionists.
2006 - $156,548 To raise the capacity of Iranian businessmen and
2005 - $55,949 businesswomen to engage as private-sector actors and
2004 - $55,949 to expand the existing modest networks in Iran that can
promote market-oriented reform. CIPE will work to
initiate a series of workshops on entrepreneurship in
Iran. To inject the voice of business into the reform
debate in Iran. CIPE will translate four publications on
private sector development, corporate governance and
the linkages between democratic and private sector
development into Farsi. The publications will be
distributed through various networks of academics,
business people and the media in Iran and will be
posted in electronic format on Iranian websites.
2006 - $100,000 To train Iranian human rights defenders on human
rights monitoring, reporting, and fact finding.
1995 - $50,000
1996 - $25,000

The Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) received
Endowment support to document the human rights
situation inside Iran through first-hand monitoring,
which will include calling local Iranian news reports
that are not available in the West. FDI will engage
qualified reporters and other sources inside Iran. FDI

National Endowment for Democracy, "Democracy Projects Database."
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Institute of World
Affairs

International
Republican
Institute

Iran Teachers’
Association

National Iranian
American
Council

will publish this information in regular reports and
distribute them to the international media, other human
rights groups and policy makers. To inform the Iranian
public on their basic human and political rights, the
information will be aired through international
broadcast services such as the Voice of America and
the BBC, in both English and Farsi, as well as through
television networks. FDI also maintains an Internet
Web site that facilitates international dissemination of
its reports, including inside Iran.
2005 - $45,800 To start the debate for judicial reform through research,
training programs, and legal consultations focusing on
problematic issues of law and justice in Iran. IWA will
organize a conference and a series of discussion
seminars to discuss the relationship between Sharia and
Western concepts of the rule of law.
2005 - $110,000 To support reformist elements in Iran and attempt to
end their current isolation through a pilot project that
seeks to link Iranian political activists to democratic
reformers in other countries. The program will develop
an international support network for Iranian reformers
as well as strengthen their communications and
organizing capacity through the provision of skillsbuilding and increased access to information.
2003 - $25,000 To print and distribute hard copies of its quarterly
2002 - $25,000 journal, Mehregan, and strengthen its content, as well
2001 - $35,000 as continue to produce and distribute an electronic
1994 - $60,620 version.
1993 - $60,620
1992 - $60,620
1991 - $50,000
2006 - $107,000 To foster cooperation between Iranian NGOs and the
2005 - $64,000 international civil society community and to strengthen
2002 - $25,000 the institutional capacity of NGOs in Iran. NIAC will
conduct a three-week training program on project
design and grant writing for a group of 14 Iranian civil
society leaders. NIAC will assist the trainees in
designing a project to be implemented inside Iran and
developing grant proposals for their prospective
projects. To strengthen the capacity of civic
organizations in Iran, NIAC will hire a Farsi-English
speaking expert to advise local groups on project
development, proposal writing and foreign donor
relations. To design and implement a two-day media
training workshop in Iran for forty staff members from
five civic groups.

243

Vital Voices
Global
Partnership

2004 - $40,500

Vital Voices will conduct a leadership training-oftrainers seminar in Washington, DC for five emerging
women leaders. These women will form a core group
of trainers who in turn will train and support other
Iranian women.
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